第 296 期·中文精读

中期选举惨败、4 万亿美元 AI 抛售、数据中心遇冷:特朗普何去何从

Midterm Blood Bath, $4T AI Sell Off, Data Center Freeze, What’s Next for Trump

围绕中期选举失利与生活成本压力,讨论特朗普如何挽回支持率,以及数据中心遇冷、4万亿美元AI抛售和潜在AI禁令。

官方音频00:00 / --:--

本期章节点时间可跳到音频对应位置

  1. 0:00开场寒暄
  2. 3:37中期选举复盘:共和党何以遭遇世代性溃败?
  3. 32:26特朗普如何挽救其总统任期?
  4. 53:13市场反应:数据中心担忧、市值蒸发 4 万亿美元、AI 禁令可能性
  5. 1:24:21科学角:OpenAI 解决指数时间假说
中文精读由 AI 基于原始节目改写,非官方翻译,可能存在偏差或错误;观点归属与表述以原音频与官方文稿为准。说明

有一组数字放在一起看,很能说明这期播客为什么值得听:特朗普第二任期开局时净支持率是正5%,中期选举结束时是负28%,三十多个百分点的摆幅。同期失业率4.1%,GDP增速第三季度3.7%,就业报告强劲。经济数据不差,选举结果却是水门事件以来最惨的一次中期失利,民主党横扫参众两院,至少29个州长席位,得克萨斯、堪萨斯、爱荷华、南卡罗来纳这些几十年没蓝过的地方全蓝了。

四位主持人花了整整一期节目拆解这个反差,最后落到一个判断上:选民投的是对经济结构的不满,意识形态压根不在选票上。这个判断四个人不完全同意,分歧本身就是这期节目最有价值的部分。

先看结果:深红州翻蓝,共和党在每个选民群体里都丢了阵地

杰森·卡拉卡尼斯(Jason Calacanis)开场先把结果摆清楚。民主党拿下参众两院,参议院最终会是54、55或56席,取决于阿拉斯加和密西西比的计票;众议院至少250席,可能到260。州长层面至少赢下29个。

翻蓝的州名单更扎眼。得克萨斯、堪萨斯、爱荷华、南卡罗来纳,这几个州两年前特朗普还都赢了两个位数。和2024年相比,共和党在每一个选民群体里都丢了支持率,连白人男性这个最铁的盘子也没守住。

得州这场尤其出乎所有人意料。萨克斯(David Sacks)说自己压根没关注这场选战,因为没人觉得阿博特会输。结果吉娜·希诺霍萨(Gina Hinojosa)赢了,萨克斯事后去补看她的采访,发现她在《纽约时报》的访谈里被主持人反复往文化战争的话题上引,她直接说“我不参与你们的文化战争”,然后把话题拉回到经济民粹主义,最后落到数据中心上:数据中心让你们的电费涨了,用了你们的水,那帮寡头靠数据中心发财,你们在付账单。

我认为数据中心议题之所以引起共鸣,就是因为这个。人们确实对AI有焦虑,担心工作被取代,但我认为人们恨数据中心最大的原因是,他们觉得数据中心在推高自己的电费,寡头靠数据中心变富,而他们在付账。(萨克斯)

萨克斯的归因:这场战争,以及战争带来的通胀

萨克斯给的因果链非常具体。战前汽油大概3美元一加仑,开战后冲过4美元,柴油更贵。柴油贵,所有靠运输的商品都贵,化肥也贵。通胀从年初的2.4%回升到3.7%,美联储不但没降息,反而加了一次,房贷利率被推到7.5%左右。

他特意强调了一个时间点。2026年1月,也就是开战前,预测市场给共和党保住参议院的概率是70%,众议院被看作五五开。通胀2.4%,市场预期年内多次降息,GDP增速预期5%。

如果这场选举发生在1月,共和党会赢得相当漂亮。后来发生了什么?通胀从2.4%走到3.7%,没有降息,反而加息,房贷利率到7.5%。这一切喂养了关于“可负担性”的叙事。所以是战争,加上可负担性缺失的体感,制造了这场海啸。(萨克斯)

他拿了几张图来支撑。第一张是特朗普净支持率和汽油价格的对照,两条线几乎完全重合。第二张是2026年参议院归属的预测市场走势,整个第一年共和党都是大幅领先,解放日关税那一波在图上连个波动都没有,真正的拐点出现在2026年3月,而战争始于2月28日。第三张是出口民调:34%的选民说伊朗战争是“关键因素”,40%说是“主要因素”,加起来74%,这批人绝大多数投了蓝。

萨克斯也承认自己判断错了。他当时的理由是:过去几次选举民调都错了,特朗普总能翻盘;而且经济数据其实挺好。他以为会是一场“红色细雨”,不是红色浪潮。结果错了。

公众的情绪相当暴躁。经济实际上好不好不重要,人们主观感受到的好不好才重要。特朗普第一年实际税后家庭收入增长了3.1%,这是实打实的成绩。但过去六个月的通胀开始侵蚀它。只要通胀跑得比工资快,你的实际购买力就在缩水。(萨克斯)

他还补了一个容易被忽略的因素:战争撕裂了共和党自己的联盟。塔克·卡尔森、乔·罗根、西奥·冯、梅根·凯利,这一整批播客圈的人流失了。萨克斯的原话是,主流媒体永远不会给共和党公平的对待,所以另类媒体就是共和党唯一的媒体基础设施,失去他们等于失去整个传声筒。年轻男性的投票倾向相对2024年翻转了36个百分点。

查马斯的认错:我把这件事完全看错了

查马斯·帕里哈皮蒂亚(Chamath Palihapitiya)在直播当晚就说过自己有盲点,这期节目他把这套反思讲完整了。

我完全看错了。像大多数人的盲点一样,我只能代表我自己说话,我的盲点就是透过自己的亲身经历、非常狭隘地从我自己的最大利益出发去看问题。脱离文化战争对我有利,但我以为这对所有人都有利。这件事不在选票上。(查马斯)

他给出的核心判断是:2020年之后,美国政治已经越过了意识形态阶段。选票跟着当下最紧迫的问题走。拜登大胜,然后特朗普大胜,然后民主党在中期选举大胜,同一批中间选民在三次选举里连续倒向三个方向。

他用了三张图来论证“意识形态不重要”。

第一张是政治献金。所有砸进得州的钱、砸进俄亥俄参议院选战的钱,全部打了水漂。查马斯的说法是,如果你反着押那些没钱的候选人,你几乎全对。钱跟着意识形态走,钱没起作用,说明意识形态在大规模选举里的权重被严重高估了。

第二张是杰利蝾螈(gerrymandering)。共和党重新划分了15个选区想把这些席位锁死,结果民主党赢了其中11个,共和党只赢1个。意识形态驱动的选区操弄,同样彻底失败。

第三张是当选的人。他说这批人没在台上讲共产主义,而是非常窄地聚焦在一件事上:可负担性,以及美国经济还能不能正常运转。这批人同时吸引了民主党和共和党的选民,先支持拜登,再压倒性支持特朗普,然后压倒性转向民主党。

我不认为伊朗真的起了多大作用,我不认为以色列起了多大作用,我不认为AI起了多大作用。这是美国社会在要求对经济运行的基本原则做一次重置。(查马斯)

他的解释框架是资产所有者和工薪阶层的分裂。零利率时代,资产所有者用极便宜的资本建业务;高利率时代,资产所有者有定价权。有关税没关税、有补贴没补贴,怎么变这批人都在积累资产。但工薪阶层这一侧,美国经济支撑他们向上走的结构能力已经坏了。

他给下一届大选的判断很直接:不管民主党还是共和党,谁能拿出经济民粹主义纲领,谁就能拿下2028。他开出的政策清单包括:堵住各种税收漏洞、取消联邦对贷款的隐性担保、免除学生债务、把某个收入线以下(他倾向12.5万美元)的联邦税归零。

我的预测跟谁赢无关,重点是他们会非常剧烈地来回摆。因为如果你在台上却什么都不做,选民就会投掉你。现在民主党有个很有意思的挑战:你在两院都占多数,你是真的去立法实现经济公平,还是把时间花在弹劾特朗普上?如果你选后者,而共和党那边推出一个拥抱经济民粹主义的人,你就会像这次共和党一样输掉。(查马斯)

弗里德伯格的另一条线:DOGE 结束那天,游戏就结束了

弗里德伯格(David Friedberg)不同意把这归因于社会主义思潮。他翻出自己在2024年大选后那期预测节目上的片段,当时他说:这次选举被解读为对社会主义的否决,但他认为2025年美国会看到社会主义运动的戏剧性上升。一年后他补了一句:这个判断第一年是对的。

他的因果链落在政府支出上。疫情期间美国政府支出翻倍,一切东西都通胀,包括资产。资产所有者受益,靠工资吃饭的人受损。所以他反对把“人们选择社会主义”当成意识形态选择,他的说法是:社会主义式的结果,是人们为了压生活成本而支持的政策自然导向的终点,跟意识形态选择没关系。

他把关键节点定在2025年6月5日,马斯克离开政府效率部(DOGE)那一天。

2025年3月我们去华盛顿,见了埃隆,聊了DOGE。他当时很挣扎,不只是内部,还有国会和公众舆论。那次我也见了好几位共和党、民主党议员,他们根本不在乎提高政府支出效率,根本不在乎政府支出占GDP的比例。那不是优先事项。6月5日埃隆离开,DOGE就结束了。我当天发推说:中国刚刚赢了。(弗里德伯格)

他补充说,2025年7月那个“大而美法案”确实砍了一些福利支出,但政府的基本开支一分没减,仍然是7万亿美元的年度预算,2万亿美元的年度赤字。

另一条线是AI的舆情。他引了一份盖洛普的跨国调查:对中国AI最乐观的是中国,93%的受访者认为AI会帮助本国人民、会让日常生活变好(这份调查在中国怎么做出来的可以存疑,但数字在那里);美国排倒数第四,36%的美国人持这种看法,比阿富汗还差,只比马拉维和孟加拉略好。

如果我自己没有变好,而别人在变好,因为“经济在增长”、“股市在涨”,那增长到底进了谁的口袋?我没拿到。AI那帮人拿到了,科技寡头拿到了。这条攻击线为什么这么好用,原因就在这儿。(弗里德伯格)

这里四个人出现了明确分歧。萨克斯坚持认为核心是可负担性,且1月的经济数据说明这个问题本来是可控的,只要结束战争就能修复。查马斯认为问题深得多,是结构性的,换个总统也修不好,除非重写经济规则。弗里德伯格站在查马斯这一侧,但把根源更精确地指向财政支出。杰森两边都不完全站,他认为特朗普的执行混乱(关税、ICE执法、爱泼斯坦文件)是把本来可以守住的阵地一步步丢掉的直接原因。

特朗普剩下两年能做什么:三个人的三套方案

杰森抛出的问题是:还有没有救?萨克斯的回答最干脆。

结束战争。这是我的第一、第二和第三优先事项。(萨克斯)

他给了具体机制。选举日当天布伦特原油就跌了10%,没有任何实质性地缘变化,只是市场开始给“战争可能早点结束”定价。如果战争结束,布伦特从110美元回到70美元,汽油跌、柴油跌、食品跌,然后强劲的GDP和就业数据重新成为焦点,特朗普的支持率可能回到40多。

他举了三个历史案例。1994年克林顿丢了众议院,1996年照样连任;2010年奥巴马丢了7个参议院席位、63个众议院席位,2012年照样连任。反例是2006年的布什,伊拉克战争拖累中期选举,选后选择增兵而不是转向,2008年共和党再输一次。

现在有很多人,基本上是新保守派,在劝总统搞某种增兵,搞某种加倍下注,打某个目标。我认为如果你这么做,你基本上就是在重演2006到2008那套剧本。如果你转向、现在撤出来,接下来两年会相当成功。(萨克斯)

杰森给的是另一套:交易模式。他承认自己不喜欢赦免权,但既然它是制度的一部分、两党都在用、每届政府都用得越来越狠,那特朗普就该这周一次性把家人、自己、整个政府的人都赦免了,把民主党未来无穷无尽的调查这张牌从桌上拿走,然后转身谈交易。他列了五件事:资本利得税改革(1000万美元以上的保证金贷款按资本利得税率的一半征税,还贷时抵扣,卖股时补缴)、医保、最低时薪分四年推到15美元、禁止在任官员炒股和与外国做生意、以及一套鼓励建新房的住房方案。

如果他在这五件事里解决两三件,我认为就足以救回他的总统任期。当然,就像萨克斯说的,他必须结束战争。但怎么结束都行,甚至民主党可以逼他结束,那样他还能说“是民主党逼我的”,这给了他一座金桥下台。(杰森)

查马斯的角度更长远。他提醒不要把孩子跟洗澡水一起倒掉:里根的历史地位随着时间推移反而越来越高,因为结构性改革的效果离得越远看得越清楚。他认为边境关闭这件事无论民主党愿不愿意承认,都是经济民粹主义者必须理解的:你要争取的选民基础想要更大的一块饼,把饼分给越境进来的人在数学上就是坏决策。关税如果真能带动制造业回流,十年后回头看也可能是正资产。

他应该想办法支持自己议程里能长久的那部分。比如用边境关闭去换取一些经济上的让步,民主党想要更高的最低工资,那就给他们。更简单的做法是把12.5万美元以下的联邦税直接归零,这对财政收入来说根本不是个事儿。这样,2028年不管谁上台,那个经济民粹主义的总统都得感谢特朗普,因为选票是这么来的。(查马斯)

四万亿美元蒸发:数据中心成了新的政治图腾

节目下半场转到市场。这周英伟达、SpaceX、特斯拉、AMD、美光全线大跌,按金额计蒸发了接近4万亿美元市值,是美股历史上单日美元损失最大的一天,不看百分比。连锁反应很快。Anthropic的IPO蒙上阴影,OpenAI今年上市的概率在Polymarket上从选前的95%掉到71%。《华尔街日报》当天的报道说估值折扣可能已经 baked in,原本1.5到2万亿美元的区间,可能变成1万亿出头甚至更低,而此前加文·贝克(Gavin Baker)在这档节目上说过会走到3到4万亿。

杰森把问题问得很直接:数据中心到底还建不建?如果民主党真的给AI泡沫放冷气、拖慢数据中心,经济会受不了,这对他们是最好的选择吗,还是说这只是在为本地社区争取更好条件的谈判姿态?

