嘉宾访谈·中文精读

AppLovin CEO 亚当·福鲁吉:挺过 92% 回撤,广告即机器学习 1.0,与 500 亿美元游戏广告市场

Adam Foroughi, Applovin CEO: Surviving a 92% Drawdown, Ads as ML 1.0 & the $50B Game Ad Market

AppLovin CEO 讲述 IPO 暴跌后如何做自己最好的投资人,隐私新规与苹果打压下广告怎样变成机器学习,以及精简团队对抗巨头的方法。

官方音频00:00 / --:--

本期章节点时间可跳到音频对应位置

  1. 0:00亚当·福鲁吉加入 Besties!
  2. 3:07发现与搜索之别,以及你的手机在偷听吗?
  3. 10:04IPO 受挫与成为自己最好的投资者
  4. 16:00隐私规则、苹果的打压与智能体如何改变人们的购物方式
  5. 20:00精简团队如何击败巨头、利润率护城河与在中国构建
中文精读由 AI 基于原始节目改写,非官方翻译,可能存在偏差或错误;观点归属与表述以原音频与官方文稿为准。说明

2022 年,AppLovin 的市值一度跌到 38 亿美元。同一年,这家公司做出了 10 亿美元的 EBITDA。

按当时那个价格算,市场给它的估值不到 4 倍。而它 2021 年 4 月上市时,市值是 280 亿美元,对应 6 亿美元的 EBITDA。一年多时间,估值倍数从 50 倍砸到 4 倍以下,股价从最高点往下掉了九成多。

创始人兼 CEO 亚当·福鲁吉(Adam Foroughi)把这整段经历在 All-In 上重新讲了一遍。他的公司叫 AppLovin,中文互联网上聊它的人不多,自动转写把它记成了「Apple 11」,听起来也毫无违和感。

AppLovin 做的事情说起来简单:它的广告平台藏在成千上万款手机游戏里,用深度学习模型预测谁会点哪条广告。它自己平台上一年处理大约 200 亿美元的广告支出,而按杰森在开场时的说法,这家公司今年「大概会印出 60 亿美元的现金」。

每天 10 亿人玩的游戏里,藏着一个 500 亿美元的广告市场

亚当解释他为什么选了这个赛道。每天有超过 10 亿人玩休闲手游,这些人是成年人,是家里做消费决策的那个人。这跟很多人想象中「小年轻打游戏」的画面完全是两回事,规模也是另一个量级。

他提到,公司两年前披露过,自己平台上一年的广告支出是 110 亿美元。此后以每年约 60% 的速度增长,粗算到今天差不多是 200 亿。把其他广告平台在这个生态里的收入也算进来,整个移动游戏广告市场大约是一年 500 亿美元。

作为参照,社交媒体广告在不久之前也才是个 500 亿美元的市场。

这个生意最特殊的地方,是用户对广告本身的态度。在游戏里看 30 秒广告换一条命,这是一次有货币价值的交换。当算法能把这条广告变成他真正感兴趣的东西时,用户的抱怨会少很多。亚当说,他们见过大量用户主动去玩广告里那些小游戏的试玩版。

广告是机器学习 1.0

查马斯问了一个更宏观的问题:上一波互联网广告催生了 Google 的 AdWords、AdSense、Applied Semantics 这一整套技术,它们后来扩散到了整个互联网。这一代广告是不是也在孕育类似的东西?

亚当的回答是:广告就是机器学习的 1.0。今天驱动 AI 的那些技术,最早的应用场景就是广告系统。

他承认,一个大语言模型对整个社会的经济价值比广告大得多。但广告是深度学习模型一种利润率极高的实现方式。推荐系统和 LLM 的结构不一样,走的轨迹却很像:LLM 领域的研究可以搬到推荐系统,反过来也成立,很多做 LLM 的研究者,职业生涯早期看的就是广告系统。

做广告生意的便利之处在于,模型每做一次预测,价值可以立刻被折算成钱。你预测一次点击或者一次转化,马上就知道这次预测值多少。

查马斯接着追问了一个更接地气的问题:人对广告的反应,2026 年和 2006 年相比,是不是发生了某种演化性的变化?

