嘉宾访谈·中文精读

阿尔温德·克里希纳与尼克什·阿罗拉:量子威胁、开放权重与前沿 AI、AI 网络战及 SaaS 崩塌

Arvind Krishna & Nikesh Arora: Quantum Threat, Open vs Frontier AI, AI Cyber Warfare & SaaS Collapse

克里希纳与阿罗拉讨论量子计算对加密的威胁、开放权重与前沿AI的经济账、AI网络战与监管,以及SaaS崩塌和软件栈整合。

官方音频00:00 / --:--

本期章节点时间可跳到音频对应位置

  1. 0:00阿尔温德·克里希纳与尼克什·阿罗拉谈量子计算对加密的威胁
  2. 9:07开放权重与前沿 AI 模型之争
  3. 18:07AI 与网络战
  4. 21:14AI 监管与全球 AI 军备竞赛
  5. 30:32垂直整合与软件行业整合
中文精读由 AI 基于原始节目改写,非官方翻译,可能存在偏差或错误;观点归属与表述以原音频与官方文稿为准。说明

DARPA 办了一场叫 QBI(Quantum Benchmarking Initiative,量子基准计划)的比赛,几年前有几百家公司报名,现在只剩大约 13 家。IBM 董事长兼 CEO 阿尔温德·克里希纳(Arvind Krishna)在 All-In 的这场对谈里用这个数字说明一件事:真正能造出可用量子计算机的公司,比大家想象的少得多。

但剩下这 13 家只要有一家成功,今天整个互联网的加密体系就会失效。时间点各方还在争论,2028、2029、2033 都有人提,取中位数大约在 2030 年。克里希纳的原话很直接:

它会把今天的密码学打穿,这件事不需要假设,这就是现实。如果它真的会发生,那你该用什么密码学来保护自己?(阿尔温德·克里希纳)

他还补了一句听起来很扎心的话:今天你有一块加密硬盘被偷了,对方可以把它放五年,等量子计算机成熟了再破。后量子密码学(post-quantum cryptography)的代码其实早就写好了,标准也公开,问题是大家太懒,没去换。

量子计算的进度条:先看纠错,再看门数每年能不能加一个零

查马斯·帕里哈皮蒂亚(Chamath Palihapitiya)追问了一个关键问题:我们现在设计的抗量子方案,是基于人类对量子计算的理论理解,那它真的牢靠吗?

克里希纳承认,这种“牢靠”跟今天经典计算机破不了 RSA 是同一个级别的牢靠,它建立在复杂性理论和计算机科学的假设上,但并不是数学定理级别的证明。换句话说,这是一场押注,押的是学术界对量子算法能力边界的判断没有错。

那怎么判断量子计算走到哪一步了?克里希纳给了两个可以盯着看的里程碑。

第一个里程碑是纠错。今天的量子计算机都是玩具,能做特定问题,但错误率高得离谱,也没有真正的扩展路径。谁先在真实运行的量子计算机上(不是模拟,不是旁路)演示出纠错或错误缓解,谁就拿到了下一轮的入场券。他预测明年就会有人宣称做到了,但需要第三方去验证;真正有实质进展大概在 2027 年。

第二个里程碑是门计算规模。今天大多数玩家在 1 万次门计算这个量级。对比一下:你口袋里的 iPhone 每分钟能做几十亿次运算。1 万听起来像个笑话。真正的看点落在增速上:如果每年能在后面加一个零,2029 年就是 1000 万次门计算。克里希纳说,那个量级“能做出来的事情会把所有人吓一跳”。

萨克斯追问了“逻辑量子比特”这个术语。克里希纳说他不太喜欢这个词,因为它让人误以为纠错之后四个物理比特就能稳定变成一个逻辑比特,像 DRAM 单元那样干净。实际上一台机器的纠错是一个整体过程,粗略换算大概是 200 个物理比特对应 1 个逻辑比特。

AI 能不能绕过量子计算直接破解密码?他给出了一个物理层面的否定

萨克斯提到一位资深 AI 研究者的观点:不用等 2029 年,今天的 AI 模型就可能先一步破解密码学。逻辑是在数论前沿,AI 也许能发现人类没发现的证明路径,找到素数分布更好的预测方式,从而用纯经典算力破解加密。OpenAI 那周发布的数学成果被当成了这个预言的早期信号。

克里希纳罕见地“较真”了一次,从物理层面给出了否定:

你不能在另一种架构上模拟某件事,还指望得到更高效的结果。量子计算机不运行算术运算,而所有经典计算机包括 GPU 都运行算术运算。AI 能不能发现新的量子算法?当然能。但它能不能高效运行这个算法?不可能,会慢一千到一万倍。(阿尔温德·克里希纳)

他的意思很清楚:AI 可以帮你找到算法,但拿不到量子算法真正的好处,必须要有量子硬件。不过他也没把话说死。萨克斯坚持说经典算力也许有另一条路径,克里希纳的回应是:理论上可能,但“如果破解一个密钥要花十年,大多数人也已经安息了”,这算不上一个实际可用的答案。

“你现在就该换掉 IT 栈了,我们已经晚了”

尼克什·阿罗拉(Nikesh Arora)是 Palo Alto Networks 的 CEO,他从防御方的视角把这件事说得更紧迫。

他提醒在场的人一个容易被忽略的事实:加密密钥分散在你整套 IT 基础设施的每一个角落,每条链路的每一端都有厂商的密钥。所以量子计算一旦成熟,能被破的是所有还没换成抗量子的地方,一处都跑不掉。

你不能等到 2029 或者 2030 年再动手。不会有一天所有人突然说,糟糕,我们花 5 万亿美元把 IT 基础设施全烧了重来一遍。你今天就该开始替换成量子安全的基础设施。(尼克什·阿罗拉)

中间方案是有的:市面上已经有可以立刻部署的技术,在流量外面再包一层后量子密钥,作为过渡。阿罗拉估了一下在场企业的状况,说你们今年 earmark 的几亿美元 IT 预算里,大概一半投在了不抗量子的基础设施上。

开源权重与前沿模型的取舍,本质是一笔成本账

查马斯把话题拉回当下,他问两位怎么看开源、闭源、前沿、开源权重这一整个光谱。

阿罗拉给了一个很实用的分层思路:先按任务决定需要多少智能,再算这份智能在这个任务上的成本。

他举了自己公司的例子。Palo Alto 在端点侧每年花 20 美元,就能检查几百 MB 的流量,靠的是跑在你设备本地的机器学习模型,几十 MB 的模型文件。如果把所有这些流量都送到 OpenAI 去,用 token 计价,那么光一家公司的消耗可能就抵得上 OpenAI 一整年的营收。这显然不现实。所以那部分工作最后会落到压缩过的、任务专用的小语言模型上,训练到 99.9% 准确率就够用。

但反过来也有另一面。当你正在被攻击,客户知道这起入侵的业务损失以十亿美元计,这时候就该调最前沿的模型,让它放马过来,“往死里推理”,把攻击止住。所以前沿模型会出现在那些业务价值高到能撑得起成本的地方。