查马斯放了一段视频作为回答。SpaceX团队去亚利桑那州科奇斯县(Cochise County)宣讲一个6吉瓦数据中心的方案,两位员工(他点名说叫Riley和Katie)非常认真地在讲:电费降40%、不用水、房产税降20%、产生的税收足够偿还县里的债券。台下在尖叫。

我的结论是,杰森,这是情绪议题,跟事实没什么关系,就像弗里德伯格说的。它代表着寡头,代表着美国经济里那道裂缝。但它同时也说明,之前那些交易确实有点过于慷慨了。最强大的七八家公司,真的需要税收减免才愿意投300亿、500亿、800亿美元,然后产生3000亿、4000亿、5000亿美元的收入吗?大概不需要。(查马斯)

他推演的结果是:新州长们会说这些条件免谈,要先看到可直接衡量的经济影响。结果就是数据中心放缓,而放缓的赢家是超大规模厂商(hyperscalers):亚马逊、Meta、微软、谷歌、SpaceX,因为他们手里有现成产能;输家是新云厂商(neo clouds),因为他们是租客;对前沿模型公司也很糟,因为他们最缺产能。

超大规模厂商现在有了一个有趣的博弈。第一条路是维持现状,继续把算力租给大企业、租给新云、租给模型公司。第二条路是少有人走的那条:把所有增量算力都留给自己的产品。谷歌有一大堆产能在上线,它可以说,这些全给Gemini。这会让Gemini在质量上追上来。为什么?因为能产生算力的资产被约束了,可供领先公司使用的面变小了,它们就得付更高的价,用户体验会退化,其他产品就有时间追赶。(查马斯)

他还有第三条“疯狂路径”,而且认为整场博弈可能就系在这一件事上:SpaceX和Anthropic的算力协议有90天双向解约条款。如果SpaceX解约,它可以把这批算力按现货价重新定价,现货价大概是市场价的两倍,甚至三倍。Anthropic没有选择,只能立刻接受更高的价格。这会向所有超大规模厂商证明,它们离最优经济产出还差得很远,也会逼着新云厂商把手里的钱全部砸出去抢算力,因为另一条路是确定的破产。

所以所有博弈论,杰森,字面上就落在这一笔交易上,落在埃隆是否决定撕毁它。如果他撕了,小心。(查马斯)

杰森不同意,他认为马斯克和Anthropic团队关系很好,而且马斯克跟奥特曼之间的芥蒂会影响判断,短期最优不代表会被执行。查马斯澄清说自己的意思跟“扔到现货市场”有差别:当现货价格涨到某个阈值,现有合同就变成了负EV,任何理性的合约方都应该在90天窗口内把合同重定价到正EV区间。这跟感情无关,底层就是一张电子表格。

州长们踩刹车,美国会不会变成 token 净进口国

杰森抛了一个更宏观的推演。如果州长们真的把超大规模厂商和新云卡死,这些数据中心可以去加拿大、墨西哥、新加坡、马来西亚,战争结束后中东也可以。那么下一代大模型就不在美国土地上训练了。那些300亿、400亿美元的建设工作、那些税收,会落到马来西亚(谷歌已经在那儿建了巨大的数据中心)。数据全球跑得很快,不需要待在美国。这些州长会补上一堂全球化的课。

弗里德伯格把话接过去,说他们可能连AI的使用都禁。

你越往左走,政客在这件事上喊得越响。没人看到AI的“好处”,他们不想看到AI被开发、被部署、被使用。这是现在普遍的表述。他们要禁开发、禁部署、禁数据中心、禁科技公司做模型、禁企业用模型。(弗里德伯格)

杰森给了个概率:1%。弗里德伯格说远高于10%。萨克斯给的判断是:民主党在下一届国会100%会推动AI立法,问题只是长什么样。他的版本是:成立一个联邦AI部门,所有前沿模型必须经它审查批准才能发布,审查标准里会包括“虚假信息”、“错误信息”、“异见思想”,也就是把疫情期间对社交媒体施压那套流程,用超级智能重演一遍,威力大得多。

查马斯不完全同意,他认为真正会立出来的法,是把数据中心和AI工厂一并纳入监管,结果是供给端被严重约束,而真正控制局面的是Meta、亚马逊、谷歌、微软、SpaceX这几家。他的证据是:谷歌当天刚接管了一个Crusoe的数据中心,把租客清走了。原因很简单,谷歌手里有最关键的要素:电。

基础模型公司远没有到“上岸”的地步。什么叫上岸?有堡垒级的资产负债表、有盈利的商业模式、有对自己野心来说近乎无限的算力。现在他们是租客。而数据中心里的租客阶层,从周二开始,风险非常高。(查马斯)

萨克斯描述了另一层博弈,他称之为“交换条件”:政府拿到更多权力,两家封闭模型公司拿到监管护城河。民主党国会说这东西不安全必须管,你觉得那两家公司会说“不,你不能管”吗?他们会说“好,我们一起把这事做好”。

弗里德伯格把这层推到哲学层面。他说模型本质上就是一堆软件,就是代码,禁止运行某段代码涉及言论自由。而且现有法律已经覆盖了后果:代码动了你银行账户里的钱,那是犯罪;代码造了非法武器,那是重罪。所以他判断,监管冲动的真正来源在权力,跟危害关系不大。

这事儿跟第二修正案是同一个问题。第二修正案的现代版本讨论的是“谁拥有这项技术”,枪支弹药已经退到次要位置。如果国家有这项技术,公民和企业没有,那国家就拥有至高无上的权力。美国建国原则的核心就是对这种权力始终保持制衡。如果AI最终全归国家、别人都没有,那就不再有任何制衡。(弗里德伯格)

杰森笑他是“毁灭博士”式的末日想象,说自己只给1%的概率,但很高兴世界上有弗里德伯格这样的人当护栏。查马斯则说这排不上优先级,选民不会为这件事激动,而且如果真立法搞出个寡头格局,反而会进一步固化经济权力,跟这批选民想要的正好相反。

萨克斯和查马斯最后在一个判断上会合了:2027年的资本开支还能撑住,因为已经拿到全部许可的项目会继续完工;2028年才是真正让人担心的一年。萨克斯的算式很直白:一个吉瓦级数据中心要500亿美元,没有人在不确定的环境下敢投这种钱,破土动工到一半被禁止令卡住、被工会罢工卡住、被社区组织卡住,是最糟糕的局面。而现在最大的几个数据中心州基本都换了届,新州长们表态要先有监管框架再发新许可。他还提醒一个技术细节:项目在建的时候未必拿齐了所有许可,空气质量许可这类往往是最后才拿的。

我的基准判断是,2027年fully permitted的项目会做完,仍然有可观的资本开支。但我对2028年很担心,我预计届时的项目储备要么关闭,要么大幅缩减,那会有很大的经济影响。而我认为民主党会用这件事去怪总统,尽管这完全是他们的责任。(萨克斯)

杰森补了一个他自己的计算。他所在的基金Launch一年投100家公司,20个人,每年在Grok、Claude这类订阅上花四五万美元,他估计产生的价值是200万美元,带来的增量收入是一百万美元上下,投入产出比15到20倍。他说全美企业里每天规律使用这套工具的只有10%到20%,还有5到10倍的人没开始用。等这批人用上agent,算力需求是现在的500到1000倍。所以他的预测是:离岸数据中心加上桌面本地模型,会是未来两年的趋势。他正在考虑给每个人配一台512K内存的Mac Studio,两万美元一台,相当于把40万美元的算力放到每个人桌上,先跑本地模型,跑不动再回落到云端,这样就不会被限流。

科学角落:OpenAI 那篇175页的论文,动摇了计算机科学27年的假设

节目最后,弗里德伯格讲了这期被四个人反复调侃但确实重要的科学新闻。

计算机科学最基础的问题是:一个问题能不能用计算机解出来?如果能,要多久?这决定了它实际上可不可算。能在多项式时间内解出来的叫P类问题,问题规模变大,耗时按规模平方或立方增长。另一类是NP问题,特点是验证答案很快,比如一个巨大的数独你解起来很慢,但检查一个填好的数独只要几秒。

计算机科学的核心悬案是:P等于NP吗?如果等,意味着任何能被快速验证的问题都能被快速求解,整个宇宙都是可计算的。

1999年有人提出了“指数时间假设”(Exponential Time Hypothesis),针对一类叫3SAT的问题,论证其求解时间随规模指数增长,也就是存在一整类问题永远无法在短时间内解出,因此P不等于NP。这个假设统治了27年。

OpenAI做的事情是证伪了它。一篇175页的论文,最后落在一个小公式上,这个公式证明3SAT这类问题可以在亚指数时间内解出,也就是不需要指数级的时间。这意味着P仍然可能等于NP,也就是理论上宇宙中每一个问题都可以用计算机解出来。(弗里德伯格)

论文还没经过第三方完整验证,方法非常新颖。更让人震动的是过程:整个证明从头到尾用了不到10天,有报道说实际只用了几个小时。一个卡了数学界和计算机科学界27年的问题。

大多数听众听着可能觉得晦涩,但它做了两件事。第一,它让“宇宙中一切都能被分析、理论上每个问题都能被计算机解决”这个想法继续成立。第二,OpenAI 能在几个小时内做出这种结果,而数学家和计算机科学家为它挣扎了27年,这个证明目前为止还站得住。计算机科学界所有人都被震到了。(弗里德伯格)

萨克斯从这个话题切回现实:AI超级智能会带来很多好处,恐惧可以理解,但未来未知,无法证伪。他更在意的是如果美国不建数据中心,中国会建,美国会付钱进口token,那会是很危险的局面。

