特朗普内阁、谷歌量子芯片、苹果 iOS 失利、TikTok 禁令、VC 现状，嘉宾基思·拉博伊斯

Jason Calacanis (00:00:00): Alright, everybody. Welcome back to the number one podcast in the world, the All-In Podcast. With me again today, Chamath Palihapitiya, your chairman dictator. How are you doing, brother? How are you feeling? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:00:12): Doing great. Fresh off the holiday spectacular. Yeah. Jason Calacanis (00:00:15): Good times. And then, getting ready for a little ski. You and I will be doing a little skiing together with Friedberg. Keith Rabois (00:00:21): That'd be quite nice. Jason Calacanis (00:00:23): Yeah. I saw that. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:00:24): Friedberg, I don't think you've skied with me and Jason. Jason is an excellent skier. David Friedberg (00:00:27): I mean I've heard. Have I skied with you, Jason? I don't think I have. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:00:31): His brother is excellent too. They're both Josh Jason Calacanis (00:00:34): the black bomber is good, Ian. Yeah. Shout out to Josh the black bomber. It's gonna David Friedberg (00:00:38): be fun. Those hips. He's got he's got skiing hips. They kinda shift. Yes. Jason Calacanis (00:00:41): Left, right, left, right. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:00:43): Yeah. Childbearing. Jason Calacanis (00:00:43): You know, Chamath Palihapitiya (00:00:44): it's kinda David Friedberg (00:00:44): like when I went to Tucson. Than the shoulders. Yeah. Jason Calacanis (00:00:46): It reminds me of I went to Tom Ford, out. I went when I went to Tom Ford to get my suit. I'll do that in just a second. But with us again, of course, your cackling sultan of science. Friedberg, how are Chamath Palihapitiya (00:00:57): you doing? Have you guys seen that clip of the guy with the fake bum that runs around the cities? Jason Calacanis (00:01:01): Yes. With security guards? It's like some sort of a Krypton put on or something. It's hilarious. This guy is a giant he's got, like, a big Brazilian butt, and he just runs around in tight catches. It's still hilarious. A clip Chamath Palihapitiya (00:01:13): of this guy. Oh Jason Calacanis (00:01:14): my god. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:01:14): It's so ridiculous. So funny. Jason Calacanis (00:01:16): Alright. With us, the cackling with this afterglow from the holiday spectacular. Let's call it what it is. It's the Christmas spectacular. We're gonna pick a side, Friedberg. How did you like our Christmas David Friedberg (00:01:28): special? Anti-Semitic, bro? Jason Calacanis (00:01:29): How dare you? How dare you? You can have the Hanukkah special. We'll do two specials. And now with us in the red throne, it's fit Sacks. It is stylish Sacks. It is. Goes to work every day in venture Sacks. His name is Keith Rabois. How are you, my brother? Welcome. Great. Keith Rabois (00:01:49): Great, Jason. Thanks. Happy to be here. You know, it's great. Being more fit and more fashionable with socks is a pretty low bar. David Friedberg (00:01:57): Yes. Keith Rabois (00:01:57): So yeah. I'm really excited and thrilled to be with you all, though. Jason Calacanis (00:02:02): You'll let your winners ride. Rain Man David Sacks. And I said, we open source it to the fans and they just got a reason with it. Love you, West Coast. Queen of Kid Rock. I'm going all in. And as we love about you, you've got a little American exceptionalism, supremacy, dare I say. You don't f with dictators. Keith Rabois (00:02:29): That's true. Jason Calacanis (00:02:29): You don't f with them. Keith Rabois (00:02:30): Yeah. I don't really love dictators. They're not good for society. They're not good for America. Jason Calacanis (00:02:34): Mhmm. Keith Rabois (00:02:35): But, you know, it's not always America's job to fix all of that. David Friedberg (00:02:38): Alright. Well, what about running companies? Should company CEOs be dictators? Keith Rabois (00:02:43): Yes, actually. So I believe in the founder mode, the Brian Chesky founder mode. I held a conference in New York recently that Brian was nice enough to speak at called Hiring, the Art of Hiring for Founder Mode. So specifically for people who subscribe, founders that subscribe to that view, how do you hire people, and how is that different than what you would hire in a standard, you know, monstrosity of a company like Google or something? Jason Calacanis (00:03:04): Yeah. Good founder mode in New York, by the way, just history, if I remember correctly. Lots of good founder mode in New York. David Friedberg (00:03:10): J. Cal, do you wanna give Keith's background? Well, Keith, of course, Jason Calacanis (00:03:15): went to Stanford with the boys. Sacks and Peter Thiel went on to do PayPal. He had a stint at Square. He started a bunch of other companies, worked at Khosla Ventures. He worked at that. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:03:26): He worked he he went to LinkedIn. That's how it all started. Keith Rabois (00:03:29): LinkedIn was pretty key. Like, Reid left PayPal, started LinkedIn. I joined them. So, yes, that's true. And then after that, I went back with backslash from PayPal days to Slide, which is on the actual history. We don't have to talk about that. But then, I did jump into Square as the 20th employee and helped build a pretty good company. Jason Calacanis (00:03:48): Yeah. And then founder You said Keith Rabois (00:03:49): then I got lazy. I didn't David Friedberg (00:03:51): go to Keith Rabois (00:03:51): VC, you know, became lazy. You know? Decided to be VC in 2013, spent six years at Khosla Ventures, five at Founders Fund last year almost last year now. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:04:01): Before we jump in, I actually have a question for you. Starting already. How does that happen, Keith? How do you your ad founders sorry. And then you get what, like, what pulled you to go and work with the note? And then what pulled you back? Like, how does that process work? Because these things are typically meant to be sort of forever jobs. Keith Rabois (00:04:22): That's true. So I, you know, had the benefit of having Vinod on the board of Square, which I think is typically how executives wind up turning into VCs is you forge a relationship with board members. So, like, for example, Roelof Botha, who runs Sequoia, had Mike Moritz on his board. Roelof was our CFO at PayPal, and Mike recruited him. So that's a very common same thing. Ravi at Sequoia today was the COO and CFO of Instacart. Again, same thing, Mike recruited them into Sequoia. So I think that's typically how people become VCs. I always knew I wanted to be a VC since 2003. I was a very active angel investor, as you know. Even when I was, you know, concentrating on all these other jobs, I was writing a lot of checks. And so anybody writing a lot of active angel checks probably has in the back of their mind. One day, I might wanna be a professional investor. We could talk about the merits or demerits of that, but, like, the goal was pretty clear in my mind. And then at some point, I think you have to make a decision. What do you wanna be in life? You know, venture has long time horizons. It is a job for life. Like, 15, 20 years is pretty much what you have to commit to. So you don't really wanna start venture when you get too old because 20 years, you know, you'd be like Donald Trump age. Jason Calacanis (00:05:33): Yeah. So I can run for president in I Keith Rabois (00:05:36): can run for president in 25 years or something. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:05:39): Keith, why did you leave Founders Fund to go to Khosla? Keith Rabois (00:05:42): So Khosla was great. I spent six years there. The truthful reason why I left, it's kind of funny given COVID and how history changes, I hated commuting to Sand Hill Road every day. We were one office, period, in office every single day. And I felt like the future of investing was more in San Francisco than in Palo Alto at the time, and I just despised sitting in a car 45 minutes each direction. Turns out, you know, COVID changed everything, how people do their work. Like, we're recording this by Zoom. Before COVID, we'd probably all be in the same studio recording a podcast like this. But Vinod and the team were very inflexible about it, and Founders Fund was located in the city. Obviously, I knew Peter since college, as Jason alluded to. And I decided that, you know, it's better for me. I remember talking to Sam Altman. And I said, am I crazy for changing funds mostly on a commute basis? And Sam said, you're human, and every single study of human happiness is inversely correlated to your commute time. It's like there's nothing wrong with being human. In any event, there are a lot of similarities between FF and KV. Both are great funds that have put up, you know, incredible returns, have funded iconic founders and companies, but they're very different. KV is involved as early as possible, and FF is a momentum investor and is maybe the best on the planet at being a momentum investor. So almost every successful investment of Founders Fund over eight funds was invested at $500 million or more entry valuation. And almost every single investment at KV in eight funds was, like, the seed or Series A investment with very few exceptions ever. And so Anduril and Ramp are the only exceptions at Founders Fund. And at KV, the only exception would be Stripe, which I led in, you know, 2013 or so, which is an order of magnitude higher valuation than any KV initial investment ever. So KV is much more an input-driven organization. Founders Fund's much more output-driven. And, you know, there are great technology companies that are input-driven. Keith Rabois (00:07:42): Think Amazon, Apple. And there are great technology companies that are output-driven. So you can choose, but certain people are gonna be better in some environments and other people are gonna thrive, you know, in other environments. I fit in really, really well at KV. Jason Calacanis (00:07:55): You enjoy the early stage. You enjoy year zero, year one, year two. Right? Well, Keith Rabois (00:07:59): a, I'm very good at it. You know? I think I prefer to invest as early as possible on a keynote deck only. Like, if I meet a founder and there's a keynote deck, there's no product, there's no metrics, that's my sweet spot. Because I also know nobody else in venture is good at that. Nobody else is still active in venture. Jason Calacanis (00:08:14): What's the secret? What's the secret from a keynote to a check? Keith Rabois (00:08:17): It comes out of founder assessment. At the end of the day, the only data point is: Is this founder capable of building an iconic company, period? And I prefer to compete when there's no metrics because all the metrics are going to do is confuse you. That said, there are a lot of investors who are very good once there's product metrics, financial metrics. And so I compete with people who are pretty good at what they do, so I prefer to go as early as possible. And then secondly, I like company building. Like, I think part of my role is to help the founder increase the amplitude or probability of success, and I enjoy that. At FF, that's very controversial. Jason Calacanis (00:08:49): Yep. Right. Yeah. The founder reigns supreme, and everybody else is there to get out of the way. Right? Yeah. David Friedberg (00:08:55): I've had both KV and FF as lead investors in both Climate and at Ohalo now. So I know both firms really well, and it's really I always people always ask me about the difference between the two. That's always what I get to. It's like Founders Fund, they have this kind of mantra. They find great founders and just get out of the way. Let them run. And they don't want to be helpful. That's not their objective. They feel like if they have to be helpful, it's not the kind of founder. I mean, Keith, obviously speaking outside of yourself. And then at Khosla, as you know, Vinod has been extremely and the whole team there, especially at Climate, have always been extremely helpful. So adding board members, introducing commercial partners, being very traditionally proactive participatory VCs on the board. Very different, both very valuable. When I had a board issue at Founders Fund, and there were some board members that did not like my strategy, had issues with what I was doing with the company, Climate Corp at the time. Founders Fund actually stepped up and protected me. And they got the rest of the board together to protect me in a way that was actually at a very crucial moment for the business. And as a result, we had a massive exit within a year. Jason Calacanis (00:10:03): I saw Brian Singerman is leaving. So does anybody know which ambassadorship he's taking? David Friedberg (00:10:09): I mean, Jason Calacanis (00:10:09): the timing's a little interesting. Is it not? Keith Rabois (00:10:12): I don't know. You gotta compete with our friend Kenny Howery. Jason Calacanis (00:10:15): Yeah. Kenny Howery. Where is he off to next? Keith Rabois (00:10:18): Hopefully, some great destination. I'm sure. Nice to meet you. Jason Calacanis (00:10:21): Crash. Yeah. Something warm this time. Okay? Sweden's a little bit much. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:10:24): Sweden's a Jason Calacanis (00:10:25): little bit cold. Keith Rabois (00:10:25): Send them my wish list for you. Jason Calacanis (00:10:27): Yeah. Let's go. Like, maybe like, is there, like, a Turks and Caicos or something? David Friedberg (00:10:31): Embassy tour. We should do an embassy tour this year. Keith Rabois (00:10:33): Saint Barts? Do they have an embassy there? Jason Calacanis (00:10:34): Saint Barts? Yeah. That's a great idea. Keith Rabois (00:10:36): They don't, unfortunately. It's a French protectorate. But Jason Calacanis (00:10:39): Well, you know what? Everything's on the table now. We could make them the 51st, 52nd, 53rd, or 54th state. I mean, we're in the game right now. Canada's coming on board. David Friedberg (00:10:47): Keith, did you not want a role in the administration yourself? Keith Rabois (00:10:50): No. You know, thank you. I love politics. If you, you know, follow my Twitter feed. I pay a lot of attention. I used to be involved in politics before I got into tech. However, what I realized about where I am in my career in tech is if I stop doing what I do, I'm never gonna come back. Like, technology is rapidly emerging. We're gonna talk about all the latest developments this week. Like, you can't take your foot off the gas in the network-building parts of venture for two to five years and come back when you're, like, 50 years old. And so I felt like I'm not ready to give up on venture. I'm in, like, the prime of my venture career. I'm only 12 years in, actually, Chamath. So I figure five or 10 more years. Yeah. Like, is the sweet spot. And so I'd like to see the companies that I was involved in grow up, become public companies, etc. And I didn't feel like I could ever come back if I quit. At some point, would I like to get involved in politics? Probably, yes. Mhmm. But it's a decade out. Jason Calacanis (00:11:43): Well, the household's involved. Big announcement. Your husband, Jacob, is joining the administration. Can you tell us a little bit about that? Keith Rabois (00:11:51): Yes, sir. Jacob's getting very Jason Calacanis (00:11:53): proud of that. Keith Rabois (00:11:54): Yeah. It's very extremely exciting for him, obviously, for the country, I think, because he's gonna be the chief economic officer really for the country. His job is to build foreign policy from the business standpoint, which if you think about it, what's the foundation of power in the world? It's economic success. Why did the United States win World War II? Because we had an economic engine that could outcompete Germany plus Russia plus Japan. We could build more tanks, you know, blah blah blah, etc. And so the economic engine is critical to this administration. Obviously, Trump understands that. We had a great three years under his first administration, as he likes to say, best economy ever before COVID, which may, you know, may be true. And we need to rebuild American strength, and Jacob's job is to export that philosophy. And sometimes you can build economic strength through working through foreign affairs. And so that's his main job is to be the primary point person undersecretary of economic affairs, and then they've got a bunch. The Democrats and the woke people added a bunch of other things to the title. It used to be just undersecretary of state for economic affairs, and they added, like, you know, environment and all these politically correct things. So, hopefully, they'll subtract all that stuff and just go back to undersecretary of state for economic affairs. Jason Calacanis (00:13:08): Mhmm. And interestingly, what's turning out to be interesting as Trump assembles this group I'd love to get the panel's thoughts on it is not everybody thinks the same. Jacob's position on TikTok, which we'll get to in this show, is very different than some other people in the administration. Even Trump himself flip-flopped a little bit on that. So what are your thoughts, as we get started here, just on that assembly of people, you know, including Sacks, obviously, who couldn't be here this week, but will be on future episodes. There's your announcement, folks. What are your thoughts on that, the sort of diversity in opinion in the administration and how that all sorts out? Because some people are Keith Rabois (00:13:48): very comfortable. Exciting. I think it's very obvious watching from afar that the way Trump makes decisions is he likes to ask a lot of people a lot of different questions, and then he makes the decision. That's why he's to some people, the media, and then he's very unpredictable, is he doesn't just take one source of input and so you can never totally predict the output. But he has an interesting cast of characters and listens to them. Like, so, for example, I haven't spent that much time with him, but insofar as I have, he would go around the room and ask every single person at dinner, what's your view on X? And literally go around the room of 28 people and listen to every single person. So I think that's how he makes decisions. Jason Calacanis (00:14:30): X being a topic, not the website X. Keith Rabois (00:14:32): Not X. Yeah. Everybody knows what he's thinking about X. I think he likes X. Jason Calacanis (00:14:36): Chamath, any thoughts on this, the wider team as we see it get assembled? We obviously don't have Sacks here. He joined the team. What's your thoughts on the collection of characters and executives? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:14:48): Here's an interesting tweet that I saw, Nick. Can you just share it with the guys? Jason Calacanis (00:14:52): Oh, net worth of each one. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:14:54): Now the reason why it was interesting to me was not the net worth per se, but I think this is the first time that I can remember in modern history, at least, that I've been in the United States and following U.S. politics where such an enormous number of businesspeople have been motivated to come and work inside of the administration. And I think that it creates this very interesting contrast and compare. I think that the Democrats would never have assembled a group of people like this even though the Democratic Party has a version of this chart that they could have made. There's a lot of extremely talented businesspeople that support the Democratic Party. The problem is that they believe it's deeply unfashionable to get strong, competent businesspeople to take a pause in their business career and come work in government, and you almost look down on people that are successful. Whereas the Republican alternative here, if it creates a movement, so to speak, so that subsequent presidents tap folks on the shoulder, I think we'll be much better off. And the reason is pretty simple. I think that the United States economy is too complicated to be managed by theoreticians, by folks with random Ph.D.s and absolutely no working experience in the real world. And when you bring those people in to oversee those Ph.D.s, I think you probably get better outcomes. So I hope this becomes a standard, which is ask these very talented, clearly demonstrated, successful people with judgment to hit the pause for a year or 3 or 5, whatever it is, step into government, help the country, and then go back. Jason Calacanis (00:16:41): And this was what the Founding Fathers, Dave, actually prescribed. This is what they wanted. They wanted people who were in business to do a tour of duty to serve their country and then to get out. They were not interested in career politicians. Correct? David Friedberg (00:16:57): I've said this a number of times, but all of the Founding Fathers had jobs, had professions, and they stepped in to serve their country as a civic duty, participated in the process of executing the responsibilities of government and then stepped out and went back to their private lives. I think it is such a more powerful model for government than people who choose to be politicians, to represent people as a living because it creates extraordinarily nasty incentive structures, if that's the model, which is, for example, to curry favor with private industry participants and then go cash that favor in after you leave. And I think that this alternative where you have people who are everyone looks at them and, oh, they're all billionaires and so on. They're actually as because they're independently wealthy and they have enough money than they'll ever spend. I think Larry Page once said, you can never spend more than $1 billion in your life no matter how hard you try. It's literally impossible. People think like, oh, you could spend all that money. Actually, when you buy stuff, most of the stuff you buy are capital assets that you end up selling later. It's very hard to spend at that level. So when you have people that are truly independently wealthy, their motivation is actually quite different than someone who's trying to make it from $100,000 to $500,000 of net worth or $50,000 to $1 million of net worth. And I think it actually creates a higher degree of freedom, and it aligns the people much more in the long-term outcome of government rather than their own personal interests. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:18:23): And they're just smarter. So I'll give you a simple example. Maybe we'll talk about this later, J Cal. I'm not sure. But when I saw the DOJ's theoretical guidance on the Google antitrust matter, their idea is to divest the browser. And I kinda scratched my head thinking, would any reasonable business person think that that was the right remedy? Meanwhile, three weeks later, Google's like, here's a superchip in quantum computing. Jason Calacanis (00:18:55): Here's a quantum computer. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:18:56): That breaks the world. Yeah. And I thought, how is it that these folks are so disconnected from reality that they don't understand what's actually sitting inside this company? And I think it's in part because they don't know the right questions to ask. And the reason they don't know what the right questions to ask is they've never worked in the real working world. Jason Calacanis (00:19:15): We have a professional class of politicians, and their understanding is 10 years old. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:19:19): But it's not just politicians. This is also bureaucrats. So my point is these folks need to get off the sideline and work in a company for a while, know the bowels. They'll be much better able to guide these regulatory agencies if they actually just know what's going on. So if the right answer is some antitrust issue with a company where you need to divest, wouldn't it be great where like 100 smart businessmen looked at that said, that makes sense. David Friedberg (00:19:47): But but let me Jason Calacanis (00:19:47): give you the counter David Friedberg (00:19:48): To that, Chamath. Because the counter to that, which it comes up a lot just so you can, like, frame the response, is why are all these people coming out of pharma companies to regulate pharma? Why are all these people coming out of big ag companies to regulate big ag? Why are all these people that come from energy companies coming to regulate energy? The common refrain is business people are basically bringing business interests into the government by transporting themselves into these regulatory bodies versus having career politicians or what you call bureaucrats be kind of independent regulatory authorities. So what's the response in that context to that refrain? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:20:22): They're absolutely right, and that's how it should work. The United States can no longer afford to be a bleeding piggy bank for bad ideas. So, yeah, like, if a bureaucrat thinks the right thing to do is to divest a random browser to fix Google's monopolistic tendencies, that's not a remedy. Jason Calacanis (00:20:42): Or spend tens of billions of dollars on a high-speed rail like we were talking about earlier this week. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:20:48): This is not logical. It's not meaningful. It's misguided. So if what we want is kindergarten soccer where everybody gets to touch the ball, that's what we are getting right now, which is it's not useful. So I would rather have a business person with a direct point of view. And by the way, with the level of transparency, the big issue, I guess, Friedberg, that that would create is could these people advantage themselves somehow to make more wealth? But the reality is that would be so obvious and laid bare. What happens today is they burrow with this midlevel of an organization and they do exactly this, but it's not laid bare. Yep. So I'd rather be a transparent where some guy tries to take the government for $500 million and we castigate that person than what's happening today, which is you slip in the back door, you get paid $400, $500 from a company. Then you come back to the government, then you go back. Nobody knows who these people are. Nobody knows the decisions they're making. And they're altogether misguided because they're not grounded in an understanding of the real economy. David Friedberg (00:21:54): Keith, where do you fall? Yeah. Keith Rabois (00:21:56): Well, I share actually, you're both right in some ways. If you look at who's Trump's pick, these successful people, they're not typically being assigned to industries they came from. So it's not like he's taking drugs, you know, he's actually taking the opposite. Like, you figure RFK, for example. So, actually, I think you can take successful people who have proven themselves through merit. Like, I think that's one of the other benefits of the real world is the only way you get ahead is you're in a Darwinistic experiment with other people that are comparable. And to be successful, you have to outthink, outwork, etc., and that shows up ultimately in promotions and net worths and various other metrics. So Trump has taken a lot of successful people, and I think we want a society where we aspire for our kids to be successful. We want to emulate successful people that needs that will yield more success. Like, having Elon involved in the government will yield more success than, you know, if you penalize successful people. You'll get you stigmatize it. You get less of it. So I think if you transplant successful people into industries that they're not from and that they have no interest in going to after the government, you might get the best of both worlds. Because I can see some of the critiques of, you know, you're regulating, you know, your friends' companies and you're gonna make money later. That said, most of Trump's people are not gonna do that. You can also pass laws like, you know, you can't lobby, you can't work for x years after. There's also this great data point. I think it's the last 60 years. Trump is the only president whose net worth went down after office. Every other president that, you know, took a relatively modest net worth or mediocre net worth and turned it into a stratosphere. Keith Rabois (00:23:33): So if you think about the president as the, you know, signature example, it's great that Trump, like, is setting the opposite illustration. Jason Calacanis (00:23:40): Well, you I mean, we've discussed this on the other pod, Keith, a couple of times, which is domain expertise can be an ankle for a founder. You know, you got a founding team that works in the hotel business. They're gonna look at something like Airbnb and say this will never work. You got somebody who worked in transportation. They're gonna look at Uber and say that'll never work. They'll look at PayPal if they worked in finance, and they did say to you and the team, that's never gonna work. Keith Rabois (00:24:04): Yeah. I mean, well, I think it's critical in venture to not really fall for that trap. I always mention that I don't like people with expertise typically as founders. I think when I call diligence or call experts, I only ask one question, which is, what is metaphysically impossible about this working? Like, is there a law of physics that I don't understand that makes this actually impossible? And if they can't isolate a very specific principle that makes it or fact that makes it actually impossible, then I just ignore everything they say and, you know, write a check. Jason Calacanis (00:24:38): Yeah. Because then it's just all vibes and opinions, etc. So Keith Rabois (00:24:41): They're experts in the prior world. Right? They've learned why not. And this is actually, like, to combine a couple topics here. The reason why Trump is so effective. So the most interesting question to me over the last year was, how is this guy who everybody in the media and everybody in, you know, the legal groups of various things is trying to attack and hate, and all these people publish these, you know, books. Why is he on the precipice of being elected president of the United States twice? You must have a superpower or two. Most of us do not get elected president of the United States twice, and most of the people who are attacked by everybody who has power in the establishment definitely do not get elected president. Right? So when it came down to and I interviewed a lot of people who are critics of him, but knew him well, like, ex-cabinet people that don't like him, it comes down to he just asked a lot of why. Like, why do we do this? Why do we have to do it this way? Why have we done it this way? And it turns out in politics and in D.C., most of the answers are pretty mediocre or weak or poor or haven't been rethought for 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70 years. And so he just constantly dives in and says, why? Why? Why? Why? And that's actually what predicts success for founders is in a domain they don't know anything about. They're just like, why? Why do we take these hotel things for granted in the Airbnb case? Why should they be so expensive? Why should scarcity, you know, prevail in New York for four months of the year, etc., etc.? Jason Calacanis (00:25:56): Alright. Let's get to our doc, and we got a ton of stuff to get to. Google's new quantum chip is super impressive. Friedberg and I were talking about that on the group chat. On Monday, Google announced its latest quantum chip. It's called Willow. Here's the chip if you haven't seen it. It's beautiful. It was fabricated in Google's new chip plant in Santa Barbara. They started this project back in 2012, their quantum computing project. And the headline basically is Willow performed a standard benchmark computation in under five minutes. That would have taken today's fastest supercomputers 10 septillion years, or 10 to the 25th power, which is billions of times older than the universe. If you don't know what quantum computing is, Friedberg will expand on it, but basically computers are binary. You've heard this before, 1 and zeros. Quantums use qubits. You know, those are 0, 1, or both at the same time. And, Google got a 5% pop. They're up 13% in the last five days. Probably on the other news that Gemini 2.0 is out as well, which is unbelievable. I've been playing with it. What do you think, Friedberg, of this big announcement? David Friedberg (00:27:03): Google's announcement is a paper published in Nature that follows a preprint they actually put out in August. So this news has been out for a little bit. There's obviously a press cycle this week around it to kind of make a big thing about it. But it is a very kind of important milestone in the evolution of quantum computing. So do you want me to kinda talk about quantum computing again? I think we've talked about this in the past. Like I Jason Calacanis (00:27:28): mean, maybe a brief primer for people, but, like, what does this mean practically? I think what people wanna know is when did these things actually have an impact in the way, say, NVIDIA's GPUs have had? David Friedberg (00:27:39): Yeah. The big breakthrough here is that the whole basis of a quantum computer is called a qubit or a quantum bit. It's radically different than a bit, a binary digit, which we use in traditional digital computing, which is a 1 or a 0. A quantum bit, you can kind of think about it as a wave function. It's sort of a quantum state of a molecule. And if we can contain that quantum state and get it to interact with other molecules based on their quantum state, you can start to gather information as an output that can be the result of what we would call quantum computation. And that sounds complicated, but what it really means is that instead of doing kind of binary computation where we're adding numbers together or doing kind of other traditional arithmetic, there are really interesting functions you can do with qubits. Qubits can, for example, be entangled. So two of these molecules can actually relate to one another at a distance. They can also interfere with each other, so canceling out the wave function. And then when you read it out, you get a result that is basically a very, very complex problem that is solved through this quantum interpretation. It's really hard to kind of highlight how different this is from traditional computing. So quantum computing creates entirely new opportunities for algorithms that can do really incredible things that really don't even make sense on a traditional computer. They're not possible to kind of resolve on a traditional computer. And sorry, let me just state one thing. The quantum bit needs to hold its state for a period of time in order for a computation to be done. And so the big challenge in quantum computing is how do you build a quantum computer that has multiple qubits that hold their state for a long enough period of time that they don't make enough errors that you can actually do a computation with them. So what Google was able to demonstrate here is they created these, call it logical qubits. So they put several qubits together. And by putting several qubits together, they were able to kind of have an algorithm that sits on top of it that figures out, hey. David Friedberg (00:29:50): This group of physical qubits is now one logical qubit, and they balance the results of each one of them. So each one of them has some error. And as they put more of these together, what they were able to demonstrate for the first time ever is that the error went down. So when they did a 3-by-3 qubit structure, the error was higher than when they went to 5-by-5, and then they went to 7-by-7, and the error rate kept going down and down and down. So this is an important milestone because now it means that they have the technical architecture to build a chip or a computer using multiple qubits that can all kind of interact with each other with a low enough fault tolerance or low enough error rate that they can start to do these quantum calculations. This is a big area of opportunity. One of the very interesting areas that a lot of people are talking about is in cryptography. So there's an algorithm by a professor who was at MIT for many years named Shor. It's called Shor's algorithm. And in 1994, 1995, I think, around that time, he basically came up with this idea that you could use a quantum computer to factor numbers almost instantly. And all modern encryption standards, so all of the RSA standards, everything that Bitcoin's blockchain is built on, all of our browsers, all server technology, all computer security technology is built on algorithms that are based on number factorization. So if you can factor a very large number, a number that's 256 digits long, theoretically, you could break a code. And it's really impossible to do that with traditional computers at the scale that we operate our encryption standards at today. But a quantum computer can do it in seconds or minutes. And that's based on Shor's algorithm. And if you want, there are some great YouTube videos that describe Shor's algorithm and how it works, but it's, like, mind-blowing when you look at it. It's, like, this really, like, nonintuitive but simple set of steps that when you put them together on a quantum computer, it's like this thing can instantly figure out all the factors and then you can break a code. One of the things that this highlights is that in a couple of years, theoretically, if Google continues on this track and now they build a large-scale qubit computer, they theoretically would be in a position to start to run some of these quantum algorithms like Shor's algorithm. And so we're now kind of spitting distance or a couple of years it's not really clear. Is it 3 years, 5 years, 7 years? David Friedberg (00:32:02): But a couple of years away from having computers that theoretically could crack all encryption standards. And there are a set of encryption standards that are called post-quantum encryption, and all of computing and all software is gonna need to move to post-quantum encryption in the next couple of years. So there's, like, this big kind of push now to, like, how do we do that? How do we accelerate it? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:32:19): I saw Sundar post it. I saw it in my feed. I ended up missing my next meeting because I had to figure out how long it will take for us to crack the encryption standards that we use for Bitcoin. Nick, here's the answer because I was so tilted by this idea. So if you think of Willow as essentially like one stable logical qubit equivalent in a chip, we need about 4,000 to break RSA 2048, and we need about 8,000 to break SHA 256, which is the underlying encryption framework for Bitcoin. So I think you're right. I think we're in the sort of like Jason Calacanis (00:33:02): The endgame? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:33:03): 2- to 5-year shot clock. No. I mean, I think what'll have to happen is some of these chains will need to obviously reimplement something at a pretty foundational level. The weird thing is Friedberg says is, like, the Willow chip's error correction gets better the more of these things you start to use together. Now there are some really big problems and see inside these chips, like logical interconnects are very complicated. If you put 2 chips on a board, like, the chip-to-chip communication is all this stuff that we haven't figured out how to do, but this is a big deal. And I was I was really like, my god. What's going on here? Jason Calacanis (00:33:43): Other projects at Google are finally landing. You have Waymo Chamath Palihapitiya (00:33:46): too. Incredible. Jason Calacanis (00:33:47): And you have this now. I mean, Project Loon might be gone, but, you know, I think those projects, we're gonna see a couple of them change the world. Yeah? David Friedberg (00:33:56): Just to give you a sense on the numbers. Like, Google's target for fault tolerance on a quantum chip to make it logically useful is 1 times 10 to the negative 6. Right now, this Willow chip is kind of running at 99.7%. So it's still a few orders of magnitude away. They have a long way to go in getting the fault tolerance low enough to actually build logical gates using qubits that can resolve kind of computational output. And so there's still a build cycle ahead, and that pathway is a little bit unclear. But what they've shown is this almost feels like the Shockley transistor moment. It's like it turns out to Chamath Palihapitiya (00:34:32): the right David Friedberg (00:34:32): You know, here's this transistor. Now everyone's like Chamath Palihapitiya (00:34:35): You have a lossy transistor, and then you'll figure out p-n junctions. You'll figure out all of these ways of just, like, getting the error correction down. But by the way, this reinforces what you said before, which is it's hard for an outsider like us to comprehend what's really happening inside of Google because the business they built was able to fund this. I mean and and I I went down a rabbit hole because I'd never heard of who this guy was that that runs this, Hartmut Neven. Jason Calacanis (00:34:59): He's in Santa Barbara. David Friedberg (00:35:00): They have a whole team at Santa Barbara. They've been running for, like, 10 years. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:35:03): He has his own law, Neven's law. And then I went down the rabbit hole of that. But what's amazing is so valuable for humanity, Google had the money to fund him for the last 12 years. David Friedberg (00:35:13): Exactly. Jason Calacanis (00:35:14): And the greatest money printing machine of all time is paying dividends. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:35:17): Yeah. But isn't it great to know that Google takes these resources from search and, sure, maybe there's waste or maybe they could have done better with the black George Washington or maybe they could have done better with YouTube. But the other side is they've been able to, like, incubate and germinate these brilliant people that can toil away and create these important step-function advances for humanity. It's really awesome. DeepMind is on Jason Calacanis (00:35:49): that list as well. Keith, what are your thoughts Chamath Palihapitiya (00:35:50): on that? Yeah. Keith Rabois (00:35:51): Yeah. So I think first of all, I think there's a long time before this becomes a commercial product or application of any sort. So, you know, it's great that they're taking money, but think about it as, like, almost like Stanford takes money or the US government funds basic research in some ways. This is at least a decade-out kind of thing. There's another I mean, this area is way beyond my expertise, but I've been talking to a lot of smart people because I do financial services innovation. And, obviously, encryption is pretty critical whether it's Bitcoin or other places. And there's a couple of concerns. One is it's not even clear that you can verify that this is true, by the way. Like, standard computing to explain sort of the magnitude of difference. Standard computing would take Chamath Palihapitiya (00:36:32): That's right. Keith Rabois (00:36:33): 10 to the 25th years, to verify that what, Google analysis is accurate. So there's a chance that it's not even true. For David Friedberg (00:36:41): the thing for the sampling test they ran? Yeah. Jason Calacanis (00:36:43): They have David Friedberg (00:36:44): a lot. Keith Rabois (00:36:44): Right? They have about 10 to 20 50 number of years. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:36:47): That's the big, I think, hole in the whole RCS benchmark that they use, that it only is, it's a framework that only a quantum computer could theoretically even. Jason Calacanis (00:36:55): So how do you think it's correct is, I guess, the question. It takes that long to solve. Keith Rabois (00:37:01): And then to be practical, like, assuming you solve all this and it's accurate, blah blah blah, you make it faster. Second, then, there is the post-quantum computing encryption, which, you know, a lot of people, a lot of things, a lot of poor things have switched over to. So you have historical communications that were encrypted under an old paradigm that would be vulnerable. And, you know, every year that goes by, like, the embarrassment level or the threatening level of old historical communications will probably have some decay function or some half-life. So if it takes another 10 years, communications that were drafted 20 years ago, yeah, there'll be some embarrassing things and blah blah blah blah. But the more time it takes, the more safe, you know, sort of private communications and exchanges will be. So I think that's positive. Third is there's a question of order of magnitude here. You mentioned you need, like, three orders of magnitude sort of improvement. Is each step function, you know, incrementally easier and faster, or is each step function, you know, 10 years? And I don't know that anybody knows the answer to that. David Friedberg (00:37:59): That's right. That's right. Jason Calacanis (00:38:00): Yeah. A lot more work here to be done. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:38:04): So you're David Friedberg (00:38:04): you're not buying any quantum computing stock yet? Keith Rabois (00:38:07): Not yet. We have looked at KP, you know, talk about, like, technology-forward, you know, VCs. Over the years, I've sat through partner presentations, and we've never really pulled the trigger. There's other reasons, like, including, like, even if you have quantum computing, you have to rewrite software on top of it from a different—it's a completely different, you know, world and who do. David Friedberg (00:38:26): Nothing maps. Nothing maps at all. Nothing. Keith Rabois (00:38:28): So you're starting from scratch. Yeah. So you have an application layer, which might be actually an interesting business opportunity. Jason Calacanis (00:38:34): Yeah. How are these things actually gonna be coded, and how are developers gonna interact with them, if at all? Maybe by that time, we'll just be AI running. How do you build. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:38:41): It on the compiler? Who the hell knows? How do you build the language properly? These are all complicated. Yeah. Keith Rabois (00:38:46): Who's gonna write the BASIC? Who's gonna write, like, the Microsoft BASIC? David Friedberg (00:38:49): The interesting thing is there's a lot of work that's been done in this space. Like, thinking about quantum computing and quantum algorithms is like an entire branch. People do spend a lot of time thinking about this and working on this, and there are ways you can kind of simulate and test and start to build out models for how you could utilize quantum computers. But, obviously, we just don't have, you. Keith Rabois (00:39:09): Know? David Friedberg (00:39:09): In industrial-scale systems at this point. Jason Calacanis (00:39:11): There was one interstellar Marvel Easter egg in your announcement that I wanted to get your thoughts on, Friedberg. Google said that this massive jump in performance, quote, lends credence to the notion that quantum computation occurs in many parallel universes in line with the idea that we live in a multiverse. So is that somebody in PR is high AF or reads too much science fiction? Dude, David Friedberg (00:39:41): You know, you know the crazy thing for us. So the crazy thing about quantum physics is such a mind. Have you guys taken quantum mechanics? Like I have not. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:39:50): I have. Yeah. David Friedberg (00:39:51): I remember the summer I took it, like, the first quantum mechanics class. It's and I was, like, glad it was a summer course because you really have to, like, think, like, pretty deeply about what you've learned in quantum mechanics. There's just nothing about it that's intuitive. Like, the way we kinda think about the world is not the way the quantum world operates. In the case of a qubit, as soon as you measure the qubit, it collapses to a value. If you try and measure it, if you try and look at it, it goes to 0 or 1. The probability by which it goes to 0 or 1 is defined by, you know, the quantum state right at the moment you observe it. It's it's just such a mind. So effectively, this thing is existing in a superposition in multiple states at the same time until you try to observe it. And that's the case of quantum mechanics. So what's kind of happening, I think, in that language, J. Cal, is nothing novel was kind of discovered or represented. That's just quantum mechanics. It's a mind, and you could go watch hours of YouTube videos if you wanna, like, get taken down the mind rabbit hole of quantum mechanics and realize, like, nothing. Jason Calacanis (00:40:54): One thing I've always found fascinating about this discipline is that looking at a qubit changes it. Like, it understands it's being observed. David Friedberg (00:41:04): Any particle, there's a slit experiment. And if you try and observe light as a particle versus a wave, it actually changes what happens, what the outcome is of it being a particle or a wave, same with electrons. The thing about quantum mechanics is the observation of a particle changes what happens. Serious question. Jason Calacanis (00:41:25): Here's a question. David Friedberg (00:41:26): Here it comes. Here it comes. Buckle in, Freeman. Jason Calacanis (00:41:28): When you look at the quantum bucket, can you get a better idea of the scale of Uranus? David Friedberg (00:41:50): It's the same concept. The quantum state of the cat is it's both in the box and not in the box. And you don't know whether it's in the box or not until you open the box. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:41:58): Until you open the box. Yeah. David Friedberg (00:41:59): And then you open the box, and there's an x probability that it's in the box, x probability it's not in the box. But when you don't see it, Chamath Palihapitiya (00:42:04): it's both. It's both. Jason Calacanis (00:42:08): And if you're a cat lady, you have three of those boxes, and I'm a dog person. David Friedberg (00:42:13): Well, we got more engagement from Keith on that science corner than we have from David Sacks. Jason Calacanis (00:42:18): Did for Chamath Palihapitiya (00:42:18): that. So Jason Calacanis (00:42:19): he's more. He's more. He's more. He's more. He's more. No no science. David Friedberg (00:42:21): No. No. Jason Calacanis (00:42:22): In fairness and fairness, hold on. BMI. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:42:24): I need to I need to get in Sacks. They both said, this is stupid, and I'll never touch it. Except Keith was kinder and more articulate in getting there. Jason Calacanis (00:42:33): That's tough. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:42:34): He did. That's right. Sacks would've just been snoring. David Friedberg (00:42:37): Yeah. He would've he would've done this he would've he would've done his move where he goes stupid and then, like, he would've Jason Calacanis (00:42:43): done his next topic. Keith Rabois (00:42:45): There's an advantage of Monday Partner BDs is I get to watch the science fiction stuff, you know, every week even if I don't really understand it. But, like, a decade of watching science fiction, you pick up some tricks. David Friedberg (00:42:56): Exactly. Do you Jason Calacanis (00:42:57): do you play chess with Peter Thiel while that discussion's going on, like, success? Keith Rabois (00:43:01): Actually so I don't play chess at all. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:43:03): Oh, okay. Keith Rabois (00:43:04): The reason why is if I do something, I wanna be really proficient at it. I don't have the time. Jason Calacanis (00:43:09): Got it. Got it. Also, you have a life. You have a life. Keith Rabois (00:43:11): Yeah. I like to do, like, other things. Jason Calacanis (00:43:13): Things in the real world. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:43:14): Big big shout-out to Gukesh D, my my my Indian friend, 18 years old, new world champion. Jason Calacanis (00:43:20): I saw Chamath Palihapitiya (00:43:21): chess world champion. Jason Calacanis (00:43:23): Yeah. New world champion. Did was he playing Magnus Carlsen? Is that who he played? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:43:28): Every brown guy that's done any random useful thing in the world, we all know each other. We're in a huge group chat. Jason Calacanis (00:43:34): Oh, is it really? Yeah. Just tell us this. Keith Rabois (00:43:37): Name of the group chat? David Friedberg (00:43:38): Isn't, like, the top 10 tech companies? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:43:40): The group chat's name is what can Brown do for you? Jason Calacanis (00:43:43): What can Brown do for you? Okay. There it is. Also, UPS is filing a trademark infringement case. Hey, speaking of chip news, Apple is making its own AI server chips for internal use. A report just came out that Broadcom and TSMC are helping them develop AI inference chips. You know, inference chips like, well, how to map. And there are obviously GPUs like NVIDIA GPUs. Those are like the giant dump trucks that help you build large language models. These inference chips are kind of like speeder bikes, you know, motorcycles quickly getting you the results from the same ones. It's called Baltra. Baltra. I don't know what that's in reference to. Mass production in 2026. They don't plan on selling the chips. They don't plan on cloud computing. The reason they're doing this obviously is because they really want the iPhone to be the interface and they have planted their flag that they want to have privacy and have AI working off of your local device and not having access to your data, but having a compelling AI experience. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:44:47): My my iPhone does not work. I'm sorry. I'm just gonna say it. Okay? I don't know what happened in Jason Calacanis (00:44:53): You upgraded your software. It's what happened. You're on iOS 18. It doesn't work. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:44:56): I after three years, I upgraded to the newest phone. I upgraded to the newest OS. The phone doesn't work, meaning, like, to call people. I can't call my wife anymore. I can't call my kids anymore. The phone bricks constantly. My Photos app doesn't work. It is just really bad. And I think for a company of this scale, I don't understand how it does not go through a more complicated test harness that catches all of this. Jason Calacanis (00:45:18): It there are. I'm not Chamath Palihapitiya (00:45:20): gonna complain, but because I know it's hard for them. I know it's complicated and but it's really bad. Jason Calacanis (00:45:25): You're not the only person. People are freaking out about the interface changes on photos crashing is a major thing, and Apple Intelligence just doesn't work. So it does seem, Keith, that Apple has gone off their game of making polished stuff to race to try and, I guess, catch up to their perception of, you know, AI being a disruptive force at the interface level, i.e., your phone or desktop. What are your thoughts on this news story about them doing more chips? They've obviously had great success with the processors and phones, and now the M4. Incredible if you haven't tried the Mac Mini. Best computer for the dollar in the world right now. But what are your thoughts on Apple? Keith Rabois (00:46:04): So the most important thing about Apple is to remember it's vertically integrated. And vertically integrated companies, when you construct them properly, have a competitive advantage that really cannot be assaulted for a decade, 20, 30, 40, 50 years. And so chips, cost illustration, go all the way down to the metal in building a chip that's perfect for your desired interface, your desired use cases, your desired UI, and nobody's gonna be able to compete with you. And if you have the resources that you know, because you need balance sheet resources to go in the chip direction, it just gives you another 5 to 10 year sort of competitive advantage. And so I love vertically integrated companies. You know, I posted a pinned tweet. I think it's still my pinned tweet about vertically integrate is the solution to the best possible companies, but it's very difficult. You need different teams with different skill sets, and you need probably more money, truthfully, more capital. But Apple's just gonna keep going down the vertical integration, software, hardware, you know, all day long. And there's nobody else who does hardware and software together on the planet, which is kinda shocking in some ways. Is there a world-class company? A company that's world-class in both software and hardware other Chamath Palihapitiya (00:47:09): than Tesla. David Friedberg (00:47:10): Yeah. Maybe. Nvidia? Keith Rabois (00:47:12): Nvidia? Well, may not really. Could they do a world-class UI? You know? Maybe. Maybe there's a foundation, but you have to have a different vision, maybe a different team. Not clear. Tesla's close, I guess. I'd say the software's good. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:47:27): If you define software as it touches a consumer, Tesla, Apple, in some ways, Google, maybe Meta with the Meta glasses. Trying. Jason Calacanis (00:47:40): Trying. Attempting. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:47:41): You can't say NVIDIA because I think NVIDIA touches the consumer through an app that then sits on top of CUDA, which I think is a brilliant strategy for them. But it's it's it's Jason Calacanis (00:47:51): it's all been Tesla and then a long tail of people. Right. Keith Rabois (00:47:54): Well, so, anyway, first of all, Apple has a lot of competitive advantages that they, you know, have been actually leveraging for about 15 years now. And even back then, there's some old great Steve Jobs videos. I'll see if I can find you a clip where he talks about this very intentionally from the 1990s. You know, he came back to Apple. He said, we're gonna be doing vertical integration, basically using those words of software and hardware, and there's gonna be nobody else that can compete with us. I think it's in an interview he did in, it's published in, In the Company of Giants, I believe. And he's perfect on point. He just followed that strategy for, you know, the next 25 years. Now you're seeing some of the stations, though, of a competitive strategy that gives you incredible advantages is you get very sloppy in other places, especially over time because you have such great competitive moats that you don't have to compete at the cutting edge of this. Like, the Photos app is completely unusable. I'm the biggest Apple fanboy in the world. Like, I I I remember interviewing once with a job for Tim Cook. And I walked in and I said he's like, why, you know, why are you interested? And I said, well, you know, I own every SKU of every product you've ever produced except I don't have every color of each, you know, iPod. And he was, like, blown away. And but now, like, my Photos app is completely unusable. So I totally understand, you know, to wrap the frustration. And they they are showing, like, the decay function, you know, culturally and otherwise, that eventually somebody will figure out an angle to rip them out. Jason Calacanis (00:49:18): Yeah. I'll tell you, we talked about dictators at the beginning of this, Chamath, and, obviously, this is your wheelhouse as a dictator yourself, is, you know, there has to be a constant fear that some a-hole is going to come to your office and be like, what did you do to the Photos app? And that fear does not exist inside of Apple. It's not like the MobileMe. You ever hear the MobileMe story where he brought the MobileMe team in and said, how is MobileMe supposed to work? They said, well, it's supposed to back up everything. When you buy your new phone, you get everything. You never have to worry about losing the phone. Slammed his hand down and said, well, why the f doesn't it work that way? Fired the person, brought the next person in, and said, now make it the way he said it's supposed to be. Game over. I don't think Tim Cook's doing that. Jony Ive's not there, and, obviously, Steve Jobs' not there to terrorize people. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:50:04): Well, I don't think you look. You don't need to necessarily terrorize people, but I do think you have to go through UAT. So I think it's pretty reasonable when you have a large footprint of consumers using an app to go through user acceptance testing is like first base. And typically what happens is you can do a process of a few months where several 100,000 people get it all over the world. And as long as you do an okay job of getting a decent distribution of people, this would have come out. But I wanna just talk about what Keith said as well. It's literally not just photos. It's like the phone doesn't work. So there are just core structural issues with this operating system now that make the iPhone maybe 10 to 30 percent less usable. And that's Jason Calacanis (00:50:50): everything is everything Chamath Palihapitiya (00:50:51): is really frustrating. Jason Calacanis (00:50:52): The command center, you know, when you pull up your little command center to change the brightness and your AirPods, it's just like, what are they doing here? Chamath Palihapitiya (00:51:00): By the way, so do you need a chip? Do you need a machine learning chip to do inference to figure out that when you constantly run your phone at a certain level of brightness, you should just allow the phone to be at a certain level of brightness? David Friedberg (00:51:12): Just stop Jason Calacanis (00:51:13): changing the damn brightness. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:51:14): Why does it re I mean, this is not this is not complicated software engineering, guys. Jason Calacanis (00:51:20): No. But this is my point. There's no arbiter of taste anymore. Taste is the backstop who says no. Keith Rabois (00:51:28): Yeah. Let me pause, double-click on that for a second. So I think taste is great if you have it, but there's only so many people on the planet that are gonna have, you know, cutting-edge taste and be right. If you don't have taste, what most tech companies do is they use data. Data is something that's approachable and leverageable. Because Apple has, like, the antibodies to using data to measure success with the user experience, to measure whatever success. If you subtract taste even by a bit, you don't have the scaffolding that every other company would use, and so you see the worst of both worlds. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:52:01): That's a great take. That's a great take. Jason Calacanis (00:52:03): Good take. I mean, just go off the rails. Right? You go off the rails. David Friedberg (00:52:06): So Keith, Chamath Palihapitiya (00:52:06): do you think that what happened is, like, when Steve Jobs isn't there and Jony Ive isn't there, there's still a bunch of folks that probably think they have taste, but the real taste folks left and there's really no scaffolding left to Keith Rabois (00:52:20): be more modern. You had at Facebook Meta, obviously, or that Google uses would catch some of the stuff. They without a doubt. Like, no doubt about it. You'd know that users are less thrilled, and they'd use things less, and you'd fix it. And maybe even you take that too extreme. You never develop taste. Like, I could argue that about Google or Meta. They don't really have taste. But, like Yeah. You could argue the paradigms. But, fundamentally, if you don't have that backstop, if it tastes retracts even 10%, not all the way down, you're just not gonna catch this stuff. And I think there's only like, how many people in the world really have cutting-edge technology user experience taste? I don't know too many. I would fund them right away. It's incredible. Brian Chesky might have it. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:52:57): It's an incredible point because I, if I'm being really insecure, I would want to say, oh, yeah. No. We had a lot of taste at Facebook back in the day, but actually, we had so much scaffolding around data probably because intuitively, we knew that that was way more reliable for us. Keith Rabois (00:53:15): It's more predictable scale. It's certainly more scalable. Right? Like, you take Steve out. You don't need a dictator, but you do need a taste, and taste is artistic. The same thing in venture, like, you know, like scaling venture funds is really, really challenging because early-stage investing is more like taste than data-driven. In later stage, you can use data and scale it and scaffolding. So I think there's just fields. It's a little bit also, you see, like, these sports teams. They just happened at Stanford when Jim Harbaugh left. It took years for the decay function for, like, the next coaching regime to show they were completely incompetent. Like, the next year, they're pretty good. Next year, they lost one more game than they should have. Next year, they lost two more games than they should have. Blah blah blah. And then, eventually, it became, like, horrible. And then, you know, there's a decay function with an organization when you take out the person who is the original thinker or the leader or the dictator or whatever. And so I think some of this is showing up now. And then, you know, playing on a field that's not favorable to them, which is there are advantages Apple has in AI, but there's some significant organizational structural disadvantages. And that's the field that people are gonna be competing on for the next five years from a consumer perspective, and they're playing on a field where they don't have all the advantages in their favor. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:54:29): Yeah. Yeah. True. Let's go to Jason Calacanis (00:54:31): the app level here. TikTok is scrambling right now after an appeals court upheld the January 19 deadline Chamath Palihapitiya (00:54:37): Red beef. Jason Calacanis (00:54:37): for divestment. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:54:38): Here we go. Meat. David Friedberg (00:54:40): The boy in the world. Jason Calacanis (00:54:41): Here we go. Keith Rabois (00:54:42): I refer you to my Twitter feed. My ex Jason Calacanis (00:54:46): I mean, you and Jacob must sit—I mean, what do you do? You just sit at dinner and feed the kids and then talk about TikTok in China. So it's Keith Rabois (00:54:54): Well, I think TikTok is pretty obvious. Like, you don't even have to have a conversation, in my view. Like, TikTok is a threat to the national security of the United States. And that's why. Why? It's going to people Jason Calacanis (00:55:05): who are like, it's just an app. It's just an app. Why? Why? Why? Keith Rabois (00:55:08): So I think there's different dimensions. One of the problems is there's so many things wrong with TikTok that actually sometimes people get confused because there's not just one of these or sometimes there's just one that. So they are definitely using the app to track data about Americans. And there's evidence that regardless of what alleged protections exist, there are people in China monitoring what certain people in the United States are doing. And the CEO lied under oath to congressional committees about this, and the evidence is now in the public domain. Hopefully, this Justice Department will prosecute him for lying on earth. I think setting a really good example that you cannot just purge yourself before Congress. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:55:46): Sorry, Keith. Can you double-click into that? So what did—how did it come into the open source that what he said was a lie? Like, what what is Keith Rabois (00:55:53): So there are people in China who, on the record, have said they had access and have had access to American user data, which he swore under oath to Congress that they were storing the data in Texas somewhere, and that there's no possibility that, you know, Chinese nationals in China could access the data. There are now several instantiations of this in the public record, let alone what's privately available. Jason Calacanis (00:56:18): Yeah. I mean, the case specifically too back in 2022, ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, had used an app to track locations, had used their app to track the location of journalists because they were trying to track leaks outside of TikTok. Keith Rabois (00:56:33): Then secondly, let me keep going here because it's worse. So there's a law. The fundamental problem is in China, there's a law that says if you're a Chinese company, upon request of the CCP, you must provide all user data. So any Chinese company is subject to that law, period. There's no court intervention. You don't need a subpoena, blah blah blah. And so any executive of that company is subject to significant penalties on the record for not providing any user data at the request of the CCP. So as long as that law exists, there's a real structural threat to the United States. Now then there's the issue of the app being used, manipulated on a content basis to influence, you know, policy in the United States to disadvantage this or that or create hostilities. I don't really know the answer. I think there's been studies that suggest that and, you know, pretty rigorous methodologies, but that's a second level. And then third is why the hell are we allowing Chinese companies to compete with us when no American content-based organization is allowed into the Chinese market? Reciprocity. Whether it's Meta, Google, etc. You know, there's a strong argument there that Reddit, if you don't allow our content or non-Chinese content into your market, why should we be enabling Chinese companies to be successful, in quotes, in the U.S. market? And that's more of a fair trade, free trade. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:58:06): Keith, do you think that the Pegasus spyware that can infiltrate WhatsApp so that you can turn on the mic and listen remotely, and it has no fingerprints, it's very difficult to detect, do you think an equivalent, let's call it a backdoor, exists inside of TikTok? Keith Rabois (00:58:22): Yes. So my evidence for this that I believe is an interpolation of what's in the public domain is if you looked at that vote to ban TikTok, it was extremely bipartisan despite, you know, controversy. And what happened was that vote was taken a week after there was an intelligence briefing to both the House and Senate intelligence committees that was confidential. And the votes, you know, all of a sudden flowed through. I think there are things that are not in the public domain about TikTok that spooked a lot of elected officials and led to this bipartisan consensus. How many bipartisan votes do we see on an allegedly controversial issue that, you know, basically, the vote was, like, you know, like, not even close in either house. Jason Calacanis (00:59:05): 360 to 58. Keith Rabois (00:59:08): Yeah. When you see a vote like that on something meaningful, never. Yeah. Yeah. Like, it basically Jason Calacanis (00:59:13): They definitely got spooked. And, I mean, if you just think about Navy SEALs, Special Forces, they're not allowed to use a lot of these apps. Government officials aren't to use these apps because they know that all you have to do is, like, if you tracked somebody's child and their TikTok usage, now you know what parent is. You start thinking about the security and safety of individuals in the government. Crazy. Keith Rabois (00:59:33): So 352 votes for an incredibly popular product. Yes. Think about how bad somebody has to be to get a consensus of 352 votes on an app that's used by, you know, a huge fraction of the American public. Jason Calacanis (00:59:49): Passed the Senate 79 to 18, and you are right. If you say you're gonna ban TikTok, Vivek was against TikTok, but then he opened one because that's where voters are. You're gonna lose that generation of voters. Pretty scary. Keith Rabois (01:00:02): Arguably. I mean arguably? Okay. Theory. There's some risk. I I can sum that. Jason Calacanis (01:00:06): Okay. Biden can, if he's awake, extend this window by 90 days. I don't know if grandpa is up for it, but he could extend it a bit. And, obviously, this with the Trump campaign, you know, he says a lot of different things. Trump has flip-flopped a couple of times during his first term. He tried to ban it. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:00:25): Wait till he gets the readout that the rest of these guys got. Jason Calacanis (01:00:30): Yeah. And, well, and then he had, Megadonor and TikTok investor Jeff Yass gave PACs $50 million, and he owns 15% of it. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:00:38): When I had dinner with him, this is one of the things that I pointed out to him was this specific thing. I said, you have to look at the Pegasus-like equivalent infiltration of WhatsApp having been done on TikTok. Because the reality is if TikTok has 200 million users, it is true that, you know, 199,999,000 just don't matter. So you could turn on the microphone. You're not gonna hear anything. But there are probably 1,000 to 10,000 to 15,000 people, and I do suspect that state actors are smart enough to figure out how to triangulate who you would wanna be able to turn it on when that phone is in your pocket or when that phone is on a desk. And I'm sure you will hear all kinds of random things. And many of those things could be quite sensitive in nature. So I think that this is something that the government's gonna have to look at really intensely. Jason Calacanis (01:01:39): There's such a simple test here. What are they doing with their own people in China? They are in a police state there. They make the Stasi jealous how much they're tracking individuals in China. So if they'll do it to their own people, they would have no problem doing it to an adversary. And ask yourself, if the shareholders care about money, they would be willing to divest. Right? No problem. They wanna take the company public. So if you won't divest and get off the board as a CCP, it's because you see this as a valuable tool. Right? I mean, just work through the basic logic, folks. Keith Rabois (01:02:11): Right. At some price point. Right? Like, what I would do if I were president, I'd say, you tell me the fair market price for TikTok, and I'll go, you know, I'll make sure that there's buyers. Right. But because CCP won't name any price Jason Calacanis (01:02:24): There is no price. That allows David Friedberg (01:02:25): them the greatest tool they Keith Rabois (01:02:26): could ever have. Here's the point. Right? Jason Calacanis (01:02:28): That would be like giving up your nukes. Keith Rabois (01:02:30): I don't think they should have to sell at a less than fair market price. I think that's, you know, legit. Like, I believe in capitalism. But there any free market should allow for, you know, some price discovery. And if they can't name any price, period, that suggests that you're doing something that's nefarious. Jason Calacanis (01:02:47): There's no reason to get by Keith Rabois (01:02:48): the way, Chamath, you probably know this. You know, if you meet, like, at least, you know, some of the times I've met with the president, they take your phone away. Why do they take your phone away? Chamath Palihapitiya (01:02:57): A hundred percent. Why. Exactly. Pretty obvious. Yeah. Exactly. Jason Calacanis (01:03:00): Also, there are phones that can be designed to be weapons as we've seen, a number of people got some nut shots with their pagers recently. Alright. Let's talk about venture as we wrap up here. Man, Keith Rabois, cooking with oil, new Sacks, new red meat Sacks. Are you a steak guy too? You eat a steak once in a while? Keith Rabois (01:03:18): Oh, of course. Jason Calacanis (01:03:19): What's your cut? What's your cut? Are you coulotte? Are you a ribeye guy? I this David Friedberg (01:03:24): is not Tom Keith Rabois (01:03:24): The obvious is how 8 to 10, 12 ounces max, medium, you know, solid. I don't really care of Jason Calacanis (01:03:30): the cut. Yeah. Keith Rabois (01:03:31): You'll just Pretty much. But Wagyu, I'll I'll I'll be a little non-American. Go Wagyu. You know, like, Australia or Japanese. Yeah. Sure. Jason Calacanis (01:03:38): Alright. Alright. I think, just shout out to my friend, Kimbo. Keith Rabois (01:03:41): I'm a magic of red you know, red meat Republican. Of course. Of course. Jason Calacanis (01:03:44): I'm a big fan of this coulotte slash the Kanye stuff. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:03:47): You know you know what I bought? Yes. I just bought recently a a Denver cut, which I've never tried. Incredible. Denver cut. Okay. There you go. Yeah. Jason Calacanis (01:03:55): Alright. Let's wrap up with a venture update here at the darkest hour, Keith. Sometimes before the dawn, VC deal activity has, getting close to, pre-COVID numbers in 2019. Obviously, major funding drop-off happened in 2022. Yeah. It's been a couple of years of this, but deals, the number of deals is coming back. The amount being put to work coming back to, I would say, the steady state, perhaps even normal level. And, but VC exits sadly are not keeping up. But we did have ServiceNow go public today, up 50%. And the wrath of Lina Khan is officially over. She's out. Andrew Ferguson is in. This looks like a great appointment. Another one by Trump in the column of somebody who wants to allow business to occur and wants a free market. He wants to do basically everything Lina Khan didn't do, which is allow some Roy, what's your pulse like here, and what's your take on the venture industry? And then we'll go into M&A and exits. We'll start with just investing. Is it ramping up? Are you seeing high-quality companies? Keith Rabois (01:05:07): Well, I'd say that you should cut that data by AI and non-AI, and you might see a tale of two different cities. My anecdotal experience is there's AI companies where the market's pretty hot, maybe clearly a little bit, but hot, and AI companies with the right team are getting funded, you know, frequently, quickly, etc. And then there's non-AI companies, and I think you'll see a very different, you know, sort of chart there. I do think net-net, you're probably at a steady state that looks reasonable across 40 years, you know, like, etc. But it would be interesting. And, you know, you have to make some methodological decisions about what's an AI company, what's not. But if you could do that, it'd be interesting to see if the lines, you know, look similar or not. But it's pretty hot. Like, people started companies. Founders are optimistic. Crypto companies also, you know, are back in vogue, obviously, due to the change in administration. I think a lot of people had been hesitant to start new crypto companies and, you know, there's always, yeah, and confidence in the new administration, the SEC, etc. So we'll see if innovation accelerates, you know, with all of the new capital and all the new founders back in crypto. In enterprise software, it had been pretty cool. Non-AI-based enterprise software, but, you know, like, as you mentioned with the IPO this week, trading very aggressively, I think, you know, maybe there's some inspiration there for, you know, more traditional boring tech companies. Stripe. Stripe. Stripe should go public, but, you know, they don't listen to me. So Jason Calacanis (01:06:35): Yeah. You did not. Why aren't they going public, Keith? What's the story with the boys over there? Why don't Chamath Palihapitiya (01:06:40): they get disrupted by crypto stablecoins. So Jason Calacanis (01:06:43): I mean, seriously, talk about missing your window. Get out there, boys. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:06:47): They bought that crypto stablecoin company for, like, $1 billion. Yeah. Defensive. Keith Rabois (01:06:51): I personally believe and subscribe to the view companies should go public as early as possible. I'm in the group Bill Gurley, yeah, sort of school of thought. Jason Calacanis (01:06:57): What amount of revenue? What amount of revenue? Put a Keith Rabois (01:06:59): number 1 million minimum, but predictability matters, you know, definitely. So do 50. Like but 50 with line of sight to 100 and knowing 100 to 200. I wrote a whole chapter in Elad Gil's, you know, High Growth Handbook on why companies should go public as early as possible. So I've been on this crusade forever. I like accountability, transparency, discipline. I think they're good things. And, you know, there's a critique that, like, oh, you're not gonna be innovative anymore. If you look at some of the companies we've been talking about, what are some of the most innovative companies in the world, they're public companies. It just takes the right leader to say, I'm going to be innovative, and I don't care what the bureaucrats and lawyers, you know, I'm just not gonna get distracted with that. And so I like public companies, and so I think you'll see a lot of the companies I am involved in go public at a fairly rapid clip by historical standards. Different founders, though, have different, yeah, sort of views on this. It's very reasonable. Stripe, SpaceX, you know, for example, founded 2003. Who knows, you know, if it's gonna be a public company? So you can have a very successful company like SpaceX or Stripe. But my preference is to go public early, and then you have the capital resources, equity, or capital to be strategic and per your point about potentially missing window. And they were able to transact, you know, in that particular case and get ahead of the curve or at least not miss the curve. But sometimes when you're a private company, there are strategic assets that you can't get your hands on. And, you know, think about Facebook buying Instagram. We talked about the taste issue. Instagram had taste at the time. Like, Kevin had taste. And think about where Meta would be, had they not been able to acquire Instagram. Jason Calacanis (01:08:39): Yeah. Totally, totally different timeline. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:08:42): for the public currency to have bought WhatsApp. Keith Rabois (01:08:44): Yeah. Or WhatsApp. Jason Calacanis (01:08:46): So optionality increases as you have that public currency. If you're a private buying a private, the acquired company needs to believe that you're gonna get it over the finish line. They're gonna have some liquidity at some point. Whereas with the public, I mean, they just sell within whatever their window is. Chamath, your thoughts. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:09:00): Well, I was just gonna ask Keith a question, which is what is the game theory behind Stripe not going out? Like, what's the what's the strategic rationale? Keith Rabois (01:09:09): You know, honestly yeah. Without sharing, like, you know, one-on-one conversation sort of stuff, I think the question, the burden they they inverted the burden, which is why should we go public? A lot of fat a lot of people ask the question the opposite way, which is, you know, why wouldn't I go public? I think their first principle thinkers, like, put for my point about Trump and I think true of Elon, they asked, like, why? And they're like, well, what advantages would we get? And I actually think the M&A one is very real. Jason Calacanis (01:09:39): It is. Keith Rabois (01:09:39): now. Yeah. I think they've been able to construct alternatives to most of the advantages, but not every company is gonna be able to do that. It took a lot of effort, energy. And then the question is, would you substitute that energy into something else that might be higher value creation if you weren't to, like, creating the alternatives to a public structure? Jason Calacanis (01:09:58): That is a great answer. Friedberg, your thoughts here on public markets, M&A, the end of the wrath of Lina Khan, and what we might see in the new year post- David Friedberg (01:10:07): I disagree with the conflation of Lina Khan into all this stuff too much. She's a big company break-apart kind of mandate. It has nothing to do with tech M&A, small like, the typical kind of deal flow stuff that I think you're focused on. I've said this a number of times. I'll just say it again. But I think on the, on the general liquidity thing, I don't think that the thing holding up acquisitions and IPOs is markets. I actually think it's investor and board expectations on valuation relative to where they put money in the last couple of years. So if you look at the valuations from '21 to '23, you know, early '23, so much money went in at such high prices. Those investors can take those companies public today. There's a public market appetite at all times for anything. It just depends on valuation. And the real issue right now is that a lot of the VCs, the late-stage private equities, the ones that did the big markups in the late-stage D rounds, E rounds, etc., they don't want to take these things out and take a 60, 70 percent haircut on the IPO. They'd rather let this thing sit private and see if they can earn their way back into the valuation that they did the mark at when they put the round together. Keith Rabois (01:11:13): I 100% agree. 100% agree with this. Jason Calacanis (01:11:17): Yeah. I mean, these overhangs are very real. David Friedberg (01:11:20): I don't think the exit liquidity dearth fundamentally is driven by markets. I think it's just driven by the sell side and the investor expectations. Jason Calacanis (01:11:28): Also a culture thing, I have to say. Like, in talking to a number of, like, the leaders of these public companies that were very acquisitive in M&A, they are taking the position. It's easier for us to build a competing function, a competing adjacency, than do any tuck-ins. They just told the corp dev people pencils down, and they are not wanting to spend a year or two on a deal when they have a breakup fee, when they see what happened with Adobe, or they just think, well, why don't we do those big deals ourselves. Keith Rabois (01:11:57): Yep. David Friedberg (01:11:57): Those are big deals. The small deals are different. The small deals are more the small deals are the fact that over a couple of years, like, Google bought a cybersecurity company. Like, there are these acquisitions that happened at 800 million that maybe should have been done at 200, 250. And, again, it's the same problem that the sellers of the high-quality companies demand too high a premium that the buyers of these rational scaled companies are like, that's not worth it. Just like IPO candidates. So I don't know, Keith, if you've got experience in Keith Rabois (01:12:22): the I also agree. So I used to be an antitrust litigator, which I know Jason knows. And I think I hate, like, you know, the current leadership, the antitrust division. I called her a fraud. I think she is intellectually a fraud. Jason Calacanis (01:12:34): Why? Why is she Keith Rabois (01:12:35): Well, she published a paper that was false. Like like, there she it it the her her whole claim to fame is this paper about Amazon. And the data in Amazon the data she used in the in the paper at Yale was false and She's too smart to have done it accidentally. Benedict Evans wrote a good critique of it if you wanna read all about the data. Second thing is you look at Amazon, which is this alleged, like, quintessential example. Have you heard of Shopify? Shopify is one of the biggest success stories over the last decade, right down the middle of competitive Amazon, and there was nothing Amazon could do. They lost the core market to a competitor that was started and, you know, went public at a very low valuation. And Shopify is dominating DTC commerce. Nobody builds a DTC commerce brand except on Shopify. So everything about her is like a fraud. 100%. That said, I don't believe that what she's done has affected, you know, excellence very much at all. Because, like, the truth is in high-end venture, like institutional venture capital. Other than the WhatsApp and, like, maybe, like, a Plaid acquisition or something, you know, one every two years, you don't drive returns in venture to an institutional venture capital fund through an Like, WhatsApp may be the only one that really drove a fund-returning exit to a serious fund. It just doesn't happen that way. I need IPOs, like, to return our funds. Our funds are, like, billions of dollars. You don't get returns on lots of acquisitions at $50 million to $100 million. Jason Calacanis (01:13:57): to $200 million to $300 million to $300 million fund still. Keith Rabois (01:14:00): But there but most funds have ballooned for lots of reasons. David Friedberg (01:14:04): There are a Jason Calacanis (01:14:04): lot of big ones. Keith Rabois (01:14:05): Yeah. And that's actually led to some of the perversity that, you know, David talked about. As if the funds get large, their tendency to do these things also increases. So, yes, a seed fund can drive returns on M&A acquisitions that might be deterred in a bad, you know, hostile administration. Yeah. Does my major fund of $500 million to $2 billion drive returns through M&A? No. Jason Calacanis (01:14:29): No. I mean, they could fill in the first 1x, maybe. Yeah. Keith Rabois (01:14:32): I've been lobbying officials for a long time on this crusade. They come in and they expect that, oh, you know, M&A, blah blah blah blah. And I'm like, no. No. No. I could care less. Only my most mediocre companies are acquired. Jason Calacanis (01:14:43): And the IPO window has started to crack open. Just to give you a couple more data points, gentlemen. WeRide, the Chinese-based self-driving car company, went public on the Nasdaq last month. $4.5 billion market cap. Pony.ai, another Chinese-based self-driving car company, went public in November. Klarna plans to go public in the U.S. I think they quietly filed ServiceTitan today, the taping of this on Thursday, and Shein, the fast fashion company. Well, Keith Rabois (01:15:12): Shein's gonna have some real problems in the new administration. Jason Calacanis (01:15:16): Yeah. Right. Tariffs. As we wrap here, that's a good place to wrap on. What what do you think of, I guess, two issues, Keith. We'll we'll end with politics since we started there. Two things seem perplexing to people in finance. One is tariffs and how that's going to work. And the other is inflation and what the impact would be on 15 million people being shipped out of the country and the impact that would have on inflation vis-a-vis the unemployment rate getting even lower than the historic low it's been in our lifetimes. What do you think of those two issues? Take either one. Keith Rabois (01:15:54): Well, I think, first of all, the Treasury Secretary understands this. Like, I think Scott actually from everybody I've talked to—I don't know him, but I have interviewed about 10 or 12 people that are very successful on Wall Street, and every single one of them universally has acclaim for him. And they've all made points to me that these kinds of subtleties, he really does grok. And so when he says you can raise tariffs without inflation, he understands how all this substitution works and is running an equation in his brain. He's a very successful trader, and that's a really good skill. For also Chamath's earlier points about Darwinistic evolution of brilliant people being successful, understanding how the economy actually works, he's perfect. So I think you're gonna see real tariffs, like, especially against China. And the Trump administration is completely committed to reducing inflation, the cost of eggs, you know, and the groceries. And I think those things can be reconciled. I know amateur economists, you know, with random degrees from Wharton don't think so. But as Trump pointed out in the debate and, you know, J.D. Vance pointed out with some research, his first administration imposed all these tariffs, and there was no inflation. And then J.D. Vance pointed out that the Federal Reserve has a study that says, you know, housing prices, which are a primary driver of affordability for a normal American, are inflated because of illegal immigration. So I think this administration And Jason Calacanis (01:17:16): not making more units. I mean Well, I think this administration Yeah. Keith Rabois (01:17:20): There is substitution, right? If the price of one gig goes up, consumers typically have, you know, unlike people on this podcast, typically have a limited budget. And at the end of the day, if one price goes up, you have to substitute somewhere else, so the debt deflation might be negative even. So in any event, this administration is not naive, and the people that Trump has put in place to drive this in Treasury, the National Economic Council absolutely understand this, and they're committed to driving down actual prices. The hardest area is gonna be health care. That is really, really difficult, and it is a major driver of cost to a normal person. And Obamacare has been a disaster. The question is, what do you do about that, and I don't have an answer for you right away. I have some ideas. Jason Calacanis (01:18:03): Chamath, your thoughts on tariffs and or immigration and inflation, and that seems to be a place where even across the aisle, you got people debating it. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:18:12): I think Keith said it pretty well, which is that we do have a lot of experience with how tariffs can be implemented and that the practical experience is not what the fear-mongering is about. That being said, I think the devil will be in the details, which markets for which goods, what is the tariff, and why. What I hope happens is that if we can really study the second- and third-order degree impacts of some of these markets, what the tariff does is it acts almost as a reverse subsidy for American companies to compete. I'll give you one very narrow example. If you believe in electrifying the American economy, one of the underlying things that you need are electric motors. Right? Electric motors and electric batteries. And just to double-click on electric motors for a second, electric motors need a permanent magnet. If you look inside of a permanent magnet, there are these rare earths that are just required to make these magnets. But as it turns out, it is impossible for any company that is not a Chinese company to be able to manufacture these magnets in an economically viable way. And the reason is because not only can China make it and they can make it in the absence of a lot of environmental controls, they'll also subsidize. So if anybody tries to compete, they'll just inject a subsidy into that economic supply chain where they're always cheaper. So what do you do, Jason? If you can observe that and realize that we want supply chain diversity, what the tariff does is it starts to push back on those kinds of activities because it doesn't allow it to continue to work. Then if you take that with what the United States government already does through the DOE, which is through subsidies and underwriting, this is what I mean by it could be a really amazing new moment for the American economy. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:20:09): And that would please a lot of people, including a lot of people on the left if they just took the time to understand what's being proposed. Jason Calacanis (01:20:15): I mean, look at rare earths. You mentioned them. We have some of the great deposits in the world in our country. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:20:23): Why can't we get the largest lithium deposits in the world? Jason Calacanis (01:20:25): It's because of environmental regulations. And it's the same thing with Starship going up. But we got a lot of regulations in this country. I understand people want to do the right thing, but we also have a lot of debt. And if we could start mining rare earth metals here and maybe loosen the regulations Chamath Palihapitiya (01:20:40): The lithium supply chain is another really good one that's emblematic of all of this, but there are so many other markets. Like, I'm sure that if you looked in something that's a little bit more down the middle like appliances, what you would also see is the same thing where Whirlpool will try to make an appliance or Bissell will try to make a vacuum cleaner. And the Chinese equivalent makes it almost like fighting uphill. And there has to be a way to course correct that. Jason Calacanis (01:21:08): Well, I mean, look at BYD. Some of these cars, they're just copying wholesale everything Tesla has done in their design and feature set, and they're half the price. And so they were selling really well in countries that allowed them and they would decimate U.S. automakers and German automakers if David Friedberg (01:21:24): they were Chamath Palihapitiya (01:21:25): different. A different version of this. I wrote this in my weekly newsletter, but I was curious why these Chinese models are so good. And I was like, the training of these models seems to be quite fast. The quality of these models is really good, the Alibaba model, etcetera. And part of what you realize is when they do their training runs, the Chinese models have no guardrails in the sense that there's no copyright checks. No. There's just none of these things that otherwise slow down an American company to make a useful model. They don't have any of those things. So that's another example where maybe there's not an economic tariff, but there has to be a simple reciprocity. And in the absence of reciprocity, I think it's reasonable to say that there need to be checks and balances. Jason Calacanis (01:22:11): Friedberg, you have anything to add there on tariffs or okay. For Chamath Palihapitiya, your chairman, dictator, the sultan of science, and Newsacks, better BMI, hates dictators. What's your take on Ukraine? Maybe we could fire up a Ukraine discussion. I can get into it. No. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:22:28): No. No. No. It's the one episode. How do you Jason Calacanis (01:22:30): feel about Ukraine? No. No. No. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:22:32): Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Jason Calacanis (01:22:32): Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. With Keith. Keith Rabois (01:22:34): By the time you have me back, hopefully that's solved. Jason Calacanis (01:22:37): Hopefully, that's solved. Day 1. We're gonna saw the land day 1. Okay? Keith, you're excellent. You're an expert. Keith Rabois, excellent husband. Very, very effective. Great, great American. Great host. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:22:50): Great talk host. Jason Calacanis (01:22:51): Awesome on you may have heard of 2 words, all in. Okay. You may have heard of it. David Sacks. Brilliant crypto. I mean, we didn't even dive into crypto. I mean, people are going a Chamath Palihapitiya (01:23:03): little nutty on this crypto. Jason Calacanis (01:23:04): What do you think about all this crazy crypto going on here, Keith? Everything spiking back up, XRP, Bitcoin. What do you think of Saylor? I know the Saylor fans are, like, obsessing about him coming on the pod. What do you think of Saylor taking these loans to buy Bitcoin and that other people are following suit to put it in their treasury? Keith Rabois (01:23:24): Well, short version on crypto generally is I still think the primary use case is speculation, and not that there's anything wrong with that. People speculate on stocks, retail trading. People speculate on football games, gambling. Like, the natural tendency for humans to want to speculate is very real. The art to me is because everybody's now a node connected into these crypto, let's call Bitcoin, you know, can you build an application on top that would have too much inertia, too much friction to start from scratch, but it has real value? And I think it's possible because so many people are now connected based upon speculation initially. So that's what's exciting to me. But, you know, we've watched speculation before in crypto markets, and, you know, it's very volatile. So, hopefully, someone builds real layers of productivity or utility on top. It takes advantage of the network. It's a little bit like back in your days at Facebook, Chamath. You know, you had the social graph, and you'd say, you know, you'd build applications on top of the social graph. But if you had to create a social graph from scratch, that was a heroic effort, and nobody else is gonna do it. That was, like, literally the Facebook monopoly story. And so I think that's true of crypto. There's lots of nodes. Someone's got a social your social graph against Jason Calacanis (01:24:33): And there's no Zuckerberg to rug pull and say you David Friedberg (01:24:35): can't. Someone's gotta Keith Rabois (01:24:36): Build. Someone's gotta build the application on top, and that'd be extremely exciting. Jason Calacanis (01:24:40): What do you think, Friedberg? You were monitoring this Saylor situation, the Mr. MicroStrategy? The way people David Friedberg (01:24:47): seems. Well, I think the way the Saylor financial structure is set up is it looks a lot like a synthetic call option on Bitcoin. You get a convertible note, so you earn a coupon on the note. And then you have a conversion price which is a premium to the stock price which you can translate. If you look at the book value or the net asset value of the stock, that's how much Bitcoin there is. And the premium it was 2 to 1, Jason Calacanis (01:25:14): I think, or 2 and a half to 1. David Friedberg (01:25:16): The yeah. The premium that the conversion price is at tells you what Bitcoin needs to be for you to have equity upside. So it's effectively a convertible note. You earn a coupon and then you have a conversion premium that you can kind of convert to equity, which basically gives you a call option. You're saying, the premium you're paying is the price for the call option effectively. And you're earning this kind of coupon in the meantime. So it's a way for some people to kind of trade the price of Bitcoin. Seems like this guy said a lot of hedge funds and I don't know if you guys saw the CNBC article that it's kind of like or Bloomberg. It's like the hottest trade in hedge fund land right now is to buy up these convertible notes that he's issuing. So if you actually were to sit down and do the Black-Scholes modeling of the, the value of the synthetic call option that he's selling you with the convertible note, there's a reason people are paying for it. They think that there's value there. So there's certainly something to the structure that makes sense. Jason Calacanis (01:26:09): Alright. So for your sultan of science, the dictator, and Fitzsacks. Fitzsacks here. Low BMI, low heart rate. What's the heart rate at right now, Keith? Keith Rabois (01:26:19): 40 to 42, like, measured by Eight Sleep in a typical day. Jason Calacanis (01:26:25): Oh, Eight Sleep. Wonderful. What do you think of our next, by the way? Keith Rabois (01:26:28): Oh, well, we'll see. I don't know if I would have made that trade, honestly. Jason Calacanis (01:26:31): But for Karl-Anthony Towns? Really? Yeah. Fascinating. He's playing so good. Keith Rabois (01:26:35): I know. But, like, I think you had the chemistry all dialed in, and hopefully they could build back better, you know, of, like, buying Jason Calacanis (01:26:42): this better. Absolutely. Alright. Listen. We'll see you all next time. Don't worry. Sacks isn't going anywhere. It's just a little bit busy right now. There's a transition going on. Sacks is transitioning, and we'll see. The pod will transition as well. We'll see what it looks like in the new year. Chamath Palihapitiya (01:26:58): We have a good lineup of cohosts. Jason Calacanis (01:27:00): We're gonna do eight weeks. It's gonna be all in idle. All in idle is occurring. We're we're rotating people in, and you get to vote, audience. David Friedberg (01:27:08): Keith, that was great. Thank you. Jason Calacanis (01:27:09): You did great, Keith. Keith Rabois (01:27:10): That was awesome. Thank you for joining us. For sponsoring. Really, really Jason Calacanis (01:27:14): excellence. Yes. Keith Rabois (01:27:15): That's good, guys. Jason Calacanis (01:27:51): We should all just get a room and just have one big huge orgy because they're all just useless. It's like this, like, sexual tension that we just need to release somehow. Let