日常的防御场景,阿罗拉的态度是明确的:拿一个开源权重模型,喂自己的专有数据训练,自己管权重,这样才有可审计性、可解释性,出事时能说清是怎么发生的。

克里希纳从经济学角度给出了更具体的数字。今天上一代模型大约 20 美元每百万 token,最顶级的要 50 美元。如果拿一个中国的开源权重模型,比如 Kimi K3 这种 8000 亿参数的,跑在自己的 GPU 上,加上一周左右的工程优化,成本可以压到 1 到 2 美元每百万 token。

哪家企业会拒绝一个便宜 10 倍、甚至 40 倍,还能完成 95% 工作的方案?经济学在这里是决定性的。(阿尔温德·克里希纳)

他还补了两条理由。

第二条是 IP。如果你用的是带思维链的前沿模型,链条本身会被记录、被审计、被对方留存,等于把自己的思路交出去了。品牌和数据资产会逼着企业把模型搬回自己的机房。而前沿模型厂商不会卖给你权重,所以绕一圈还是回到开源权重。

第三条是地缘政治。今天最好的开源权重模型是中国的。克里希纳认为,只要你是把它放进沙箱自己跑,风险很小,从云端调用就是另一回事。但他同时判断,未来一两年西方一定会有同等能力的开源权重模型出来,中美之间的差距最多 6 到 12 个月。

三条加起来,他给的预测是:75% 到 90% 的 token 用户最终会转向开源权重模型。

查马斯继续追问:那剩下的 token 消耗,是真的需要,还是因为默认设置懒得改?克里希纳拿自己开玩笑:

开发者是懒的。你不设管控,他们就会选最贵的那个答案,因为最省事。(阿尔温德·克里希纳)

所以他的建议是,实验阶段放开用最贵的做验证没关系,但一旦进入生产环境,除了极少数场景,继续用最贵的模型就是浪费。

攻击者只需要一个漏洞,防御者要堵住每一个

查马斯换了个角度提问:你们两家实际上是在打一场战争,能不能从人类打过的战争里学到点什么?

克里希纳给出了三条战争逻辑。

第一是联盟。把大家的漏洞集中起来,统一修补,统一下发补丁,让防御联盟的力量超过单个攻击者。这正是阿罗拉在推的合作项目:企业把发现的漏洞交给可信第三方,第三方修好、分发补丁,所有人在同一时间变安全。这套机制和今天网络安全行业共享攻击特征库是一个道理。

第二是成本对称。战争史上最常见的结果是攻击方比防御方便宜,防御方烧钱烧到撑不住就投降。所以目标是把防御做得同样便宜,让攻防成本对称,胜率才会上去。

第三是技术代差。二战、朝鲜、伊拉克,凡是有一方拿到技术优势的,基本都赢了。所以真正的目标是拿到技术优势,把对方的攻击成本抬到无法承受。

阿罗拉补充了 AI 在这件事上的双刃剑属性,他用 Mythos 这类代码模型举例:你教模型什么叫好代码,它同时就学会了什么叫坏代码。模型第一次被放出来扫代码库时,确实找出了大量漏洞,但当时幻觉率还有 30%。问题在于,攻击方只需要一个真实漏洞,防御方要把每一个都找出来补掉。他的估计是在场企业测出来的结果,大概 60% 到 80% 是真漏洞,20% 是幻觉。所以没有人敢不做二次验证就直接让 Claude Code 上去打补丁。

查马斯问了一个更直接的问题:智能体写的代码,是不是没有 bug?克里希纳答得干脆:

不是。但它依然会比人写的代码更强。(阿尔温德·克里希纳)

IBM 现在大约一半的代码由智能体写。之所以更强,是因为智能体在写出代码的同时会跑评估,确保它能发现的问题在代码出门前就被修掉。但克里希纳也承认这里的死结:我们只能找到我们知道怎么找的缺陷。这个循环在计算机科学里是出了名的,验证本身在计算上就不可行。除非输入被严格限定住,否则很难真正证明一段代码正确。

没有一个国家会先停下来,这是这场军备竞赛的前提

萨克斯抛出了一个政治层面的推论:既然不可能出现各国手拉手一起停止 AI 开发的局面,那就必然演变成军备竞赛,必然需要攻防优势、需要算力储备、需要保护产业和就业。这个逻辑能不能说服那些主张叫停 AI 的人?

阿罗拉用一个类比回答:

世界上没有哪项技术在诞生时,人们是同步在建安全体系的。莱特兄弟造飞机的时候没有 TSA。你不会在坐上飞机之前先被要求脱鞋。(尼克什·阿罗拉)

他的判断是,过去一段时间公众被反复展示 AI 的阴暗面,舆论已经过度偏向风险叙事,关于收益的讨论被挤掉了。但这不改变一个事实:没人会减速。他给出的底线是责任归属:

你建造了它,你就要对它负责。你不能放出去之后说,哎呀,我也不知道怎么控制它。这个说法不成立。你是商业企业,你从中获得了经济价值,你就必须承担你签下的那份责任。(尼克什·阿罗拉)

克里希纳把“控制”这件事说得更绝:除非全世界一起唱 Kumbaya 集体减速,否则根本控制不住。而只要有一个国家减速,日本、中国、印度没人会跟着减,他们会说太好了,你慢下来正好给我追赶的机会。他顺手拿欧洲举了例子:因为害怕所有可能性,所以先上监管,结果大家都看到了那边的科技经济有多“活跃”。

关于美国的政治现实,克里希纳给了一段比较内行的观察。参议院 2022 年就开过闭门听证,2023 年开过公开听证,众议院和白宫两届政府都反复讨论过,问题一直在原地打转。他认为 AI 和数据中心的监管议题,很大程度上是被民粹主义驱动的,跟技术现实关系不大。至于“50 个州全部禁止数据中心”这种说法,他的判断是不可能,但 30 个州禁是有可能的,剩下 20 个州会乐开花地把这些投资接走。

萨克斯补充了他上周在华盛顿的一次酒局:一位资深国会议员跟他说了两件事,一是一位全球最大公司之一的 CEO 对网络攻击已经怕到失控,二是第四季度可能出现 50 州联合封杀数据中心。萨克斯转述时自己也承认后一条不太可能,但他强调的是,有人真的在这么想、这么说,这件事本身就是信号。

算力集中在两个国家,这才是真正的不平等

查马斯问了一个更宏观的问题:这些模型能力越来越强,成本越来越低,最后会不会形成“有”和“没有”两个世界?