给读者的几条可操作判断

  • 看美国政治,先看可负担性,再看意识形态。这期节目四个人吵了三小时,唯一没有分歧的一点是:钱在政治上没起作用,杰利蝾螈没起作用,起作用的是选民对自己钱包的体感。判断2028年谁赢,不要看候选人立场,看谁拿出了能让工薪阶层感知到收入改善的具体方案。
  • AI板块的短期风险出在电力许可,不在模型能力。4万亿美元的蒸发跟哪个模型退步了没关系,跟州长换届后新数据中心拿不到许可有关系。持有AI相关资产,需要把“地方政治对数据中心的态度”当成和财报同等级别的变量来跟踪。
  • 超大规模厂商和新云厂商的分化会加剧。供给受限时,手里有现成产能和电力的玩家变成造王者的角色,租算力做生意的玩家最先被挤掉。谷歌接管Crusoe数据中心是个信号,后续类似的租客被清退事件会不断出现,可以持续跟踪。
  • SpaceX和Anthropic那份90天双向解约条款,值得放在自己的推演模型里。查马斯认为这是整条AI算力博弈的胜负手。如果这个条款被行使,现价算力会跳涨,所有依赖外部算力的模型公司都要重新算账。条款结构、双方产能、现货价差都公开可查,可以自己动手算一遍。
  • 创业或做业务的人,现在该算的是本地算力的账。杰森所在基金的实测数据:一年四五万美元的AI订阅,换来约两百万美元价值。同时他在准备给每人配两万美元的Mac Studio跑本地模型。如果你对云端限流敏感,本地推理加云端回落的混合架构,现在就该做技术验证。
  • 做长线投资的人,盯2028年的资本开支断崖。萨克斯的基准判断是2027年已获批项目会完工,2028年项目储备会关闭或大幅缩减。这个时间点和下一届大选重合,会是经济和选情的双重变量。
文稿来自 All-In 官网(allin.com)发布的官方 Transcript,说话人按官网分轨数据标注,个别段落可能张冠李戴。
Jason Calacanis (00:00:00): Alright, everybody. Welcome back to the number one podcast in the world, the All In podcast. And I'd like to start by saying that All In recognizes that we are on the sacred land in Austin, Texas of the Haito, the Comanche, the Kickapoo, and the Tonka Wata, and we appreciate all their sacrifices and bring us here. And we will be evaluating... I just talked to our HR department. We'll be evaluating a fifth bestie, Brad, two white, two male. So we're looking for alternative DEI fifth besties to include in the roundtable. David Sacks (00:00:35): Wow. Jason Calacanis (00:00:36): So some big changes coming to the David Sacks (00:00:38): DEI is back is what you're saying. Jason Calacanis (00:00:39): Is back. Sachs, what... Did you have anything for the docket this week? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:00:43): I have an announcement. Jason Calacanis (00:00:43): You have an announcement. Okay. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:00:45): I'm transitioning. Jason Calacanis (00:00:47): From a douchebag to an s. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:01:11): Sax, Jason Calacanis (00:01:12): where do you wanna start? You wanna start with... David Sacks (00:01:14): I think there's some really important news around SaaS out there. I mean, maybe Salesforce launch a couple of new features. Definitely top of docket type material. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:01:25): I'd like to start with Science David Sacks (00:01:26): Corner. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:01:28): Words nobody in our fan base have ever said. David Friedberg (00:01:31): I'm ready to go. You guys wanna talk about exponential time hypothesis? Think that's what the audience wants. Jason Calacanis (00:01:35): They want the the SAS update from SAS and the science update, and then we can get our market review and we'll wrap the show up. No. In all seriousness, there was an election this week. We had an amazing livestream over a million views so far. Crazy, Chamath. I don't know if you knew this, but 400,000 people tuned in live making us, I believe, the number one election night livestream. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:01:59): Not true. It was 500,000. And just to put it in perspective, the far right streamers got about 87,000. The far left streamers got 250,000. We got 500,000. Okay. Which was bigger than most cable as well. So we were the biggest and bigger than, I think, most, if not all cable as well. David Sacks (00:02:17): Apparently, America wants hot takes from tech bros. I don't Here we go. Who would have thought? Who would have thunk it? Jason Calacanis (00:02:24): And by the way, that was with only three of our all stars on the court. Sacks had a board meeting Thursday night and couldn't make it... Tuesday night. He was busy. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:02:31): Yeah. David Sacks (00:02:32): Was busy that night. I was I think I was passed out in a bar. Jason Calacanis (00:02:35): You passed out? Was treating the... Sax is the only guy who goes to the bar with his own bottle of tequila. He's like, can you put this behind the bar and serve it to me on $50 a glass? Special thanks to Ted Cruz, Rahm Emanuel, Shane Copeland of Polymarket. Man, did he have a great night. I think Polymarket nailed it, 99% of their prediction markets turned out to have it perfectly. The hilarious fifth bestie Tim Dillon, Tale of Lorenz based. Tale of Lorenz was fantastic and insightful. Brad Gerser did a solid job, brought some charts, and Ben Shapiro from the right. So it was a really great great panel. And today, we're gonna take a a pretty systematic approach to what happened this week. We're gonna start with a postmortem on the midterms. And then second, we're gonna talk about the second half of Trump's term the next two years. So I'm sure data centers will come up in our in our recap postmortem, etcetera. But we're gonna do a deep dive into the AI trade potentially cracking. So let's start with our postmortem on what just happened in the midterms. Obviously, the Democrats sweeped both chambers of Congress and they won at least 29 governor races. Dems will wind up with 54, 55, or 56 seats depending on how Alaska and Mississippi wind up. They have a lot of votes still coming in in the house. Dems will have at least 250 seats, maybe even 260. The bigger story is where the Republicans lost deeply red states that haven't gone blue in generations went blue, including the great state of Texas. Please don't blame me. I've only been here for three years, and you might be surprised that what my voting ticket looked like. Kansas, Iowa, South Carolina for the first time in decades, Trump won all of those states by double digits just two years ago. Compared to 2024, the GOP lost ground in every voter group, even white men. So let's go around the horn, Saxe. People wanna hear from you most of all, I guess. So what went wrong here? What are the lessons the Republican Party can learn? Jason Calacanis (00:04:48): And and what did the Democrats do right in the last eighteen months leading up to the midterms? David Sacks (00:04:53): This was a shalking. This was a blowout. It was, I believe, the biggest midterm loss since the Watergate midterm loss. So this was obviously a big defeat for the Republicans. There's no sugarcoating it. What's the reason for that? I believe the vice president, J. D. Vance, explained it very well. It was this war. And I... The only thing I would add to that is it was this war and the economic consequences that follow from the war. So what am I talking about? Price of gas, it was around $3 before the war went over 4 and higher, price of diesel even higher and then that factors into the cost of food, all the goods that have to be transported, also fertilizer costs went up. And so you saw the inflation rate at the beginning of the year back in January before the war, it was down to 2.4%. We finally had that problem licked just about. Remember, was 9% under Biden And in the first year of the Trump administration, we brought it down to 2.4. The market was expecting multiple rate cuts this year. And we were forecasting 5% GDP growth, which I don't think was too overly ebullient based on what we were seeing at that time combined with the expectation of rate cuts. Jason Calacanis (00:06:05): Aggressive but not unbelievable. David Sacks (00:06:07): Unrealistic. Jason Calacanis (00:06:07): Not unrealistic. David Sacks (00:06:08): Yes. Okay. And by the way, the prediction markets back in January were showing a 70% chance of Republicans holding the Senate, and then the House was perceived to be a toss-up. I think that if this election had happened back in January, it would have been a pretty successful one for the Republicans. What happened since then? Well, you got inflation going from 2.4 to 3.7%. Again, mostly driven by the cost of gas and diesel and all these other products where you have to pay a higher cost of transportation. And you end up not having any rate cuts, you end up getting a rate hike that brought the cost of mortgages to roughly seven and a half percent. And that overall fed this narrative around affordability. So it's the war plus the perception of the lack of affordability is what really created this tidal wave. Now, you know, I I have to admit, I thought that... I mean, look, I didn't think this would be a great election for Republicans, but I thought that it wouldn't be this bad. I I I was wrong about You said it was a spritz. It would be a spritz. Jason Calacanis (00:07:13): I thought David Sacks (00:07:14): it could be a spritz. That was based on a couple of things. Number one is that the last few elections, the pollsters have all been wrong and and Trump has always managed to defy the odds and I thought that this polling data must fall into that pattern. And then the second thing is that the economy is not that bad. I mean, in fact, it's quite good. So just today, we had a new jobs report. It was a very robust jobs report. The number of new jobs created is being revised up. You've got unemployment tick down to almost record low, 4.1%. You've got still pretty healthy GDP growth. In the first half of the year, it was around 2.1 to 2.5%. And then third quarter, the tracking by GDP now is 3.7%. So I thought given the fact that you got great employment, you got solid GDP growth, I thought the fact that inflation was too high would not result in this type of tidal wave. I thought it'd be more like the Biden midterms where he had extremely high inflation, but the economy itself was still pretty decent and it ended up being more of a red spritz as opposed to a red wave. So that was my pattern recognition. It was wrong and I think one of the reasons why it was wrong here is because I think the public is in a pretty ordinary mood. They're very concerned about affordability. It doesn't matter how good the economy actually is, it matters how good people perceive it to be for them. And in the first year of the Trump administration, we made enormous progress in delivering real post tax household income. It rose by like 3.1%. But because of the inflation numbers over the last six months, you're starting to chip away at that, right? Because again, as long as inflation is growing faster than your wages, you're losing purchasing power in real terms. I think the electorate is getting ornery about that. And just one other thing I wanna say about it, which is there's one other piece of why the war I think was so bad, which is it fractured the Republican coalition and the Republican base. J. David Sacks (00:09:23): Cal, you've pointed this out. We lost all the podcast bros. I mean, obviously, was Tucker Carlson and Joe Rogan and Theo Vaughn and and that whole set Jason Calacanis (00:09:31): Megan to David Sacks (00:09:32): Millenn. Megan Kelly. So, you know, a house divided against itself cannot stand. I mean, we lost a huge part of our base. And I would say that the Republicans in particular are dependent on the podcast circuit. Let's call it alternative media. Why? Because the mainstream media hates us. Legacy media hates us. They will never give us their percent left. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:09:52): So it is Yeah. What it David Sacks (00:09:54): And I think one of the reasons why Trump produced such a resounding victory in 2024 is he appealed to that whole podcasting circuit. And and frankly, we should have done a better job giving them all front row seats in the White House press room. We should have stayed connected to all of all of them because they are our media. By the way, they don't, you know, they don't work for us. They're willing to defect, obviously. Jason Calacanis (00:10:15): They have their own opinions. David Sacks (00:10:16): They have their own opinions, but we have to pay attention. I think our side has to pay a lot of attention to them because without them, we don't have any media that supports us. So I think that losing them was a big deal. It fueled Yeah. The sense. And I think that a lot of those people showed up and then did a protest vote. Cause they wanted to send the message that they want out of this war. Jason Calacanis (00:10:39): Friedberg, just a couple of quotes for you to react to. Ted Cruz called it a Watergate level repudiation. Shammoth DeSantis said, quote, close to an extinction level event for the current GOP. And in a very long expos that JD Vance did, that was pretty surprising for everybody that there's some reporting. It was approved, maybe not approved. We'll we'll get all that out later. But what's important is what he said. He's in line with USACS. The Iran war was the driving force here in the loss and that the GOP has to rebuild trust with voters on four axes, ending the war, focus on cost of living, putting America first, and maybe a little controversially, change our relationship with Israel. What are your thoughts on JD's post and the other reactions, and just why did this turn out to be a tsunami? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:11:34): Don't know if it's as much of a David Friedberg (00:11:36): positioning and marketing issue as it was sort of fundamental. I'll go back to the clip from the prediction show right after Trump was elected. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:11:48): Okay. Can we pull that up, Nick? I think that the the party line David Friedberg (00:11:51): is that socialism was defeated in this election cycle and that there was a resounding kind of vote from the American populace against socialism. And I actually think my my contrarian belief is that we'll see a rise, a dramatic rise in socialist movements in 2025 in The United States. Jason Calacanis (00:12:12): Okay. David Friedberg (00:12:12): And I think that we are gonna see, as Gavin pointed out, an acceleration of progress. We're gonna see an unleashing of, economic growth because of deregulation and AI. But I do think that some industries and some companies are gonna be huge winners and some companies are gonna be huge losers. There's gonna be some parts of the economy that are gonna be big winners and some parts of the economy that are gonna be big losers. So I just wanted to Jason Calacanis (00:12:34): know nailed it there, Freiberg. That was, very accurate for the first year of the presidency. David Friedberg (00:12:38): And so if you just zoom out a little bit, the macro condition was there was a moment after the election when when there was this idea of Doge, this idea that government spending would be reduced, which I believe fundamentally would have affected the cost of living. And we can argue about that. People disagree. They wash that point away. I do think it is the fundamental driver on the cost of living is government spending. The more the government spends, the more expensive things get. I believe that. And we can go through the analysis on what happened in France. You know, government spending as a percent of GDP is one metric. How many people are employed or depend on government checks is another metric. But as the government's involved in more of the economy, things get more expensive. So when Doge was coming around, the idea of Doge, the idea of government efficiency, the idea of making sure that every dollar spent by the government has a positive ROI for the people was a great idea. We visited DC in March 2025 and we visited Elon and we talked about Doge and he was struggling. It was pretty clear he was struggling, not just internally, but with congress and with the public perception of what was being done there. And I came away from that visit in March 2025 where I also met with multiple members of congress on that visit, republicans and democrats who did not give a shit about improving government spending efficiency, did not care about the total government spending as a percent of GDP. It was not a priority. And on 06/05/2025, Elon left and it was the end of Doge. The idea that Doge was gonna continue was over. And I said China just won because to me at that moment, the day that that this ended, that this administration ended that effort, is the day that it was clear that we were going to have a runaway cost of living and a challenge for progress for the majority of Americans, and the end result of that is voting in more of these kind of socialist principles, socialist policies, socialist politicians. So for me, my tweet on June 5 was China has just won... David Friedberg (00:14:35): Was the day that it was announced that Doge was basically coming to an end. And then the one big beautiful bill passed in July 2025, which had some entitlement cost reductions, but all of the fundamental spending of the government has not been reduced. And we're still running a $7,000,000,000,000 a year government budget with a 2,000,000,000,002 trillion dollar a year deficit. So I don't think congress was ever on board. It is a structural fundamental problem, and no one's on board with it. And I think that was key to what happened here. For the majority of Americans, they don't feel like they're getting ahead. They don't feel like they can afford things. They don't feel like healthcare is accessible and they are struggling and it wasn't addressed. My view was it wasn't addressed in the way it should be, and we can all disagree on policy matters, but that's my view. And as a result, people still felt that way, and that's what drove the vote. But I do think on AI, it's this idea of this oligarchy. If I'm not getting ahead, someone else is because, quote, the economy is growing, quote, the stock market is growing. Who is getting all of that growth? Because I'm not getting it. The AI guys are, the tech oligarchs are, and so on. And I think that that's why AI was poised for this. But I do think that there was some external influence that happened on AI, and I'll pull up this chart here real quick, which I shared around on the group chat yesterday, which is an incredible Gallup study that shows AI optimism and pessimism in countries around the world. The most optimistic country for AI is China. 93% of Chinese citizens think AI will mostly help people in the country, and 93% of people think AI will make their daily lives better in China. And we can believe or not believe how Gallup does their surveys in China. The US is fourth last. We are worse than Afghanistan, and we're just slightly better than Malawi and Bangladesh. We're fourth on the list of countries at 36% of Americans believing that. And so I think that in addition to the priming of the pump, which is if I'm not getting ahead, someone's getting ahead and the AI guys, because we create the AI in this country, are getting ahead, made it really easy to attack with this oligarch narrative that there is a group of people that are benefiting and making a lot of money, and then there's a large percentage of people that aren't. David Friedberg (00:16:45): And so I think it's pretty clear that this this vector was a really effective one. Whether it persists or not is TBD, and I think we should talk a little bit about what's next later in the show because I do think AI is gonna play a major role in how the politics are gonna play out over the next year. Jason Calacanis (00:17:01): That's two incredibly concise and candid recaps of what happened there, Chamath and just as a side programming note, great job on Rick Rubin's podcast this week. If you haven't checked that out, Chamath was on Rick Rubin and it was awesome. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:17:14): Thank you. Jason Calacanis (00:17:15): Chamath, did you sit barefoot in his backyard with him, Chamath? Yeah. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:17:18): Yeah. I mean, by the way, when you go to Rick Rubin's recording studio, he walks you around and he's like, oh, Chamath, here's Bob Dylan's old touring van. That's where we recorded Adele's album. And then he's like, this is where Kanye and I laid down this album, and then here's where Jay Z and I... I mean, it is the craziest place, but it puts you in a totally centered state of mind, I gotta say. Yeah. And we sat around in his studio barefoot, sitting across each other just talking, and then they they put it out as a conversation. Jason Calacanis (00:17:51): Telling people this is where I introduce them off, Polly, hop Chamath Palihapitiya (00:17:53): a tee. Jason Calacanis (00:17:53): So greatest stock market highs of our lifetimes, lowest unemployment of our lifetimes, and we still had the tsunami. When you look back on it, Chamath, what do you think happened here? And you said you were... I mean, in a moment of great candor and self reflection during the livestream, you said, hey, listen. I had a blind spot here. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:18:16): I got it totally totally totally wrong. I got it totally wrong. Jason Calacanis (00:18:20): Okay. Unpack. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:18:22): I'll go through all the ways in which I got it wrong but I I just wanna first acknowledge what my blind spot is. Like most people's blind spots, but I can just speak for myself, is through the lens of my own lived experience and very narrowly what is in my best interests. And I think what we had was a move away from the culture wars. That was very much in my best interest. But I think it was in everybody else's best interests as well. I don't think that was on the ballot. But what I don't understood clearly enough, and I think that this election has made extremely clear, is that since COVID, we have moved past political ideology. And I wanna say this again. I do not think Democrats or Republicans matter. That is my real takeaway after this election. There is a central bloc of people that vote the prescient issues of our time. It was a gargantuan win for Biden, then it was a gargantuan win for Trump, and then it was a gargantuan win for the Democrats in these midterms. What are these people voting for? I think what they are shouting now, they were trying to signal and now they are shouting, is a broad based belief that the economy has completely decoupled from reality and is broken. The economic reality in America is broken. There is a small percentage of people, the four of us on this pod and all of our friends, who are the asset owners of America. And we have benefited in every weather condition. When rates were zero, we benefited because we were able to build our businesses with very cheap capital. When rates were high, we benefited because we had pricing power. And in every condition in between, whether there was tariffs, whether there were not tariffs, whether there were subsidies, whether there were not subsidies, we've all managed to continue to accumulate and grow assets. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:20:26): But we are few and far between. And then there's everybody else who are wage earners, and the structural capacity of the American economy to support and grow wage earners is broken. It's clear. Why do I say that? I do not think, and I disagree with Friedberg, I don't think this has anything to do with socialism. I don't think the far left one particularly more than they were expected. I don't think the far right one particularly more than was expected. This was a complete and total repudiation about the state of the economy. The economy is broken. I have a few charts to support my point of view. Number one, if this was ideological and if ideology mattered, money in politics would have had a more direct impact on the election. But when you look at the amount of money that was spent, all of this money was wasted. All the money that went into Texas was wasted. All the money that went into senate raises in Ohio was wasted. The better bet was to look who was being spent money on. If you had taken the opposite candidate who had no money, you would have been overwhelmingly more right. So money follows ideology. Money did not work in this election. Ergo, in my opinion, ideology did not matter that much. Next chart. Redistricting and gerrymandering also follows ideology. You try to set up the geographies in a way so that you could gain more seats. Look what happened. Of the 15 Republican seats that were redrawn so that they could capture all of them, Democrats won 11 of them. Republicans only won one. So, again, ideological gerrymandering also totally failed. So we have ideological spending in politics, failure. Ideological gerrymandering, failure. Next chart. And what you had were centrists, normal people. These are not people running around talking about communism. These were people that very narrowly focused on one thing and one thing only, which was affordability and the functioning of The United States economy. And they spoke to a large block of people that were both Democrats and Republicans. Initially supported Biden, overwhelmingly supported Trump, and then overwhelmingly went to the Democrats largely to vote the displeasure with the economy. That's it. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:23:01): I don't believe Iran really had much to do with it. I don't believe Israel had much to do with it. I don't believe AI had much to do with it. This is the American society asking for a reset on the economic principles on which we operate. And I think the obvious thing to do for the ambitious candidate on the left or the right is to take these three charts together and have one very precise takeaway, which is the economic populist platform will be the one that you can take to the presidency in '28. And the path is really straightforward. Because if you look at what happened to Harris and then you look at how aggressively all of these states moved towards what I think is economic centrism, what you have is for either side to not worry about whether you're a Democrat or whether you're a Republican. But if you embrace reasonable standards of economic fairness, you will win. So I got this wrong. I thought top down economics can still work. I thought that when you had asset owners building assets and investing in the economy, these things can get to everybody else. It's clearly not happening. It's not true. I have to update my priors. And my new framework is we need to figure out how to stop all the loopholes. We need to figure out how to do some of the things we've talked about before, stop the federal underwriting of loans, combine that with getting rid of student debt, take all federal taxes beneath a certain band, probably 150 k to zero. There's all kinds of things that can be done now to allow the wage earning class to feel more ownership of The United States economy. And until it happens, my prediction is not that Democrats or Republicans win, but they will violently keep going back and forth away from the status quo. Because if you are in power and you do nothing, they will vote against you. So now the Democrats have a really interesting challenge. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:25:10): What will you do with the majority in both houses? Are you actually gonna try to legislate economic fairness, or are you gonna spend your time distracted with impeaching Trump? Because then you will find yourself, if the Republican candidate embraces the economic populist platform, you'll find yourself losing the way the Republicans lost in the midterms. Jason Calacanis (00:25:32): Alright. Incredibly, well explained there, Chamath, and I agree. Now is not the time to dunk. Now is the time to dissect all this. And who could have ever seen this coming? Nick, roll the tape. This is why they will lose the midterms. The Democrats are gonna shellac the Republicans in the midterms. Trump sold people that prices would go down. We're back up to 3% inflation, folks. Not only is it not going down, it's going up. Trump has failed the middle class. That's the bottom line here. It's basically going to result in the Democrats doing a clean sweep in the midterms. Trump promised not to start a war, he did. He promised to solve inflation, he didn't. The end, you know... David Sacks (00:26:14): Well, stop clock is right twice a day, Jay Cal. Jason Calacanis (00:26:17): Absolutely. I... Look. I did cheat out but let me David Sacks (00:26:21): My take on that is that you were not right until the war began. That last clip that you did, you were vindicated. Right? Because it's it's the war and inflation. I mean, those are the two things, specifically the affordability problem that results when you have this inflation. Look, price of gas, everyone goes to the pump to fill up every week or two and the average household is paying $200 a month more in gas costs. Then they go to their grocery store and everything is much more expensive because the cost of agricultural products has gone way up and so on down the line. And at the end of the day, that's what matters to people is their pocketbook. It's like, do you have more purchasing power in real post tax, post inflation terms? That's how you measure if you're doing better off. And the Trump administration delivered that in the first year. We did. 3.1% increase in real household income. It was negative during the Biden years, and it was positive during Trump '45. What happened? The war begins. Price of gas and diesel and all the rest goes up, and purchasing power starts to go in reverse. And then on top of it, you lose the young males who are, again, the fans of all these podcasts. That's where they get their news from. Young males flip their vote by 36 points in this midterm relative to the twenty twenty four election. So again, in my view, it's very simple. It comes back to the war and its economic consequences. Now here's the good news is if we get out of the war, we can make rapid progress on this. All the other economic numbers are still good. Again, job growth, the job report today was great, economic growth is still good. There are lots of very positive economic numbers. The issue is fundamentally the price of oil, the price of gas, price of diesel, and the way these things flow through the economy. If the war has ended quickly, those prices will drop very quickly. Inflation will come back down. That will give the the Fed permission to cut rates, so mortgage costs come back down, and we can get back on track. Jason Calacanis (00:28:31): Sachs, you're right. The endless war, endless inflation were the straw in the back of the camel, but I think you're absolutely wrong when it comes to what happened previously. All of the polls were correct. Everybody on the right said the polls were wrong. All the prediction markets were correct, and everybody on the right was saying that those were wrong and those were being manipulated. And for a year plus on this podcast, and and I'd like to dissect this moment by moment, I had pointed out this chart, and this is the silver bulletin, which is just absolutely nailed this cycle. They did a great job. Nate Silver is phenomenal at what he does. And here if you look at it, it... It's really worth looking at, It's not just the war. Liberation Day, people forget the tariffs. Trump started the term at 5% plus net approval rating. He ended it at negative 28. This is like an over 30% swing. And Liberation Day, as I pointed out when it happened, was far too chaotic. And and I spoke to the CEO of Cuts Clothing, if you remember, we had this discussion on the podcast, and he's a Trump loyalist. And and people were arguing at that time, oh, these these tariffs are gonna be great. These are awesome and that no prices would be added, and the and the American public didn't have to pay for it, this was gonna balance the budget. Not only did it not balance Chamath Palihapitiya (00:29:53): the budget, it did spike inflation. Jason Calacanis (00:29:55): And president Trump should've just worked with congress. Remember, he had to go to the supreme court. He lost there. And this is a a leak in president Trump's game. Then over the summer, we had some pretty hot discussions here, about the ICE, enforcement. And I said, listen. You know, no Americans, including people I know in law enforcement, people I know who employ people who have been here for twenty years and, yes, who are illegal aliens technically. Nobody wants to see this. Nobody wants to see masked agents without body cameras beating people up and without their badges on. Right? That was a huge mistake, and he had a massive drop and then started to hit negative 20% net rating. This is all before the Iran war started. And if you look at the summer of twenty five with those ICE actions, it also had the Epstein files, and that's where you lost all the podcast bros. They did not want to have Trump renege on sending the the Epstein files out. And, of course, you you get all the way to the war and the endless allegations of grifting and the endless inflation, and that then just plummeted them from 20 to negative 23. That... That's a series of events that happen. And I just wanna state for the record here, I'm an independent. I I vote now 55% Democrat in my life, 45% Republican. When we started this podcast, it was probably seventy thirty. I have moved significantly towards the right because of the lunacy of the left. But what happened here is the Trump two point o agenda, I think, got abandoned, and there were tons of distraction. President Trump has the right ideas, but often his execution is extremely variable. And that's just a way of being very generous to say it's chaotic. And if you have that chaotic moment and then everything is about the data centers, everything's about