阿罗拉不太担心软件层面的鸿沟,因为技术会便宜到人人可用。他真正担心的是算力分布:

未来算力的快速发展,大概率只会出现在世界上两个大国。算力现在极度稀缺,你想跑任何规模化的事情都很难拿到。离震中越远,你拿到算力的可能性越低。这跟经济实力无关,纯粹是供给约束。你可能是一家欧洲公司,意图和动力都对,但某天突然发现,因为离震中太远,你拿不到美国或中国公司能拿到的那份算力。(尼克什·阿罗拉)

克里希纳则把它放进了更长的历史周期里。他认为这就是一次典型的资本与劳动的替换,17 世纪发生过,18 世纪发生过,19 世纪又发生过。过去七八轮里,愿意在资本上多投入、而不是死守劳动的一方,每一次都赢了。这一轮也不会例外,而中美这两个国家恰好都愿意走资本密集的路。

他接下来的判断比较尖锐:真正会输的,是那些把社会哲学绑在“保护每一个现有岗位”上的国家。他强调的是“每一个现存工作都不能动”这条红线,而不只是“要给劳动者机会”,这两件事完全不同。工作被替代和被迁移是可以接受的,因为迁移之后可能是更好的工作。决定这一轮谁赢谁输的,是这种社会哲学。

IBM 大型机活了 65 年,靠的是垂直整合

查马斯是垂直整合的坚定信徒,他请克里希纳讲讲 IBM 巅峰时期的故事。

克里希纳说,IBM 大型机之所以能活 65 年,核心原因就是垂直整合。上世纪 60 年代,IBM 是真的“一路做到沙子”:自己找沙、自己做晶圆、自己建晶圆厂、自己做芯片,机器外面那层金属机壳也是自己做的。这么做的好处有两个,一是不让任何 IP 外泄,二是把整个技术栈的利润都留在公司内部。

今天 IBM 唯一不做的是晶圆制造,因为规模不够。但芯片设计、工程、可靠性、大部分软件仍然在内部。他给出的判断标准很清楚:如果这一层能带来非常重要的优势,就该自己做;如果是大宗商品,就买。

阿罗拉把这条逻辑延伸到了今天:英伟达就是垂直整合的现代版本。黄仁勋从最底层一直做到应用层,同时出钱投生态里的每一家,确保大家不偏离他这套纵向体系。垂直整合真正的价值在定价权:

如果你控制了整个纵向栈,你就能决定哪一层被商品化。你可以把利润在层与层之间搬来搬去。当有人攻击你某一层时,你就把那一层的利润池打掉,把利润挪到另一层去。(尼克什·阿罗拉)

查马斯顺势追问:那 OpenAI 和 Anthropic 在应用层最该做的垂直整合是什么?

阿罗拉的回答是,别被“开放模型”“开放权重”这些说法带偏,本质上是开放栈对封闭栈的竞争。他认为像 OpenRouter 这种只做路由的模式,未来会走不通,因为模型对内存和上下文的要求越来越高,推理已经无法和上下文、记忆分离。你能分离的只有推理 token 的搬运,而那点价值撑不起一个独立层。

真正的护城河在个人智能体。当你把所有上下文、所有 API、所有连接都喂给一个智能体,你就被锁定了,把任务搬到下一个栈的摩擦成本太高。所以应用层最终也会形成自己的垂直栈,覆盖软件、推理、记忆、上下文这整条链路。

他还预告了消费端接下来会发生什么:未来三个月,每一家前沿实验室都会在消费入口上全力押注。这个方向他们 6 到 9 个月前试过一次,没成;现在 Meta 演示了它可行,所有人都会跟进。随之而来的是,iPhone 上现存的每一个 App 都必须变成“无头”的。

SaaS 的真正问题在于终值算不出来

萨克斯最后把话题拉到横向扩张和并购。阿罗拉先从网络安全说起。

他这八年的观点没变过:客户不该买 40 个不同的安全产品再自己缝合。他拿自己第一份工作在富达投资(Fidelity)的经历做对比,当时有 23 个系统,今天合起来叫 CRM,那会儿要自己维护主表、拼接表、23 个应用。今天你去买 Salesforce 或 Microsoft Dynamics,一边嫌贵一边用。三十年间发生了什么?整合成了一个平台,客户不再自己缝合。他认为网络安全会走同一条路。

他也很坦诚地说,安全赛道最近估值好,是因为 AI 带来的恐慌,这个溢价会回归理性,因为所有人都会在安全上无限投入。

真正的问题在安全之外:

软件的终值现在很难算。未来五到八年,到底哪些软件能活下来,没有人说得清。很多公司产品市场匹配正在被 AI 直接冲掉。我们都知道,如果 AI 用对了,现在这些软件应该长成什么样。我可以给你一半我买的软件画出一个 AI 原生版本该有的样子,那意味着一定有人会去做。接下来几年 SaaS 会经历巨大的颠覆。(尼克什·阿罗拉)

克里希纳把这个逻辑推得更远,给出了一个规模数字:一家普通企业平均使用 500 到 5000 个不同的软件供应商。在一个要防住所有攻击面的世界里,这本身就是一个巨大的风险敞口。他提的问题很实在:能不能用 AI 能力替掉其中的 490 个,只保留 5 到 10 个主平台?

这意味着大规模整合,因为分发成本决定了这件事的经济性。软件本身的价值在下降,你就负担不起给每一个产品单独建分发渠道。整合会发生,区别只是六个月还是六年。

但他划了一条清晰的界线。被 AI 替代最快的,是那些交互密集的软件。而如果业务要求的是 10 的负 15 次方级别的可靠性,比如零售银行的账务查询、月末结账,那类软件很难被 AI 生成的代码轻易替换,因为替换它的成本优势根本不存在。

以下几条是这场对谈里可以直接拿去用的判断:

  • 查一下你今年的 IT 预算里有多少投在了不抗量子的基础设施上。不用等 2029 年,现在就该开始评估加一层后量子密钥包裹作为过渡,并把新采购的抗量子能力写进供应商要求。
  • 把“用哪个模型”变成一道成本题,而不是面子题。按任务分层:日常高频任务用压缩过的小模型或自托管开源权重模型,只有在业务损失以千万美元计的场景才调前沿模型,并且给生产环境设 token 预算。
  • 如果你在做企业软件,先问自己一个问题:这个产品的 AI 原生版本会长什么样?如果你能清楚画出来,说明一定有人会去做。你要么自己做,要么准备好被整合。
  • 对开源权重模型做一次沙箱测试。别只看它有多强,关键在自托管之后能拿到多少可审计性,以及思维链不外流对你的 IP 有多重要。
  • 算力会是未来几年最硬的约束。如果你不在美国或中国,尽早锁定长期算力合约或区域部署方案,因为供给约束而不是价格,才是你拿不到算力的真实原因。
  • 把漏洞共享当成一个战略动作来做。单打独斗的防御成本永远高于攻击成本,加入或组建修补联盟,是少数能把攻防成本拉回对称的做法。
文稿来自 All-In 官网(allin.com)发布的官方 Transcript,说话人按官网分轨数据标注,个别段落可能张冠李戴。
David Sacks (00:00:00): I know that you guys have been using the t word a lot the last day or two in your conversations, the tokens, but maybe we could kind of pivot a little bit away from AI. I guess it's a little bit rooted in AI, but there's been this big conversation set in the last couple days about cryptography and some of the risks to cryptography. I think it it took root after the OpenAI math drop, but there's more conversations now about this big quantum initiative and how that might kind of take us into an era we need to kinda start to think about adopting quantum cryptography. But, Arvind, maybe we could start and talk a little bit about where things stand today from your view. Arvind Krishna (00:00:37): Sure. So a little bit of what David just touched on is DARPA's been running a competition called QBI or Quantum Benchmarking Initiative. A couple of 100 companies joined it a couple of years ago. I think it's down to maybe 13 are left. So that tells you kind of what's maybe real. I'm calling it maybe not quite real. Some of it is real. And so their goal is who can build a quantum computer that works? Let's sort of put the technology side out of it. And the debates are, is it 2028, 2029, 2033? And sort of if you pick the middle point, let's call it 2030, well, it will break today's cryptography. That's not a supposition. That's just a reality. And if that's gonna happen, then what's the cryptography that you gotta use to protect yourself against that? Unfortunately, for some of you, what's even worse, if you have an encrypted hard disk today that gets stolen, somebody could keep it for five years and break it at that point. The good news is post quantum cryptography is understood. It's well known. The code is written, but people have been too lazy to get to it. But I think the wake up moment is now. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:01:50): Are the solutions that we understand quantum proof or quantum resistant? Because it's sort of based on our basic understanding today of what quantum probably looks like. Arvind Krishna (00:02:00): Yeah. No. It is based on understanding at a theoretical level of what quantum could do. Nikesh Arora (00:02:07): Could do. Arvind Krishna (00:02:07): So they are quantum proof in the same level of rigor that today's cryptography cannot be broken by today's classical computers. That's actually not a theorem proof level answer. It's more based on complexity theory and computer science, which is grounded at the end on some assumptions, not on So if you look at where we are today and that twenty thirty midpoint, can you just walk us through the evolutionary moments that you need to see where Yes. We all have to start paying attention and say, okay. How do we move? Yes. So today, you got toy quantum computers. I'll call I'll call them toys because they can do certain problems, but they are rife with errors. They have no way to scale fully yet. So question one will be, who's the first one who can demonstrate not a simulation, not on the side, but level of error correction or mitigation on a running quantum computer. Step one. And so I'll predict you'll see somebody make claims by next year, then you should get third parties to evaluate all those claims real. You'll find one or two will make progress by 2027. Error correction. Not at scale, but error correction. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:03:24): Yeah. Arvind Krishna (00:03:25): Question two will be, can you run these things at some level of scale? Not yet complete scale. I call it gate computations for the lack of a better word. Today, most people are somewhere around 10,000, which you would think of. A normal computer is not very much. When your iPhone does a couple of billion per minute. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:03:48): Yeah. Arvind Krishna (00:03:48): So gate computations is somebody scaling from 10,000. Are they adding a zero each year? That's the second milestone I would put. You put those two steps together, and now if you put a zero per year, that means you could be at 10,000,000 by 2029. That's remarkable. That can do some things that'll surprise the hell out of everybody. David Sacks (00:04:11): Does this reference kind of this notion of a logical qubit being kind of an error corrected operating qubit? Is that... It's about... Is is that an... Is that a a term you've adopted, logical qubits, that everyone kinda has the same milestone, the same metric? Arvind Krishna (00:04:25): I don't love the term, but I think it's a fair term to just explain to people to say, hey. If I say, I'm building a computer that's got 10,000 qubits, and they say, yeah. But they're all noisy. You're right. So if I begin to error correct, it, in some sense, decreases the effective capacity of the machine. So a logical then says, okay. What's the effective capacity of this machine is, I think, a reasonable way to look at it? So that's a that's a term that I... While I don't love, because it's not like I've taken these four things, and it's like a DRAM cell, and that's it. It's actually the whole machine is that I connected, but it's got some divide. So, essentially, in physical, maybe 200 logical. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:05:04): Nikesh, you have red teams that David Sacks (00:05:06): think about what Chamath Palihapitiya (00:05:07): is at the frontier and pushing it. Let's say that you start to see these ooms, these orders of magnitude start to compound. If you had to guess, where would your red team say are the obvious honeypots? Where do you point that if you were a bad actor? Nikesh Arora (00:05:23): If you think from the perspective of everybody here has pretty much crypto keys running across their entire IT infrastructure. It's not one thing. Everything is running with crypto keys which are encrypted. Every vendor in our space has keys at each end. So the first thing that's gonna happen is whatever is not quantum proof is gonna be breakable. So our view is you can't wait for 2029 or 2030 because it's not like one day all of us are gonna go out and say, oh, shit. Let's go burn $5,000,000,000,000 of IT infrastructure and let's go build it again in one year because now we need quantum safe infrastructure. So you should be built... You should be replacing your IT stack today with quantum safe or quantum proof infrastructure right now. Now there are technologies, there are capabilities which are already out of the market where you can start, you know, wrapping post quantum ready keys around traffic as a stop gap. So you can do that. But the time to... If he says it's twenty, twenty nine, thirty, we're already late. David Sacks (00:06:26): We're three years away. Nikesh Arora (00:06:27): Well, three years away. And I'm pretty sure everybody in this room has got few $100,000,000 of IT spend that is earmarked for this year, and I'm guessing 50% of your spend is on infrastructure that is not quantum safe. David Sacks (00:06:40): There was a pretty senior AI researcher that said we don't need wait. '29? Well, I mean, his view was actually models, AI models today can get us there before quantum computers get us there. Do you have a view on this? And I guess, you know, and and I guess it's rooted in this idea that on the frontiers of number theory, you start to develop models and proofs that are not apparent to humans today that allow us to rethink how we can effectively do code breaking. And perhaps the OpenAI math dump this week is an early indication that this might actually be a good prediction that he made. Arvind Krishna (00:07:21): Since you geeked a little bit by going down that direction, you'd excuse me if I just geek a little bit. It's not going to be possible. At the end of the day, this goes back to stuff that people like Richard Feynman did. You cannot simulate something on a different architecture and expect a more efficient result. Right. So if you take that as a thesis, quantum computers do not operate in arithmetic. Nikesh Arora (00:07:45): Right. Arvind Krishna (00:07:46): Which is what all of classical computers, including GPUs, do. Could you have an AI algorithm discover a new quantum algorithm? Absolutely. Could it run it effectively and efficiently as it is hardware? Pearson. Yes. It's not possible. So you need quantum hardware to run these things to get the positive advantage that the quantum algorithm has. Otherwise, it'll be slower by an order of a thousand or 10,000. So could you prove that it's a workable algorithm? Yes. Could you get that benefit? Unlikely. David Sacks (00:08:22): I think the argument is using... And I know we're geeking for a minute, but just using classical computing, you can actually have a different path, an arithmetic path. For example, if you had a better predictor of the distribution of prime numbers, you know, like, at the frontiers of number theory that we've not really resolved, We can start to have classical models that can start to break cryptography. Arvind Krishna (00:08:44): It is possible. The question is how long will they take? Because that's always the question. David Sacks (00:08:48): Yeah. Arvind Krishna (00:08:48): So I think it it is gonna be possible, But if it takes ten years to break one key, most people are gonna rest in peace. That's not a practical answer. That's the... That's, I think, where the debate is gonna lie, but it won't prove out until it's done. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:09:02): Let me move the conversation to something that's happening currently. I would love to get both of your takes on the following concept. There's open source. There's closed source. There's frontier. There's pacing the frontier. There's now effectively very reasonable alternatives that are open weight at a minimum. Your philosophy around the entire spectrum and just give us a sense of how we should think about models and capabilities over the next couple of years. Nikesh, you wanna Nikesh Arora (00:09:35): Sure. Look. I think earlier in the day, somebody said, don't restrict your teams in terms of capability in the experimentation phase. Don't start trying to cost optimize. Don't start trying to stitch your own in that phase because the teams who work for us, to 20,000 people, have just discovered AI in the last twelve to eighteen months. And it's not fully diffused across the organization. So if you make it harder for them to adopt, if you make it harder for them to understand, it's gonna take longer for us to be ready. So right now, we're saying, go use the best model you can find, the easiest way to use it so you can understand and can we validate the things that these things can do whether it's from an efficiency perspective, a revenue perspective, or a product perspective. That's kind of, I call it, phase one. But in phase one, what we've discovered is there's different courses for different courses. Right? What people don't understand, know, there was a moment whenever we thought the cybersecurity was gonna consumed by AI models and, you know, our lives are over because Mythos is gonna solve every problem. Well, guess what? We inspect all traffic at an endpoint at the cost of $20 a year. Right? Hundreds of megabytes of traffic per endpoint at the cost of $20.25 dollars a year because machine learning is running on your endpoint, your compute, and we run it on a 20, 30, 40 megabyte payload. Now if you want to take all that traffic, run that through OpenAI using tokens for every employee in your company, sounds like the sound of revenue. Like, OpenAI would probably generate all the revenue in one ear from one company. Arvind Krishna (00:11:07): Right. Nikesh Arora (00:11:07): So that's not a practical example of how a model would do. So what you do is you take a small language model, you compress it, you make it task specific, you keep keep training it until it gets to 99.9% accuracy and say, instead of using it, using machine learning algorithms, we're gonna use generative AI, small language models, they're gonna do that at the end. So the point is, what we're doing is we're trying to figure out what tasks requires what level of intelligence and what is the cost of that intelligence for that particular task. And you suddenly discover you don't need a Ferrari for every task. And by the way, the customers don't wanna pay for a Ferrari for every task. I'll give you the flip side. Flip side is, let's assume you're undergoing a breach. You're being attacked. You know you're being attacked. At that point in time, every customer in the room said, don't worry. You, the chairman model, need to to stop the breach because they know the business impact of that breach in the billions of dollars. At that point in time, I can run agent swarms. I can do all kinds of stuff that you want from a defensive perspective. So there, I may want to use the most up to date frontier LM and say, go think about it, reason the hell out of it, and figure out how to stop this breach, how to make this happen. So what we're discovering is you're gonna end up using Frontier LMs in unique cases where the business value that is gonna get disrupted justifies. Or you can do drug discovery if you want. I think for most practical use cases in enterprises, we're gonna end up training some version of an open source model. And I think when it comes to, even in peacetime for us, for example, running a defender model, we're most... More than likely gonna take an open rate model, use our own proprietary data, train it, manage the weights because that sort of gives us the auditability, the explainability, and the the open system. We can actually explain how that happened. Arvind Krishna (00:12:46): I completely agree, but I'm gonna take a slightly different lens to get to the same exact end conclusions. Let's take economics. So today, $20 for a million tokens for probably generation minus one, 50 if you wanna go to the most extreme. We could take one of the Chinese open rate models, take a Kimi k three, something like 800,000,000,000 parameters. And if you run your own GPUs with a little bit of optimization, but I'm talking like a week of engineering work, we could drop the cost to about a dollar to $2 for a million tokens. Which enterprise in the world will not accept a 10 times or, in this case, a 40 times cheaper answer for effectively what can do 95% of the work? Right. So I think economics is important. The second is going to be, at the end of the day, you you just talked previously about chain of thought, not just the end tokens. Speaker 5 (00:13:39): Well, Arvind Krishna (00:13:40): effectively, then you're giving away your IP if that chain of thought can be captured and logged and audited by somebody else. So so brand and IP is gonna drive people to say, I need to run the models on my own. Well, you can't run a frontier model on your own because none of them will give it to you, so then you're back to open weight. And the third is geopolitics. The best open weight models today are Chinese. By way, I think there's very little danger if you're putting them in a sandbox and running them by yourself. Sure. If you use them from a cloud, that's different. But I think that over the next year or two, I'm very doubtful that there will not be great models that come up in the West that are also open weight and that are as capable as the Chinese. The gap in these things is six to twelve months at the most. And so all those three drive me to conclude. I don't know whether it'll be 75 to 90%, but that's the range I would put. Of all token users, we'll go to open rate models for the reasons I mentioned, added to the reasons that Nikesh mentioned. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:14:35): And the token consumption that's left over, is that because you actually need it, or is that because it's a default behavior and people are too lazy to change? Arvind Krishna (00:14:45): Okay. So I'm gonna talk about developer behavior. And since I was one, I'm making fun of myself in a younger age. Developers are lazy. They're gonna use the most expensive, the most expensive answer unless you put a control on it. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:14:57): Right. Arvind Krishna (00:14:57): Because it... Chamath Palihapitiya (00:14:58): It's easy. Arvind Krishna (00:14:59): Yeah. And so that is gonna do... Take it there. So I would say if experimentation phase, you allow that to prove it works, and now I gotta put in a cheaper answer, it's probably fine. If it gets me there a lot faster. But doing it for production usage is where I am skeptical that it's of value except for a tiny number of use cases. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:15:20): In case, you were brought in as one of the small circle of people for Mythos, kind of preview it, be it their partner. I'm sure you're now doing that with OpenAI as well. When you're sitting with these guys, is part of you thinking they're looking at my business, and they're like, wow. This is a great business. Like, do do you think that's... And and what is the what is the actual technical boundaries that you expect to be respected? And the reason I ask this is we've talked to a couple of other CEOs. I think Mark Benioff does the best example of this where, you know, we've talked about ZDR, and he's been incredibly aggressive about making sure there's zero data retention and doing that on behalf of his customers. What's so interesting about these EDR and all of this stuff is, like, none of the models say that they won't generate synthetic data. It's literally not in there. You guys should look. There's all these outs. There's all these trapdoors. So I'm just wondering, like, when you're in the room, what are you thinking? David Sacks (00:16:16): When you're in the room, you Nikesh Arora (00:16:18): come out and say, these guys are not gonna get into my business. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:16:21): They're not gonna... Nikesh Arora (00:16:22): They're not gonna be able to get into my business. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:16:23): Okay. Nikesh Arora (00:16:24): Because if you think about what... When Mithos came out. Right? The we've been paying billions of dollars for encoding agents. Well, guess what? We're fundamentally... Not everybody got ZD out in coding. There's tons of people out there using Cloud Code. We have no issue about that data training the model. So we are training these models with end users doing coding. These models are getting better and better doing coding. Well, guess what? If you teach a model what model what good code looks like, it also can figure out what bad code looks like. So the first thing that Missiles did, it figured out what bad code looks like. And if you let it loose against your code, it'll tell you what is bad. What's fascinating is when it did that, even then it was fine. It was hallucinating 30% of the time. Right? But the problem is the reason Chamath Palihapitiya (00:17:08): it's Nikesh Arora (00:17:08): perfect for attackers is they just need one vulnerability. They don't need 10 vulnerabilities. If you're a defender, you need find every vulnerability and patch it. So all the people in Zoom, I think, who have been through this journey in the last twelve months is that everybody here has gone, tested them, whether with Metals or with some cousin of Metals or some open source models and discovered. Every vulnerability has to then be tested, understood, you know, figured out. And I would guess in this room, if by show of hands people say, the number is roughly sixty to eighty percent have been have been real and twenty percent have been hallucinations. So from that perspective, the models are great to be able to tell you what the vulnerability is. But I don't even think anybody in this room, if you ask them raise their hand, will tell you that they're not gonna even use Cloud Code to patch the vulnerability without having to test it again. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:17:56): I have a very random question, but it makes me think. So you're engaged to defend companies, but it now looks basically like warfare, like both of you guys. It's like warfare. And so is there something that you can learn from how war has been fought or how war is being fought, and do you do that to actually inform how the technology should behave? I don't know if this question makes sense. David Sacks (00:18:20): I Nikesh Arora (00:18:21): think to the extent that you can be better together, you can collaborate. Like, Arvind runs a program. We're now saying we're all finding vulnerabilities. Why don't we pool our vulnerabilities and find the defense ones? As opposed to every company in the room trying to go test all the open source vulnerabilities they have, figure out how to patch them, go patch them individually. So then you take some trusted parties, give us your vulnerabilities, we'll patch them, we'll distribute the patches so you can all be safe at the same time. It's kinda like how cybersecurity works today. If you find an attack technique in a different part of the world, we can take that attack technique, write machine learning code, ingest that into our product, and make sure it gets available to every customer. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:19:01): Is agentically written code error free? Arvind Krishna (00:19:03): No. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:19:04): No? Okay. Explain that. Arvind Krishna (00:19:06): So... Look. But first on your war question. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:19:08): Yeah. Arvind Krishna (00:19:08): So what Nikesh talked about is you can have powerful alliances, but the alliance effectively can become more powerful than the attacker. That's technique one. Technique two in warfare, what has been the most effective is asymmetry. And so often an attacker is cheaper than the defender, so the defender runs out of money and at some point then concedes. Or can you make defense equally cheap, in which case you can basically have symmetric warfare, and then you have a much better chance of success. And the third, which has been the way all wars have been won, is when you get technological superiority on one side. So go back to World War two, go back to Korea, go back to Iraq, go back to anyone. If you get technological superiority on one side, you tend to win. And so our goal is can we get technological superiority? And that's what Nick is referring to. Can we find vulnerabilities? Can we patch them? Can we put boundaries around them? That makes it really expensive for the other side to now try to find a way through. So that's what I would answer there. Look. At the end, will agentic code be superior to human written code? Absolutely. We can find that. We use agents and coding agents now for probably half the code that is written inside our place, and it is superior to what was being written before. But the reason it's superior is the agents can also do evals and basically make sure that everything they can find is actually fixed before it ever goes out. All that said, we're only finding all the flaws that we know how to find. And so you get into this weird loop in computer science. Okay. Do I really Chamath Palihapitiya (00:20:40): properly verifiable. Arvind Krishna (00:20:41): It's not fully verifiable because that is a task that is gonna be almost computationally infeasible right now. Now I'm not going to hold out hope that it's... Doesn't become what you were talking about in number 30 and all that. This is the task in which maybe we'll find a way to actually get to be able to verify the correctness of these things, at least in where the inputs are limited. If the input can be anything, then I think it's really hard. Right. Does that make sense? David Sacks (00:21:10): Yeah. Let me ask the implications of the points that you just made. It seems obvious to me that there isn't a world where China and The United States or the West or whomever, a bunch of international countries all hold hands and say, let's all stop AI development. That being the case, it becomes becomes a a necessity that there's an arms race, that there's a defensive or offensive superiority requisite, that there's a compute capacity requisite, that there are all of these needs that arise to protect industry, to protect our economy, to protect our jobs. Does that argument win the day with everyone that's trying to stop AI and the political conversations and the social stuff about AI needs to stop and we need to stop doing this? Does this point about the inevitability of one side having it, requiring the other side to defend it, change the the the conversation? I'd love for you guys to share any anecdotes you've had with senior party officials who might not be in power today but might be coming into power and whether they're gonna kind of have a view change around this because of that point. Nikesh Arora (00:22:20): I think it's abundantly clear that nobody's stopping. Everybody seems to be working at a frenetic base to try and make sure that they get a better, smarter, faster model. It's kind of interesting. You can take the charitable side and say, there's no technology in the world that was built where people were building security in parallel. I don't think TSA existed when they built planes. It's just like Wright Brothers say, great. We have planes. Let's figure out how to fix... Take your shoes off. Yeah. Let's risk everybody before they get on the plane. That was not what they were thinking about. Speaker 5 (00:22:56): Exactly. The explosives keep the David Sacks (00:22:58): explosives out of the shoes. Speaker 5 (00:22:59): Yes. Nikesh Arora (00:23:00): That's right. That's not what they were thinking about. So, unfortunately, we've been shown the dark side of these models and we've over rotated on the dark side of the model where now the entire conversation is about the dark side and the perils of AI and not on on the benefits of AI. I think there's a narrative problem. That notwithstanding, I don't think anybody's slowing down. I think the most likely outcome, which I think hopefully is the right outcome, is that in the world, you said it and Arvind said it Arvind Krishna (00:23:28): earlier, Nikesh Arora (00:23:29): if you build something, you're accountable for it. If you build something and unleash it, you can't unleash and say, oops, I don't know how to control it. That argument doesn't work. David Sacks (00:23:39): Yeah. Because you wrote the software. Arvind Krishna (00:23:41): Yeah. David Sacks (00:23:41): Yeah. And this whole argument that you didn't write the software, that the software was wrote itself. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:23:45): Because the engineer is gonna say, well, agent 74565 from my harness wrote it. And it's like, no. You wrote it. Arvind Krishna (00:23:51): Well, but the company still wrote it, so there's products liability the market. Nikesh Arora (00:23:55): You're a commercial enterprise. You're taking economic value in return for giving me something. You're required to abide by the responsibility the responsibility that you signed up for. Arvind Krishna (00:24:05): So I think that's... Nikesh Arora (00:24:06): In my mind, it's that simple as that. And there's enough regulation in the world, perhaps too much, to hold people accountable for stuff that they put out in the open market where they don't take responsibility. Don't take responsibility. Arvind Krishna (00:24:17): But but, David, it's actually impossible to control it unless we think the entire world is gonna sing Kumbaya and say let's slow down, which as you said is unlikely. So if that's the case, fine. You put slow down here, maybe. Well, okay. Does it mean Japan slows down? Does it mean China slows down? Does it mean India slows down? No chance. They'll say, great. You're slowing down. It gives me a chance to catch up and get ahead. So a digital technology is impossible to actually slow down, and the European example tells us. So there, you get afraid of all the possibilities. Yeah. I'm not saying the real dangers. You get afraid of all of them, and you impose regulations first. I guess it's such a vibrant tech economy there. Right? David Sacks (00:24:53): Yeah. Well, I mean, neither of you actually answered my question about conversations you've had, which... Because I'll I'll tell you a conversation I had last week in DC. I had drinks with a member of congress, pretty senior ranking guy, and the conversation had two parts to it. One is I think one of the CEOs of the biggest companies in the world is completely freaked out about cyber, and he's losing his mind and he doesn't know what to do. And I just had dinner with him, and here's all the he said. And then I also think that by q four, we might see a 50 state ban on data centers, which isn't likely, but he says, Chamath Palihapitiya (00:25:30): 50 is a big number. David Sacks (00:25:31): Big number. Nikesh Arora (00:25:32): Have 50 states ever agreed on anything in this country? David Sacks (00:25:35): No. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:25:35): Well, few things about... Nikesh Arora (00:25:37): Be amazing. David Sacks (00:25:38): Yeah. Okay. Can you get everyone together? When everyone agrees on something, you know it's not true. But I think... Nikesh Arora (00:25:44): Be like a miracle. David Sacks (00:25:45): And and it's that it's it's the fact that both of those statements are being being said by someone. So where do you think this resolves? Like, how do we resolve this path forward? Arvind Krishna (00:25:53): I'll She's good at this. Try to answer your direct question. So, look, amongst us, we have all and other members of your group have... We all had different conversations with different members of this administration, the previous administration. The senate runs longer than just one admin. Congress tends to change a lot faster. This question has been in there since 2022. The senate had closed hearings in '22. They had open hearings in '23. Congress had them. The White House had them in both admins, and they go round and round this question. The regulation question on AI and data centers is driven, I'm gonna be sorry, and cynical is driven by populism, not by any reality. If I can get more votes, should I look like I'm trying to do those things? Politics is politics. I'm not gonna say that's not real. It is real. That said, enough people also care deeply about the long term economic advantage, and so that's the balancing act that is happening. I do think we are on the correct balance right now, but I'll acknowledge an election can change where we fall on that balancing act. On data centers, I think there's no chance all 50 will ban. Is it possible 30 will ban? Yes. The remaining 20 will rub their hands in glee at that point. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:27:00): If you look geopolitically for a second, it seems like we're trending to a place of haves and have nots. Like, everybody in this room is a have. You know, you're a Western market company. You have the benefit of being able to work with guys like you, but there's a certain price of entry that may not make sense for the random pick your company anywhere else around the world. What happens then when these models are so capable and effectively free? What is the actual manifestation? I'm sure you've had to think about this in terms of how you wanna respond. So how do you how do you think about that problem, this separation of haves and have nots? Nikesh Arora (00:27:36): Look, I think Arvind said that you have to make technology so cheap that it can be easily accessible by everyone. And I think we have the opportunity of making that happen. I don't think that it's gonna be so expensive that if you can run economic enterprise, it should be possible in the envelope to be able to find a way to protect yourself. So I don't think we're gonna end up in a have, have not scenario. I think the bigger challenge which is more pertinent to people in the room is I fear that we will see fast advances in compute development in two large countries in the world. We may not see that as evenly distributed across the rest of the world. And compute is very dear right now. It's very hard to get compute to run anything thing at scale at the current moment. And the challenge is gonna be that the further away you are from the epicenter, the less likely you will have access to this computer. It's not because of economic reasons. It's purely because of supply constraints. I think that's the bigger challenge. Like, You could be a company in Europe and you have the right intentions and motivations to go and sort of innovate, optimize, and run with it. And you may just suddenly discover that because you're far away from the epicenter, you don't get access as much as companies in the Western world... In The US or perhaps in China are gonna get. Arvind Krishna (00:28:48): I think... Look. I like to look at history because it gives us some information on how these things roll out. I think this is the classic labor versus capital trade off that is happening. It happened in the seventeen hundreds. It happened again in the eighteen hundreds. It happened again in the nineteen hundreds. People who spend more on capital than worried about labor tended to win every previous one of the seven or eight cycles like this. So this is what is gonna happen this time. What Rakesh pointed out is the two nations here are also quite willing to be capital intensive. David Sacks (00:29:19): Yeah. Arvind Krishna (00:29:19): It's not as simple as this. And they're willing, at the end of the day, to concede that labor is gonna be less important. That's the way it goes... Is gonna play out. Nations that get very hung up on social and left leaning philosophies that labor has to be protected at all costs. Not that there has to be opportunity for labor, but every existing job has to be protected are the ones that are going to lose. Because I think the ones there, to Nikesh's point, is cheap enough. Somebody in one country can use the capability, but what's gonna be in their head is, hey. But does it mean there's a job loss or a job displacement? Job displacement, you should take because it may result in a better job. I think that's the social philosophy that's going to determine winners and losers here. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:30:01): I have a final question before I give it to you for the final question, but the... My final question to both of you. You mentioned this here, which was great. Can you tell the story about... I'm a huge fan of vertical integration. Huge fan. I I think, like, you know, markets swinging pendulums. And, you know, there was a world, like, even in the sixties, seventies, and eighties where there was the conglomerate, and it was a... An incredibly valuable enterprise. And it was in a time of turbulence, it was the safe harbor for capital because the conglomerate was the mechanism by which you organized. And then when you had peace and prosperity, then people disaggregated. And I think moving back to the world of the conglomerate. And you told me that you... Just back there about the vertical integration of IBM at its peak. I just wanted you to... And then Nikesh, your thoughts on vertical integration over time? Arvind Krishna (00:30:47): What Jamat and I have often talked about is the IBM main frame, which, by the way, there's a few people in the room who do use it quite well and at scale. The IBM main frame has lasted sixty five years. Why? It was vertically integrated. We did a little less right now in the sense we don't go all the way to dirt. In the sixties, we went all the way to dirt. Meaning, we found sand. We made our own wafers. We built our own fabs. We built our own chips, every single thing out to the metal that surrounded the machine. What that avoided was any IP leakage, but it allowed us to keep the profit of the complete stack in the company. Today, the only piece we don't do is the actual fab. Still the design of the chips, the design of the engineering, the resilience, the bulk of the software is inside. And that vertical integration, you've got to decide. Yeah. Of course, I'm not gonna make our own metal. You buy metal. And Right. Fabs is because of scale. But I think that vertical integration in areas which are of incredible important advantage, which goes back to the infrastructure point, the two of you were making before, is incredibly important to understand where do you want to be and where, if it's a commodity, then you should not be. Yeah. Nikesh Arora (00:31:59): But you can see that the modern day version of that is NVIDIA. Yeah. If you look at what Jensen is doing, he's a modern day version of the vertically integrated stack. And he went and bought Chamath Palihapitiya (00:32:08): Jensen is at the dirt and he's at He Nikesh Arora (00:32:10): application Chamath Palihapitiya (00:32:11): wants... Nikesh Arora (00:32:11): He understands that there's gonna be a balance between frontier models and other models. He's trying to fund everybody in the ecosystem to ensure that they don't stray from the vertical integrated stack that he's producing. And the good news is if you control the vertical stack, you can decide which part of the stack to commoditize. So you can decide to move profit between layers. And if you see that there are other people attacking a certain part of your stack, you could... They destroy the profit pool in that stack. You move the profit to the other part of the stack, and you can see that happening. Very powerful market leverage. David Sacks (00:32:39): So Chamath Palihapitiya (00:32:39): to put you on the spot, so if you look David Sacks (00:32:41): at Chamath Palihapitiya (00:32:42): the application layer today, what's the obvious vertical integration strategy that OpenAI or Anthropic should be taking, and then what's the defensive mechanism for the companies that are maybe on the receiving end of that? Nikesh Arora (00:32:54): I think you're already seeing that. And I think we're we're trivialized this conversation. We start saying open models, open weight. It's literally... It's an open stack versus a closed stack. Because I don't think... I I think at some point in time, this notion of running something like an open router become impossible. Because models are getting more and more... Each model is requiring more memory Yeah. More context, more understanding. You can't separate context and memory from the reasoning. Now if you want to separate reasoning from context and memory, then OpenRoute is only responsible of moving the reasoning tokens back and forth. So I think over time, you'll start seeing it doesn't make sense that you have a effectively end to end stack. It'll be... It's like a CPA you talked about earlier when you were chatting. So it's cost a per action. The action will require you to go and traverse the entire logic Chamath Palihapitiya (00:33:40): Right. Nikesh Arora (00:33:40): From prompt till outcome. And then memory will require or make it easier and there'll be too high of friction for you to move your task from one stack to the other stack because it has all your context and memory. And you're gonna see that. Look look at what's happening in the personal agent space. Right? If you start training a personal agent with all your context, all your APIs, all your connectivity, now you've built a moat. Because now I can't take that every day and move it to the next stack and the next stack. So I think you will find in the application layer, they're gonna have a vertical stack as well, which will go through the entire process of software, reasoning, memory, context. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:34:14): To your logical conclusion, everybody will have their own then. Yes. Because it's just the right thing to do. Nikesh Arora (00:34:19): And then brute force distribution wins again in the enterprise space. Right? You're seeing that in the consumer space, brute force distribution is gonna compete. In the next three months, every frontier lab is gonna have a full on, full court press on the Muse concept. Right? Yeah. They strived that six to nine months ago. It didn't work. They've... Now with Facebook showing us how it can work, I think pretty much everybody has it. There'll be APIs. It'll be the largest battle of consumer control. Every app that exists in the iPhone is... Has to become headless. David Sacks (00:34:50): Maybe we Nikesh Arora (00:34:51): can David Sacks (00:34:51): wrap by going from vertical integration to horizontal expansion. It's been a common business strategy and enterprise technology companies to expand horizontally through m and a, drive synergies, cross sales, and so on, and you've obviously both done it exceptionally well and executed it well. How has your view been affected in the last year... This year, let's say, in terms of valuations and multiples, cost of capital. Nikesh Arora (00:35:18): Let's talk about m and a in the context of cyber, then we can talk about m and a in the context outside of cyber. In the context of cyber, I have always maintained over the last eight years that it's silly that our customers have to buy 40 different solutions and stitch them together. We barely understand our You think you understand our and 10 other vendors worth of You can stitch it? God bless your soul. Right? So we're working as fast as we can to take disparate parts of our industry and find the way to stitch them together to have the data work together. I think that's a journey. And if you want parallels, when I started my first job was at Fidelity Investments many years ago. We had 23 systems which collectively would be called CRM today. We had master tables. We had tables that concatenate with them. We had 23 different applications that did 20 different things. Today, you go buy it off the shelf and you cringe at the cost of Salesforce or the cost of Microsoft Dynamics, Oracle, whatever you choose to do. So in thirty years, what's happened is that's consolidated to a singular platform. The customers don't stitch solutions anymore. Because what happens is these software solutions become consistent. They all become like each other. They all roughly do the same thing, and there's no differentiation. So I think the same thing is gonna happen in cyber. That's what we've tried to do. We've tried to find things that are best in their category, stitch them, make them work, so our customers don't have to do the stitching. It's like that's kind of the answer on cyber. For some reason, you know, cyber is enjoying much better valuations lately because of the AI mid horse event, which is fine, which will rationalize over time because all these guys are going go spend unlimited amounts of money on cyber. Outside of cyber, I think it goes back to the conversation, Chamath and we were having earlier about it's very hard to understand the terminal value of software. It's not clear what software is going to survive the next five to eight years with where we are from an AI perspective and the notion that product market fit is getting disrupted for many of these companies. Nikesh Arora (00:37:19): We all know with... If AI was applied well, how our current software should behave in an ideal scenario. I know what I want from half the packet software that I buy. I know if if I could have my magic wand and make it do things, I know exactly how it should work in an AI first world, which means somebody's gonna do it. So I think there's gonna be huge disruption in the SaaS space over the next few years. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:37:43): Harvind, are you looking at anything thinking, juicy multiples? Arvind Krishna (00:37:47): So so over the year, it was very attractive at the beginning, not so attractive a month ago. We'll wait and see how it goes over the next few. But, actually, I wanna build on Nikesh's thought. This is not just unique to cyber. The average enterprise uses anywhere from 500 to 5,000 distinct software vendors. In a world when you have to protect against it all, it's not just the cyber threat. That's a massive attack surface. So you have to ask yourself, could I replace 490 of them with minor AI capabilities? And do I need to go back and leverage five to 10 main platforms? That implies massive consolidation because that's where the spend goes. That's what I believe is gonna play out. So there's gonna be consolidation because if you want to keep your cost of distribution low, then they can distribute all of it. And if the value of that software is falling, then you cannot afford independent distribution for each of those. I believe that's gonna play out whether it takes six months or six years. It's somewhere inside that equation. I do think also software should be distinguished. There is software where there is a lot of interaction value, which as we have seen clearly can be replaced with a lot of AI. Both examples you used were things which were interaction rich. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:39:03): Right. Arvind Krishna (00:39:04): But if in the end you go down to, I need you to be reliable at 10 to the minus 15 Right. Which is a database lookup for somebody doing retail banking or closing the books, I think that's gonna be hard to replace that easily Right. With AI generated software. So I think there is gonna be a distinction on how easy it is Chamath Palihapitiya (00:39:25): for digital twin for years before you cut over. Arvind Krishna (00:39:28): Correct. Yeah. And then there's there's no cost advantage to do that. Chamath Palihapitiya (00:39:30): Yeah. Arvind Krishna (00:39:31): Guys, Chamath Palihapitiya (00:39:32): thank you very much. Arvind Krishna, Nikesh Arora, thank you. Thank you. David Sacks (00:39:36): Thank Thanks, everybody. All of you.

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