our industry, everything's about helping us, and people laugh and mock at the idea of raising the minimum wage. Jason Calacanis (00:31:54): Tremav, you sort of pointed out here during your talk. The the k shape economy is kind of what you were invoking there. It doesn't feel fair to people, and I think you made a very accurate point that people are just swinging and just hoping somebody will care about the bottom half of non equity holders. That's exactly what it is. And Trump didn't make people feel like he was working for them. That's why they abandoned him. And the grifting allegations, whether they're true or not, is all gonna come out. But that's what we need to talk about, and it leads us to our second topic here. Our second topic, which is gonna be what the next twenty four months are gonna be about. So, Sacks, you wanted to get to this. Next eighteen, twenty four months, is there a path to redemption for president Trump? Is there a way to turn this presidency around and maybe save his legacy? David Sacks (00:32:48): Well, first of all, let me put up some charts here since you guys are doing the chart game and I didn't know we were gonna play the the chart game today. So, Nick, can can you Chamath Palihapitiya (00:32:56): Who's got David Sacks (00:32:56): the best charts? Yeah. Nick, can you throw up these charts? Okay. So so look, J. Cal, there's all sorts of issues out there that people are gonna point to. And I know you've got yours, and I'm not saying that every single issue has been executed perfectly. I do think that president Trump deserves enormous credit for completely sealing the border and solving that immigration issue Chamath Palihapitiya (00:33:18): Agree with that. David Sacks (00:33:19): Just as an example. But look, again, the question is why was this not a normal midterm result? Look at the Trump approval rating versus the price of gas. It maps perfectly. Okay? Trump net approval maps to the price of gas. Okay. Next chart. This was the prediction market for which party will win the senate in 2026. And what you see is that the Republicans were expected to win by a very large margin throughout the entire first year of the Trump presidency, all through the things you were talking about, J Cal. Okay? So the tariff rollout did not affect this whatsoever. That was the liberation day in April, not even a blip here. Okay? April 2025 wasn't a blip. And to be clear, not a blip on the senate balance. Jason Calacanis (00:34:12): Yeah. David Sacks (00:34:12): Yeah. Yes. But but I'm using this as proxy I showed. Right. I get it. But I'm using this as a proxy for what just happened where we lost what, like, eight or nine senate seats. Okay. Where does it start to change? March. March 2026. What happened? When did the war begin? 02/28/2026. Very clear. That's where everything starts to change here in terms of losing the senate. Next chart. Okay. Now, just ask voters. What'd you vote for? Why'd you vote? Question. Thinking about your vote for congress, how important to you was the war in Iran? Crucial, 34%. A major factor, 40%. So basically, 74% of the electorate said that it was either crucial or a major factor. And then of those, they broke massively for Blue. And this doesn't just include Democrats, obviously. It includes a lot of independents and it even includes, I would say, younger Republican voters. There's a huge divide in the party, I think, between you kinda got the Fox News group, it's kind of the 50 or even 60. They're I think still supportive of the war. But you look at the younger voters, young males, highly against this. Again, it ties back to the podcast bros. So again, there's abundant data to show what I've been saying. Now your question was, can Trump fix this? I think absolutely. Because the root of What's your all top year Jason Calacanis (00:35:46): three things he can do to fix it? David Sacks (00:35:48): Just get out of the war. Jason Calacanis (00:35:49): Okay. End the war. David Sacks (00:35:50): That's my number one, my number two, and my number three. Because what will what will happen? The price of Brent crude will drop precipitously. On the day of the election, the price of Brent crude dropped 10 percent. Is that because something changed in the straight of home moves? No. It's because the market started to price in the mere possibility that the war would end sooner. And we got a 10% cut in the price of Brent crude. It will go from... You know, it's been as high as $1.17. It'll go from $1.10 to 70. If this war ends, gas prices will drop, diesel will drop, the price of food will drop, and then the underlying strong economic growth, the GDP growth and the employment picture, which are still robust, will come into focus. And I think that Trump's popularity will rebound maybe back in the forties. Okay. So I... That's the thing we need to do. If we don't do that... Look. If this war hold on. Let stress this one point. If the war continues, the Republicans will continue to bleed popularity. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:36:56): I don't think this is the war in Iran. Meaning, it is in as much as it adds to a broken economy. Since COVID, the economy has been structurally broken. And I just think that there's a huge voting bloc that keeps swinging back and forth to either side asking them solve the problems and giving people mandates to solve a problem. That's why I think somebody needs to understand economic populism. Do you buy that argument or do you think that it's more narrowly just the war in Iran? David Sacks (00:37:25): I don't wanna make it, like, so overly abstract. Like, to me, the issue is affordability. Okay? And I think the electorate really cares about that. It's like the central pocketbook issue. I agree. And I think that both the economic data and the prediction markets showed that in January 2026, we were in pretty good shape on that issue. And since then, we went backwards. And I believe that we can get in good shape again without turning to socialism or completely restructuring the economy. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:37:54): Remember the twenty four election? I agree with you that economic affordability can be an abstract term, but I think that the voting electorate is smart enough to use a message as a vessel. And I remember in '24, the vessel, which again, I didn't hear it loud enough. But if I look back, and maybe I'm just imposing my narrative bias on it, was do you remember the whole controversy around the price of eggs and Trump hammered Biden and Harris on the price of eggs? Jason Calacanis (00:38:27): Over and over. Yeah. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:38:28): It wasn't the price of eggs. I mean, yes, it was, But it was a window into a broad problem and an idea. And I think gas is a problem, but I also think it is a window into a broad class of problems. And I think people focus their energy on a thing because it's easier to message around a thing repeatedly. No. You're right. But the broader basket problem data centers. David Sacks (00:38:56): That's what... Look, I I was listening to Gina Hinjosa. This is the new governor elect of Texas. So frankly, it's a race I wasn't even paying attention to because I don't think anyone... Jason Calacanis (00:39:07): Yeah. We assumed Abbott was gonna win. David Sacks (00:39:09): Gonna win. A very successful three term governor in Texas presided over an economic boom, that's why we moved to the state. We thought... I mean, honestly, I think it was the biggest shocker of the whole night. Anyway, so I started watching some interviews with her to kinda catch up on on what I had obviously missed. And I watched one interview she did with the New York Times where the interviewer kept trying to draw her out on social Chamath Palihapitiya (00:39:33): issues, David Sacks (00:39:34): right, like let's call it woke issues, identity politics, And she said, listen, I'm not participating Chamath Palihapitiya (00:39:39): Didn't take the David Sacks (00:39:40): your culture war. And then she laid out the case for economic populism as she saw it. And then she connected it to data centers, which is that the reason why data centers are bad is because they are making your utility bills go up, right? You're paying more for electricity and the data centers are using up your water. I think that's why the data center issue was resonant is because, I mean, there is anxiety about AI and and the potential job loss that could come from that, but I think the big reason why people hate the data center so much is they perceive that it's driving up their utility bills and the oligarchs are getting rich off the data centers while they're paying Which goes to... The oligarchs are getting tax breaks and you're getting higher utilities. Jason Calacanis (00:40:24): Which which goes to Chamad's point of people feel they're they're unheard and they're gonna take the only action they can which is going to the voting booth, Friedberg. David Sacks (00:40:32): So Friedberg, Jason Calacanis (00:40:33): you've heard my breakdown. You heard Chamot's breakdown, and then Saxe with a little bit of a rebuttal there. Let's do an alternate history here. Friedberg, if the war had not started, what would the midterms have looked like? And then what do you think happens in the next eighteen months of Trump's presidency? Is there a way to turn around his legacy? And if it... There is a way, what two or three pieces of advice would you give this administration to focus on in their remaining eighteen to twenty four months of power? David Friedberg (00:41:05): I kind of agree with the notion that the AI data center hysteria and the hatred for the Iran war are both rooted in this idea that you haven't solved my economic problems first. So I don't think that they're the primary. I think that they're a reflection of the consequence of not focusing on my issues first, my economic cost problem first. So I think that's still the biggest issue. I think two things are are about to happen in '27. One is I I think it's gonna be very hard with this congress and the sitting president to to come to a a resolution on a on a clean budget. And as a result, I think things are gonna continue as is, and I worry about the cost of things continuing to climb. By the way, I'll I'll just reflect on Shamaf's point. COVID was an accelerating moment for this unaffordability problem for people that don't own assets in The US, and the reason is we doubled government spending. That's what happened. And by doubling government spending, everything inflates, including assets, which is why people who are asset owners benefit and people who are earners for their labor lose because the cost of everything goes up. And if you're making money from a paycheck every week, you can't afford your health care, your education, your housing bill, your food, your gas. I do think that the Iran war was acutely off target because it was declarative at the beginning, we're not gonna do any new wars, and then there was a big war that was started, so it was an easy target. So I do think that this this budget question is a big one. What's gonna happen with spending in 2728? And as we talked about a couple weeks ago, I think the bond market will tell you where they think that's headed. Because if we continue this $2,000,000,000,000 a year deficit spending, things things are gonna remain expensive, they're gonna get worse, and it's not about people choosing socialism as an ideology to counter Chamath's comment earlier. I'm not saying people are choosing socialism as an ideology or as a set of principles. Socialist outcomes arise from the policies that people think are going to solve their cost issues. That's what ends up happening here, that people think the best way to solve the cost of things is to have the government do more and then you have more socialist policies. David Friedberg (00:43:17): It's not that people are saying, I want to be a socialist, and that's where you end up in this slippery slope spiraling problem. And I worry about how we're gonna resolve to a budget going into '27 and '28. I do think AI is gonna continue to be this really big political hot point. I think the... Like, AI is almost like the ring of Sauron. Okay? And, like, both sides want the ring of Sauron. It's this ultimate kind of tool, this ultimate power. It is a risk to the state. It is fundamentally something that takes power out of the government's hands and distributes it. Let's just assume that there isn't a company making AI and there isn't a company that owns all the data centers. Assume that there's a million data centers and a million variants of open source AI. In a world like that, there is no oligarchy that's making money off AI. So just assume that that's the case for a moment and that we can get to that end state. In that end state, the tools of AI pull a lot of power, a lot of influence away from government, from the state. And as that happens, I think the actors that want the state to be central, central command, central planning, central authority, and ultimately central power structure are going to react violently against that, and they're gonna wanna have the AI. So I actually think the calls to stop the development of AI are actually calls for them to have absolute control over AI because it is way too powerful for them to not have the control over the AI. They want the AI. And I think a lot of the policy stuff that we're gonna end up seeing here, and this is where if you play the game theory out, my... I I still think, I could be wrong, but I still think we end up in a place where the the government says we wanna regulate compute. They're not gonna regulate the chips or the models because those are too hard to kinda catch up on, and you're never gonna be able to regulate development of software. It's very hard to regulate deployment of software, but the utilization of that software is fundamentally constrained by how much access you get to compute. I think the data centers end up being treated like utilities in the future, and I do think that the government are gonna try and move down this path. They're gonna realize it's the best path to get what I just described, which is the ability to control and manage who gets access to this technology. Jason Calacanis (00:45:31): Yeah. And at a minimum, they're gonna get a great tax basis. I think a lot of the data center stuff is performative. They just wanna get a better deal. If you look at how Gina from Texas looked at data centers, she's looking at it from the community first perspective. If you look at how Trump, president Trump looked at it, it was from the companies and the economy, the GDP's perspective first. But they all... They both wind up in the same place, which is, don't disturb your neighbors. Don't pollute. You know, be a a good citizen and and maybe, splashy cashy a little bit of the funds there. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:46:02): By the way, Jason. Jason Calacanis (00:46:03): So in terms of the the... What Trump can do, I I have a a take some people might find a little shocking, Shmoop. I'm not a big fan of, pardons. Right? But they're they're the law. They're built into the system. Both parties, use them liberally, and every, administration gets more aggressive in using them. So until we change that, I think Trump right now should pardon everybody. Right now, this week, pardon his family, pardon himself, pardon every single person in the administration because he's gonna do it anyway. And then that takes off the table the Democrats doing an endless amount of investigations or it neuters it to a certain extent. And then he should say to them, let's work. Let's make a deal. And the deal he should make, number one, is do some tax reforms on the capital gains laws. Now listen. We we all make our money from capital gains, and then I'm assuming, you know, most of the people in our, circle leverage margin loans. In other words, in taking loans against our equity holdings, we should just say anything over 10,000,000, you tax it at 50% of the capital gains rate. If you wind up paying the loan down, you get that as a credit. If you wind up selling shares, you you pay the rest of the capital gains. Get that out there, smooth it out. It's a revenue stream, and it makes it feel like, hey. When rich people take these loans, at least some tax revenue comes in and you get rid of the Bernie Sanders. These people haven't paid taxes, and this year, they paid zero. Then we gotta work on health care. I'll leave it up to other folks with more experience to say what that should be, but Trump should say, hey. Let's work on health care. I'm gonna keep harping on the minimum wage. There's two ways to do it, obviously. You could say no taxes on people under a certain revenue, or income threshold, as you sort of, evoke their earlier chamath. But just say two years a year for four years, get everybody up to $15 an hour. I know that people will call me a Libtard for saying this, even though I'm a moderate independent. Jason Calacanis (00:47:50): I think it would be good for the esprit de corps, it would counter this narrative that we don't care about the bottom half of society and in fact, there's only ten fifteen million people who are impacted by under $15 an hour, so it's an easy thing to do. I would go with number four, a ban on trading stocks in office and doing business with foreign countries. Rahm Emanuel has this proposal. People on the right have it. So I think we should go get some consensus on that from everybody. And then finally, I think Trump should come to him and say, hey. Listen. We know housing is the thing that's frustrating people a whole bunch. Let's come up with a plan to incentivize the building of new homes. And he should go right into deal mode. He should go right into populist Trump, which everybody loves. If he solves two, three of these out of five, I think it would redeem his presidency. And, obviously, to your point, Sacks, he's just gotta end the war. He's just gotta end the war. However, it's possible. And I think the Dems may force his hand, and then he might say, well, you know, the Dems forced me to do it, and that gives him this golden bridge to cross. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:48:47): Look. Before we totally throw the baby out with the bathwater, I think it's important to realize that if you look at Reagan's presidency, Reagan's presidency has only grown in its stature over time because the structural changes that Reagan made were more obvious to see in its totality the further you got away from it. And I think the reality is even though the Democrats may not want to admit this, an economic populist will have to understand that keeping the borders closed is an incredibly important thing because the base of people that you need to vote for you want more of the pie. And so sharing more of the pie with people streaming across the border is just mathematically a bad decision. So you have that. Then you have tariffs, which if you partner it with the amount of money that people have committed, if that money follows through and it actually revives domestic manufacturing, the further and further you get away from it and is allowed to compound, that's gonna look positive. So I don't I don't think it's fair to say that they lost the midterm, but I don't think it means that history will look at his presidency as failed. Right now, I think what people will say is that these policies, some are obviously good, closing the border. And some, I think people will say are a question mark. And then some, I think people will say, you're gonna have to get out of it like Iran. And the further you get away from it, it'll be clear. So what should he do, Jason, to your point is, I think he should probably figure out ways to support the parts of his agenda that will endure. So to your point, what is a great trade off to make? Keep the border closed in return for some amount of economic changes. Maybe the Democrats want a higher minimum wage. Okay. Maybe what they should do... Again, I think the simpler thing to do is a 125 k or under, just wipe out the federal taxes. It's it's a nothing burger. It doesn't really matter in terms of the revenue that it generates. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:50:45): Close the few But trade it off for parts of his core strategy because that's what will endure, and people will know the president as having had the the courage to close the border when nobody else would or when when Biden just let it stream in. And then the populist economic president that then sits on top of those decisions in '28, whether it's a Democrat or a Republican, will have to thank Trump because that's how the votes will have come to them, and that's how people will feel like this economic malaise is being fixed. Jason Calacanis (00:51:18): Okay. Saxe, any final thoughts? I'll give you a last word again. Aside from getting out of the war, we all agree that's number one on the list. What else can president Trump do in the last eighteen months that would be productive for the country and for his legacy? David Sacks (00:51:31): Alright. Well, look, let me just give you three examples of previous midterm elections. Okay? So we've had big midterm elections before. 1994, Bill Clinton lost the house. It was a huge defeat, that's when Newt Gingrich became speaker. Clinton still went on to win reelection in 1996, so he made course corrections. Obama lost seven senate seats and 63 house seats in 2010. That was the shlacking. Made adjustments, still won reelection in 2012. So presidents can definitely come back from midterm defeats. It's pretty obvious. You just have to make corrections. What's the one that didn't work out so well? In 2006, George w Bush lost a pretty bad midterm because the Iraq war, people were very unhappy with it. This was three years after the start of the Iraq war. And then he wasn't up for reelection, but the Republicans then lost again in 2008. Why? Because Bush basically... What did he do after the midterms there? The surge. So, you know, he could have adjusted course, instead he doubled down. So I think this is really what it comes down to. There are a lot of people, neocons basically, who are encouraging the president to do some version of the surge. Some version of doubling down, some strike, Pickaxe Mountain, Carga Island, what have you. I think if you do that, you're basically gonna reenact the whole two thousand six, two thousand eight playbook. If you course correct and get out now, I think you'll have a very successful next two years. That's what it comes down to. Jason Calacanis (00:53:13): Right. We we we dipped our toe into data centers. Let's go do a double click here and dive right in. Stocks got killed earlier this week. Nvidia, SpaceX, Tesla, AMD, Micron, everything across the board took a massive haircut. Close to $4,000,000,000,000 in market cap wiped out. Now, again, Trump has overseen the top ticking of the market for the last two years. So, overall, I think the market is still up during his second term. But this was the second... This was the worst single day in the history of the stock market by total dollars, not percentage, obviously, and and it's the worst day for a little while. This puts a bit of a dark cloud over Anthropix IPO, and, of course, after that, OpenAI's Polymarket, our great partner in Polymarket, thanks for Shane for coming on on Tuesday, says that they're gonna have a 71% chance of going public this year. It was 95% before the midterms, and the Wall Street Journal reported today that the haircut could be baked in now. Instead of 1.5 to 2,000,000,000,000 and then going to 3 or 4,000,000,000,000 as Gavin Baker said on this podcast, we could be looking at a 1,000,000,000,000, 1 point low x trillion. Today, markets have rebounded a bit, and all of this is based upon, Chamath, are these data centers gonna go forward or not? Are they gonna be stopped? And then what is going on with governor, specifically Saxe evoked, what happened here with Abbott losing to Gina Inohosa, who took the time to do a a little presser last night and give her position, went on all the top shows. She's being pretty clear. She wants a great deal, and, it doesn't seem like she's against them. She's gonna let people build them out until 2028. But it's unclear what happens after that point. You're obviously connected, connected, I I think, think, Tremoth, Tramath, to a lot of the major players in the AI space. What... What's gonna happen with data centers? Can the Democrats afford to pop the AI bubble by then putting cold water and slowing down data centers? Because that will tank the economy. Jason Calacanis (00:55:29): I think we all understand that. So is that in their best interest, and is this posturing and positioning to get better deals for their local communities as is their job? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:55:38): There's an incredible video where the SpaceX team went to Cochise County in Arizona to present their plans for this new six gigawatt data center. And if I had to characterize that video, it's on x if you wanna find it, but it's these two very bright earnest people from SpaceX trying to explain how they're going to reduce electricity costs by 40%. They don't use water. They'll reduce property taxes by 20%. They will be able to fund enough revenues to pay off a bond in the county. It's just a litany of things. Yeah? Meanwhile, the audience is just screaming. And what you see, the two people were very poised. Riley and Katie, those are their names. Good SpaceX employees. They should be proud of how they conducted themselves. But they were getting run over, if you listen to this video. And my takeaway is, Jason, that this is an emotional issue that is not tethered to the facts, as Friedberg says. It represents a totem around the oligarchy and the, economic fissure that exists in The US economy. But it also represents that the deals that have happened are a little gratuitous, meaning should it really be the case that the most powerful seven or eight companies need a tax break to invest $30.50, $80,000,000,000 to then generate $3.04, $500,000,000,000? Probably not. Now they're doing smart deals because that's what made sense. But I think what the incoming governors are going to say is these things are off the table and instead we want to have directly measurable economic impacts before we even entertain this. I think what it means is we're gonna see a slowdown. And I think what that does is it benefits the hyperscalers because they have existing capacity. I think it's very bad for the Neo Clouds because they're renters. And it's pretty bad for the foundational models because they are so short of this capacity and they need it to grow. So to the extent that these frontier models are so much better than everybody else's product, they are the ones that need this capacity. It sets the hyperscalers to be a kingmaker. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:57:48): And they have this interesting game theory now. Jason Calacanis (00:57:51): You just say who the hyperscalers are just so people understand the difference between them? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:57:54): Yeah. Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, Google, Jason Calacanis (00:57:59): SpaceX. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:57:59): Yeah. And what they'll be able to do is make a decision. Path number one is continue to rent in the way that you're doing it today. So the status quo. Rent to some customers, large corporates. Right? Rent to the neo clouds. Rent to the foundational models. That's what they're doing today. Everybody does that. But then there's the path less traveled, which all of a sudden becomes really interesting. You could decide to take all of the incremental compute and advantage your own products. So Google has a ton of capacity coming online. They could say, I'm gonna give it to Gemini. What does that do? It actually allows Gemini to catch up in quality relative to the foundational models. Why? Because if you constrain the amount of assets that can actually generate compute and a smaller surface area of it is available to the leading companies, those leading companies will have to pay more, the user experience will decay, and then other products can have time to catch up. And now that is important because Anthropic and OpenAI are in a very fast recursive loop. They're on sixty to ninety day loop in improving their models. So now all of a sudden, without an infinite amount of supply coming online, you can slow these folks down. That's that's the path less traveled. Then there is the crazy path. Crazy path. You should look for this one very narrow thing. You and I talked about this before on the pod, but SpaceX and Anthropic's compute deal has a mutual ninety day out. Anthropic can term in ninety days. SpaceX can term in ninety days, terminate. If SpaceX says I'm gonna terminate this compute in ninety days, That is the king making move. Why? It's a disproportionate amount of the compute that Anthropic needs. It allows SpaceX to reprice that compute at the spot rate, which is probably double. The market rate. Jason Calacanis (01:00:05): Right? Anyway. The market rate. The market rate. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:00:07): And it... And it's probably not just double. It could probably triple. So whatever revenue you see on SpaceX's balance sheet from Ant could two to three x, And Ant would have no choice except to immediately capitulate and take the higher price. It would also show all of the other hyperscalers that they are very far away from having economic yield that is optimized. And so then it forces them to consider, should I be giving it to myself? Should I be selling it to the other people? It then forces the neo clouds to take all of this money that they've raised, whether it's debt or equity, and say, have two choices, which is to buy as much compute today as I can at whatever price it's available because the other path is assured destruction and bankruptcy for me because I am just out of the game. And so what will they do? They will take the last gasp and do whatever they have. So I think all the game theory, Jason, literally comes down to this one deal and whether Elon decides to rip it. Because if he rips it, watch out. Yeah. Jason Calacanis (01:01:15): And the David Friedberg (01:01:16): the Jason Calacanis (01:01:16): other two factors here, Freebird, and just some predictions. Right now, we have the tokens here in The United States. If the governors decide they want to put the screws tight on big tech hyperscalers and neo clouds and they wanna slow this down, they will need to understand that these data centers could be put in Canada, in Mexico, in Singapore, in Malaysia, and many other locations. The Middle East is a little bit off the table because of the war. War ends. You start putting these data centers in The Middle East. Then the job of doing the next large model will not occur, Freeburg, on US soil. It might occur in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Malaysia, Singapore. We're going to be a net importer of tokens, and this will be the biggest cell phone ever because all those $304,100,000 dollar jobs building these data centers are gonna go away. All of that tax will be collected locally in Malaysia where Google is putting a huge data center. And the data can make it around the world quite quickly. It doesn't need to be in The United States, which these governors are gonna learn a very hard lesson in globalization. What are your thoughts here on the data centers being banned or if it is just posturing? And then, Freeburg, could we see The United States become a net importer of tokens as opposed to a net exporter? David Friedberg (01:02:41): Well, they might ban the use of AI too. Jason Calacanis (01:02:43): Okay. Well, now we're going to... Yeah. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:02:46): A Jason Calacanis (01:02:47): very far out prediction. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:02:48): Yeah. Floated. David Friedberg (01:02:49): I mean, they're... That's the conversation Chamath Palihapitiya (01:02:51): right now. Okay. Jason Calacanis (01:02:52): I'll unpack that. Who's having the conversation? What exactly is the proposal? Because that seems to me to be a little far out there. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:02:58): The farther left David Friedberg (01:02:59): you go, the the more vocal politicians get on this point, which is no one sees the, quote, benefit of AI, and they don't wanna see AI being developed, being deployed, or being used. That's the general statements that are that are being made. So they wanna ban both its development, its deployment. They wanna ban data centers. They wanna ban technology companies from making models, and they wanna ban companies from using the models. And I think this sort of rhetoric leads to somewhere that's obviously more constrained than we are today. Jason Calacanis (01:03:34): What are the chances something crazy like that happens? Chamath Palihapitiya (01:03:35): But handicap it for us here. 10%. David Friedberg (01:03:38): California passed legislation, and Gavin Newsom vetoed it. I think it's much higher than 10%. We're seeing state based legislation. I mean, SACS quite a lot of time on this, but there's a patchwork of hundreds of laws that are passing all over the country trying to regulate model development, model deployment, model utilization, what they're allowed to do, whether the local state government gets to audit and inspect how the models operate, how people are using the models, what they're outputting. Jason Calacanis (01:04:02): You say, Sachs? Answer his Chamath Palihapitiya (01:04:04): And David Friedberg (01:04:04): fundamentally, remember a model is just a bunch of software. It's a code. It's a point about free speech. Can I actually run code on a computer? That is a restriction on, you know, someone basically reading a book is a way to think about it because Sure. At the end of the day, you're inputting and outputting digits, ones and zeros. Jason Calacanis (01:04:22): True sovereignty. Yeah. David Friedberg (01:04:24): And remember, we have Chamath Palihapitiya (01:04:25): laws David Friedberg (01:04:25): and we have regulations about what do those ones and zeros do? So if those ones and zeros go and take money out of your bank account and put them in mine, I broke a law. I'm a felon. I'm going to get convicted of that felony. If that is used to create a weapon that is illegal, I broke the law. That is a felony. And you can go down the long list of things that people should be concerned about. So you have to ask yourself the question, if we already have laws that protect ourselves from the consequence of people using this sort of speech, this sort of software, then what are we actually doing? And I do think once again that the the primal, call it unconscious political state, is that there is something that threatens the state, that threatens government itself. And I think that that's a big part of the motivation here, and I've said for a long time there's a power play. The question is, and this is me waxing philosophical for a second, is doesn't organization like Anthropic or whomever end up in a place where they're regulatorily aligned with the state such that the state has unlimited access to that model's capabilities to development and deployment and individual citizens and companies do not. And this is almost like if you go back, the the modern, like, issue, the second amendment issue is no longer about who has the bullets and the guns. It's about who has this technology because if the state has the technology but the citizens and the businesses don't, then the state has supreme power. And remember, there's no such thing as a state that doesn't have central planning and command, which means you are giving a small group of people an extraordinary amount of power. And the whole point of The United States and the whole point of the Second Amendment was to always have a check on that power. Jason Calacanis (01:06:06): Okay. David Friedberg (01:06:06): So if the state ends up getting all of the AI and no one else gets the AI, you then no longer have a check on the power. Jason Calacanis (01:06:11): I think this is like you're getting into doctor Doom scenarios. I think you're completely wrong. I think there's like a 1% chance something crazy like this happens, but I like that you exist in the world, Freeburg, to present it because idiot, you are the backstop to this level of lunacy. Chances you... Chamath Palihapitiya (01:06:25): By by the way, Jay Cal, let let me... David Friedberg (01:06:27): Call me doctor Doom all you want, but but this this is a fundamental question about what's the intention of this country. The the intention of the country was individual liberty. Yes. Of course. The right the rights of the citizen, the rights of the individual. It is not about state power, and it is not about us. And and we have a lot of laws that protect citizens from each other. Jason Calacanis (01:06:47): Mhmm. David Friedberg (01:06:47): What we're doing now is creating a different system that extends well beyond the founding principle of The United States to give a small group of actors an incredible amount of power that they're gonna centrally command and control. Okay. And I think that that's something that we need to pay attention to. And I'm not saying this is happening and the world's over blah blah blah. Jason Calacanis (01:07:03): Well, that's David Friedberg (01:07:04): why I'm trying like, percentage on it. As as this... It's not it's not binary. As the policies develop, we have to keep in mind what we're doing. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:07:11): And we already have slippery slope. You're saying it's a slippery slope. Jason Calacanis (01:07:14): Yes. Okay. Sacks. But I do think, you know, just like the p doom where people say 10% of people are gonna die, I like to put a percentage on it. What are the chances of this happening, Shammoth, or or Saxe? You... You're the closest to this, but, you know, haven't been the czar. Do do you think that this is in the realm of possibility what what Freiberg's describing? If so, maybe you could put a percentage likelihood of it happening. And then what is your take on data centers and the net exporter, net importer of tokens potentiality here? David Sacks (01:07:42): Okay. So it's a 100% that Democrats are gonna make a major push for AI legislation in the next congress. The question is what that looks like. Yes. And I don't think you have to speculate too much to understand where it's going. I believe that Democrats wanna create a surveillance and censorship state that's turbocharged by superintelligence. I mean, that's ultimately the end state. How do you get there? You create a department, a federal department of AI. You require that all the so called frontier models have to be reviewed and approved by that. The regulators give their notes on it. You can't get a model released unless you address their concerns. And their harms will include all the things that the government is telling us that social media companies should be concerned about, like disinformation and misinformation and dissident thought. All the things that the government was pressuring the social media companies to crack down on and censor during COVID, I mean, how quickly we forget all of this, they're gonna basically reenact that whole regime again using AI. And it's gonna be infinitely more powerful because we're talking about super intelligence here. So I I do believe that that is the regime that we're headed towards. So it may not be exactly the the version that Friedberg's talking about where Friedberg's saying that only the government can use the tools. I don't think that'll be the case. David Friedberg (01:09:02): Not not that binary sex. Sorry. Meant like obviously, they're they're gonna get access to models and capabilities that the public doesn't. At the end of the day, any amount of distinction between Chamath Palihapitiya (01:09:11): Oh, for sure David Friedberg (01:09:11): they will. State. What a central state actor Chamath Palihapitiya (01:09:13): gets David Friedberg (01:09:14): and what the general Chamath Palihapitiya (01:09:15): public David Friedberg (01:09:15): gets is really where that distinction of power arises, and it's really what makes it difficult for the founding principles to persist. Jason Calacanis (01:09:22): Which would be a quasi de facto, nationalization of the technology here, Chamath. So what what... What's your take on this? I'm gonna force everybody to... And and try to pin you guys down a little bit. You think that this nationalization of the technology, the government having the best version, everybody else, in The United States, corporations, individuals having 60, 70, 80% of that version? You think that's a possibility here? Chamath Palihapitiya (01:09:44): No. I don't think this is the priority. Again, I think people will get animated about this issue, but I don't think this matters. And I think that to the extent that people legislate an oligopoly, it'll further entrench economic power, and I think that that's counter to what these people want. So I think when they put the... They connect the dots, I don't think that that's what's going to get legislated. I don't think they have the energy for that. And I think at What's the end gonna get legislated is the David Sacks (01:10:10): quid pro quo, okay. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:10:11): The quid pro David Sacks (01:10:11): quo is this, the government gets more power and the duopoly of closed model companies get more regulatory capture or moats around their business. That's gonna be the quid pro quo. The government's gonna come in. The Democratic Congress is gonna say, look, we have to regulate this. It's unsafe. What do you think those companies are gonna do? You think they're gonna say, no, you can't do that? They're gonna say, okay, You know, let's work together on this. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:10:36): I think what's gonna happen is, government David Sacks (01:10:37): ends up with more power, and those companies end up with regulatory protection. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:10:41): Moff, go ahead. I don't think so. I think... Yeah. I think that if... To the extent that anybody legislates AI, I think it's gonna be broad based and include a lot of coverage around data centers and AI factories. And to the extent that that happens, maybe you'll get some regulatory capture on the one end, but you're gonna constrain the supply so severely on the other that the that the real people that will be in control of it are Meta, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and SpaceX. And so you have to remember, the foundational model companies are not home free. What does home free mean? That they have a fortress balance sheet, a profitable business model, and and quasi infinite compute for their own ambitions. And right now, they are renters. And the renter class in data centers as of Tuesday is very much at risk. And so if anything, I think what's gonna happen is all the renter classes will get co opted. For example, I don't know if you guys saw today, but Google just took over a Crusoe data center. They co opted the renter. They're like, you're gone. We're gonna take it over. David Friedberg (01:11:48): They did? Chamath Palihapitiya (01:11:49): Yeah. So why is that happening? It's because they have all of the core critical ingredients, specifically the power. So I think even a reg capture campaign can only work to the extent the government then goes and violates all these other rules and says, here's all this free electricity and go build wherever you want, and we don't care about energy because there's no money to pay for that, and there's no political will to do that. So I think the practical reality is that you have the mag seven or mag eight have more power. And when they look at that calculus, I don't think politicians want that at all either side. Jason Calacanis (01:12:29): You know, I did a calculation this week. I was looking at the phenomenal impact that agents are having inside of our venture capital firm launch, and we're spending 50,000... $4,050,000 Say the dollars name of Chamath Palihapitiya (01:12:41): your venture capital Launch. Launch. Thank you. Jason Calacanis (01:12:44): Launch.com. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:12:44): Where can I go to learn more about that? Jason Calacanis (01:12:45): To launch.com. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:12:47): You. Thank you very much. Jason Calacanis (01:12:48): Just... I'm trying to let people know I have a day job beyond podcasting. I invest in a 100 companies a year. And we have 20 people. We're spending, like, $50,000 a year, I think, $4,050,000 on these subscriptions. Grock, Claude being the main ones. I estimate we're getting $2,000,000 in value from that. I estimate we're getting about a million dollars in incremental revenue for I estimate we're getting maybe 15 to 21 in incremental revenue for the dollars we spend. In other words, the velocity of our investments is going up because we've automated everything. And the velocity in which we create new media properties is going up because we've automated everything. We're building systems. And only 10 or 20% of people in corporate America are using this technology every day on a regular basis. In other words, there's somewhere between five and ten times as many people to start using this every day. And I believe when they go to AgenTik, they start using this because it's so accessible to the average human being that everything gets obstructed. You don't have to learn to do code or set up your rig or your harness. You just tell it what you want, and it uses 50 times as much. So I think there's 500 to a thousand times the need for this. When that happens, this compute is gonna go wherever it needs to go. And I can tell you what we're doing is only 70, 80% of what the frontier models are capable of. We're not solving Navier or Stokes, obviously. And so we're on the verge of ordering everybody a Mac Studio of 512 k for $20,000, which would mean $400,000 in compute on people's desktops and running local models first and then falling back to them because we don't wanna be throttled. We wanna have unmetered intelligence. So offshore data centers will be the trend of the next two years. That's what you're gonna see. And desktop usage of local models. Jason Calacanis (01:14:32): I'll just make that prediction here. David Sacks (01:14:34): Yeah. Well, let me... Can can I, yeah, can I can I respond to that? Jason Calacanis (01:14:37): So open source, obviously, is the power of that. David Sacks (01:14:40): I think you're onto something, J. Cal. Look. When we're talking about AI regulation in the next two years, I think we need to separate... There's two different things. Right? There's federal and there's state. What the feds are gonna deal with is the the AI safety and creating a federal department of AI and all of those Orwellian sorts of risk around what could turn into censorship and surveillance and control. Okay. That's one bucket of issues. There's another bucket of issues around infrastructure which will be dealt with at the state and local level, right? And both of them are gonna play out. Now at the state and local level, I I think people are just being way too optimistic about what this election means. I mean, I'm seeing like Gavin Baker saying, oh, don't worry, you know, Innohosa, she seems totally reasonable. She's not threatening any projects and, you know, I've watched interviews with her. Look, I went and watched the interviews that Gavin watched and I don't see the things that Chamath Palihapitiya (01:15:33): I agree you. I agree David Sacks (01:15:35): does not say that existing projects are protected. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:15:37): I agree. David Sacks (01:15:38): She simply says that there'll be no new permits issued until they pass legislation You're right. Dealing with the issues she's talking about. You're a 100% What the issues she's talking about? Beast I'll doesn't hear I'll explain it. But look, I saw an analyst from semi analysis then come out and say that you do realize that projects that are under construction right now don't necessarily have every single permit they need to actually open for business. In other words, once you've constructed the data center, you may still have to get an air pollution permit. There's various kinds of permits that sometimes you don't get till the end. So if you take what she's saying seriously and literally that there'll be no new permits passed until this new regulatory regime comes into effect, we could end up with a bunch of stranded half finished projects. Now, I'm not saying that's necessarily gonna happen. I'm not criticizing her because I don't know what she's gonna do. She hasn't even taken office yet. I'm simply pointing out that this could go a lot of ways. You know, they could do this in a reasonable way or an unreasonable way. So you could end up with a lot of half finished projects. My base case is that the projects that are fully permitted will get done in 2027, but I don't think there's gonna be major new projects in this new regime for a long time for the simple reason that there's no political incentive for anyone to grant a new permit or a new project. What's their incentive? Think about this. In this last election, you had both Democrats and Republicans running campaign attack ads on any politician who approved any data center. So think about if you're a politician or you're just like a civil servant who maybe wants to move up the the ladder. What is your incentive to stamp approval on anything? David Sacks (01:17:26): I don't see it. I mean, I don't see anyone who is ambitious politically wanting to stick their neck out in any way to approve anything over the next four years. So look, I think probably the ones that are already approved and fully permitted, I think those probably get done. But the ones that are not approved yet, good luck. I think it's gonna be very difficult. So I think we get by in 2027. I think there'll still be meaningful CapEx. I get really worried about 2028. And the Democrats, I think, in a way, have a perverse incentive around this because if that CapEx tanks in 2028, they all blame Trump for that. Right? Jason Calacanis (01:18:08): Yeah. But they already have set the table. They have so... Such amazing footprint right now. They're already in the poll position. Tangy the economy, I think, opens up an attack vector for them. I think they're much better off just saying, here's what we want and extract value from them. Just extract value. We want free electricity. We want schools. We want this. Just negotiate hard. And if you David Sacks (01:18:29): don't That would be... Jason Calacanis (01:18:30): Yeah. Yeah. And if they don't, if the data centers and the... And these governors whose job it is to fight for their people and get the best deals, just like it's the company's job to get the best location, the best deal for their shareholders, if they can't come to an arrangement, again, these things can be put in Canada. These things can be put in Mexico. These things can be put anywhere. And we have Starlink and FiberLines. It's extremely easy extremely easy. It's very common to run fiber cables everywhere around the world. It's an incredibly speed efficient system we have here. It's not like twenty years ago where, you know, loading your Gmail in Japan was extremely difficult. It's very easy. It's very crisp. We have CDN technology. It's gonna be a no brainer, let alone the prescience of SpaceX, which is severely undervalued as a stock and as SpaceX, Tesla. I'm... I've been buying shares through this whole insanity. They're going to space to bring them up there. Now seems like a pretty brilliant idea, doesn't it, Jamal? Like, if they're gonna block it, all of a sudden, once again, Elon soar around the corner. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:19:32): Did he not? Well, do you remember, I think we talked about this, which Jason Calacanis (01:19:35): is, Chamath Palihapitiya (01:19:36): you know, we said his ninety day out with Anthropic is probably because he negotiated and he saw around the corner, not the other way around. Because people used to think, oh my god, this is really bad for SpaceX if they could pull the ripcord, that's not gonna happen. It's now the question is does it happen the other way around? Jason Calacanis (01:19:52): It's it's pretty interesting. I think Elon and the Anthropic team have a pretty positive working relationship. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:19:58): Oh, this has nothing... Hold on, I wanna be clear. Has nothing to do with their working relationship or whether Anthropic is a good or bad company or SpaceX is a good or bad company. This has nothing to do with that. This is a spreadsheet and the spreadsheet will dictate the answer. And the question is if spot spikes, you are economically forced to do this beyond a certain threshold. Jason Calacanis (01:20:20): Okay. I I... I'll take a I'll take a slightly, other side to that. There's still a lot of acrimony between OpenAI, Sam Altman, and Elon. Elon has aligned himself very deeply with the Anthropic team. They have an incredible working relationship. I don't think he just throws it open to Spot even if that was the most short term, midterm economic model. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:20:40): Let me finish this. That's not what I'm saying. Let me finish. You're not you're listening to what I'm saying. Jason Calacanis (01:20:43): Just let me finish, then you can counter. You can... You guys are allowed to let me finish my sentences. I know that's hard to believe. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:20:48): Not if you miscast what I'm saying. You can totally respond to it. Jason Calacanis (01:20:51): Just take a take a beat. Moving to spot might be the the right ruthless economic decision. I think that the the decision made by Elon is gonna be in part informed by his relationship with Sam Altman or lack of one, and by, the loyalty of Anthropic and their success making them a great long term partner, especially for the space data center business. So I could see him instead of throwing it up to Spot saying, hey. Let's meet somewhere in the market. But that's what I think is a longer Chamath Palihapitiya (01:21:22): I'm not saying throw it up to Spot. What I'm saying is when Spot moves sufficiently, even a long term offtake moves so much that existing contracts are negative EV. And so you just gotta move existing contracts to positive EV territory. And if you can get out in ninety days and reprice something into positive EV territory, you should. So my point is more that beyond a certain point, if a bunch of data centers get slowed down, a bunch of constraint happens, there's gonna be a lot less capacity than people think. The dollar cost per megawatt per month is gonna go through the roof. The dollar cost of a GPU hour is gonna go through the roof, and the people that will be willing to pay the premium are going to be the ginormous companies with huge balance sheets. And so you could just sell it to Google or Meta if you wanted to. You don't have to sell it to OpenAI. Jason Calacanis (01:22:15): Okay. Sachs, the really interesting part of all this, just to dip into the science corner, is these, this infrastructure does two things. Right? Inference, people using the product every day, and then building the next model. If you want to run away with the next model, cornering compute at any price is a huge advantage. So for Google, which has been behind, if they use all their compute to makes their make their model or if Microsoft or NVIDIA decide they want to start accelerating their internal models, which they have, this could be... This could determine who has the best frontier model over to you next. Final word. David Sacks (01:22:53): I'll say something very quickly. When you're talking about infrastructure of this magnitude, these gigawatt power data centers, they cost around $50,000,000,000. Okay? Nobody can make that investment in conditions of uncertainty. The last thing you ever want to do is break ground on a project like that and then when you're halfway through, you get enjoined, you end up with a strike by your workers or some community group that stops you. You really need conditions of certainty before you make an investment like that. And I think that we're headed towards conditions of great uncertainty. You've got our biggest data center states where there's basically been a regime change And all those governors are basically indicating that they favor moratorium until x y z happens. Right? They can be a little bit different in what that is. So my sense is that, look, it may not be a conspiracy to hurt the Trump economy. It may just be the reality of what's going on. But I would expect that I think there'll still be meaningful capex in 2027 as a base case, meaning those fully permitted approved projects can move forward or finish. But I think by 2028, I would expect that the pipeline will either be closed or significantly reduced and that will have a big economic impact. And I do think that Democrats will try to blame the president for that even though they will be solely responsible for this. Jason Calacanis (01:24:21): Alright. Everybody has been demanding, Friedberg, that we do a science corner on this exponential time hypothesis. I guess a layman's way of explaining it would be computers can't solve important problems quickly, but there seems to be some science and some recent innovations that say maybe this hypothesis is no longer true. Please inform Look, I think audience. David Friedberg (01:24:46): The reason for doing this science corner on this OpenAI publication is just to highlight some of the benefit and value that comes out of AI. These are, like, pretty substantial breakthroughs that are happening, all the math hypotheses they've published on. This one's called the exponential time hypothesis and it starts with like the most fundamental question in computer science which is can a problem be solved with a computer? And if so, how long does it take? And that tells you whether it's actually practically computable. This is the key point of computer science, we wanna create these machines that can solve our problems. And there's a class of problems that are called p problems where you can solve them in what's called polynomial time. The bigger the problem of a particular type, the longer it takes. And polynomial time just means size cubed or size squared. It tells you how many seconds or minutes or hours it might take on a specific computer to solve that problem. And so the the problem as it gets bigger takes more time. And then there's what are called NP problems. These are problems where you can very quickly figure out if the answer is correct. So, like, you know, it can take a long time to solve a big Sudoku puzzle, but you can check the Sudoku puzzle in a couple of seconds and see if it's right. That's an NP problem. And the key question in computer science has been, do p problems equal NP problems? Meaning, can you actually solve any problem that you can quickly check-in a short period of time? And if so, then everything is computable. The entirety of the universe is computable. And that's the big question in computer science. This idea of this exponential time hypothesis, which was proposed in 1999 by a couple of guys, And they said for a specific type of problem called a three SAT problem, which we don't really need to get into, the amount of time it takes is exponential depending on how big the problem is. So the bigger the problem gets, it's some, you know, number to the nth power. So it scales exponentially in terms of how long it would take a computer to solve it, which means that they have demonstrated that there is a class of problems that can never be solved in a short period of time, and therefore that entire class of problems means that p does not equal NP. So that's been their hypothesis since 1999. And what OpenAI did is they disproved that. David Friedberg (01:27:08): And they disproved it in a 175 page paper, and it comes down to this one little formula, which you can pull up on the screen here, Nick, which we don't need to spend a lot of time analyzing to understand. But effectively, this little formula right here is OpenAI's paper demonstrating... The the outcome of the paper demonstrating that this three SAT problem, this particular class of problems in computer science can be solved in sub exponential time, which means it will not take an exponential amount of time. So they disproved this big exponential time hypothesis that everyone thought was real. And what that means is that p could still equal NP, which means that theoretically, every problem in the universe can be solved with a computer. The solution, it's it's being evaluated now. So, you know, it's not fully kind of verified by third parties yet. People are still trying to understand it. It's a 175 pages with a very novel set of approaches that it's taken to try and get there. They did the whole thing end to end in less than 10. Some reports have argued they did it in a few hours. And so this was a deeply challenging question in computer science and has been for twenty seven years. Is this exponential time hypothesis real or not? And they just proved that it's not, and they did it in a few hours. So it may be esoteric for the majority of people listening to this, but it it does a couple of things. Number one, it keeps in play the idea that everything in the universe can be analyzed and every problem theoretically could still be solved with a computer. And number two, is it's amazing that OpenAI was able to do this in a few hours and deliver this sort of a result that mathematicians and computer scientists have been struggling over for twenty seven years, and this proof is so far holding. So, you know, this is amazing. And and so everyone in computer science, I think, was kinda shocked when this came out. Jason Calacanis (01:28:59): Absolutely. Yeah. David Friedberg (01:29:00): I was shocked in terms of how it was presented, how they solved it. It was very novel. And, it's one of these moments of humility for mathematicians, for computer science being like, holy I would have never done that. Jason Calacanis (01:29:11): And, David Friedberg (01:29:11): Sax Jason Calacanis (01:29:12): Sax, you were just very heated about the exponential time hypothesis in the group chat for the past three weeks. So when you hear Freiburg teed up here this crisply, how does this impact your thoughts on twenty twenty eight election and the future of humanity? David Sacks (01:29:29): Look. I think that AI superintelligence, whatever you wanna call it, is gonna create a a lot of good things. And the fear around it... You know, maybe some fear is justified because anything that seems powerful can make people afraid and obviously the future is unknown, so you can't prove exactly what's gonna happen. But I tend to think there's gonna be so many benefits to this technology. And frankly, if we don't do it, China's going to... They're gonna be the ones that benefit. J. Cal, you're right that if The US doesn't build the data centers, they'll get built in other countries and we'll be paying to import the tokens. Jason Calacanis (01:30:03): Mexico and Canada. David Sacks (01:30:05): Very dangerous situation. Jason Calacanis (01:30:07): He's so dumb. Yeah. Crazy. Chamath, I saw you nodding there. Yeah. You have a background in computer science. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:30:13): My formal education was in electrical engineering, but I mean, I've I've worked around software engineers for so long now. This is an incredibly interesting insight. Alright. Jason Calacanis (01:30:23): Another amazing episode of the All In podcast, the number one, two, and three podcast in the world in terms of the rankings. Think, wow. What a week we had. We're number one, in the livestream and obviously, four weeks running. We've hit number one. Thank you to the audience and we truly appreciate you being on this journey with us and you can always expect as candid a discussion in the world as possible, which it was very interesting in your discussion with Rick Rubin, Shammoth. He was very, very taken with the podcast, and he is somebody who understands art and unique moments in the world. I thought it was very interesting that he kept pressing you on what... What's the magic here? Because he's he's kind of the Sherpa of magic in many ways. And I think the magic here is that we're candid and, we break each other's chops and we try to move the ball forward with our candidates. And you had some very nice things to say about all of us, Shamath, and I just wanted to say thank you. You are my brother and I love you. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:31:16): Thank you. I love you too. I mean, what I said to him basically at the Corvette is we are a family and we get together and chop it up once a week, and it's very rare to have a window into family squabbles. Yes. And I think that's basically that's basically why it works. It's kinda unique, you know. That's maybe why the Kardashians work. Jason Calacanis (01:31:34): Maybe. You had you had such a compliment, you think, to say, I I think it was the greatest compliment I think I've got in my life. He said, you know what Jay Cal is? You know that quote from the, you know, the scene from the town where Ben Affleck goes David Friedberg (01:31:44): to Jason Calacanis (01:31:44): Jeremy Renner. Yeah. And he says, I I need you to come with me. We're gonna mess some people up, and you can't ask me any questions. And Jeremy Renner looks up and says, whose car we take? Yours or mine? David Friedberg (01:31:56): I've I've felt bad about you. Jason Calacanis (01:31:59): That was very complimentary. Alright. We'll see you on the next time. Love you, besties. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:32:02): Bye bye. We should all just get a room and just have one big huge orgy because they're all just useless. It's like it's like sexual tension that they just need to release somehow. Wet

本集资源与出处