亚当 2005 年入行,他记得当年的广告长什么样:全是垃圾式的投放,技术根本不够用。转折点是 Facebook 发现,如果能把手上的数据配上足够好的模型,广告可以变得非常相关。今天大多数人的购物灵感来自 Instagram,广告已经长得像内容了。

搜索是收尾,发现才是生意

OpenAI 有了广告产品,Google 的搜索界面正在被 AI 改造,很多人担心广告这门生意的底层逻辑要变。亚当把它拆成两类。

一类是漏斗底部的广告。消费者已经知道自己要买什么,只是在做研究、完成交易。这是 Google 搜索的生意。现在你也可以打开一个大模型,让它把同一件事闭环。所以这类广告的竞争对手基本上只有 Google 搜索。这里有个关键:就算大模型不存在、Google 广告从未出现过,只要有搜索,这笔交易本来也会发生。这一类广告带来的经济增量其实很小。

另一类是发现。用户在看广告之前,根本不知道自己需要那个东西。这是 Meta 的生意,也是 AppLovin 在做的事。

你给消费者看一个他完全不知道存在的东西,让他「哇,这个挺酷」,然后马上去下单。这才创造经济增量。(亚当·福鲁吉)

他描述了这个链条的完整形状:用户下单、等包裹、拆包裹,整个过程都有情绪回报。这笔消费是凭空长出来的,不是从别的地方挪过来的。

手机没有偷听你,但广告确实在拼图

有个流传很久的猜测:中午吃饭聊到某个东西,下午就刷到了它的广告,是不是手机在偷听。

亚当说不是。他给了两个理由。第一,精确追踪用户位置再渲染广告,是一项数据量极大、成本极高的工程。第二,把麦克风内容实时传上去解析、再翻译成广告,同样不现实。

他给的解释更朴素:你在别的地方留下了可追踪的动作。搜过、逛过网页、查过产品,你自己都不记得了。然后你随口说了一句相关的话,再看到广告,就会觉得它在偷听。

真正会起作用的是关系数据。如果你和某个人在同一个社交网络里有关联,他搜过的东西可能会影响你看到什么。亚当不觉得这有什么问题。

他承认「诡异感」确实存在,也会让人害怕。但在这么大的广告体量下,各家收集的数据,管理方式其实相当统一。他想提醒的另一件事是,广告变相关之后创造的经济价值是实实在在的。「你今天看到的那条广告,你能认出它是什么。20 年前你根本认不出来。」他补了一句:数字广告经济现在占 GDP 的很大一块,这些技术越好,GDP 增长越快。

从 280 亿到 38 亿,他做的第一件事是买回自己的股票

AppLovin 的总部在帕洛阿尔托,亚当自己住在洛杉矶,早期没有怎么融 VC 的钱。2021 年 4 月上市,280 亿美元市值,6 亿美元 EBITDA,最高冲到过 400 亿。2022 年股价几乎每天都在跌,一路跌到 38 亿市值。

亚当对这件事的复盘是金融式的:你的股价由你的投资者的质量决定。

疫情期间上市的公司太多,轮到 AppLovin 出去的时候,蓝筹投资人已经没有精力去研究这家名字很蠢的公司到底是干什么的。结果是需求端没人,供给端一堆人想卖:早期的私募投资人、已经离职的联合创始人,还有手里持有股票的员工。这个结构决定了股价只能往下走。

他的反应是:不再跟投资人说话了,他们又不买我们的股票,浪费时间。但公司手里有大量现金,那就买自己的股票,做自己最好的投资人。

后来他们回购了大约 60 亿美元的股票,注销了 20% 到 25% 的流通股。这笔钱在股价高点时值 500 多亿美元。

主持人问:这个判断是一开始就这么清醒,还是中间也经历过一段「天哪我们该怎么办」的时期。

92% 的回撤,怎么稳住一支团队

亚当说很难。他会接到家人和朋友的电话,问他是不是想自杀。他自己的回答是:我们持有这些股票的成本几乎是一美分,就算跌成这样还剩 10 块钱,账面依然是赚的。

但问题在于,团队会接到同样的电话,而他们没有 CEO 这个位置带来的定力,持股比例也没那么多。

他用的办法是把局面重新定义成「我们对抗全世界」,同时发了一份业绩股票计划。这种计划通常只给 CEO,他们把它铺给了公司里的关键人物:现在确实很难,你以为到手的房子可能没了,但只要你留下来,等我们恢复,上行收益会非常大。

真正让公司翻身的是技术。2023 年 4 月,他们把推荐系统从回归模型换成了深度学习模型。这家公司的收入完全由广告算法驱动,算法越好,广告主在平台上的回报越好,投入就越大,而且一切按效果付费。

但那段时间他们依然不跟投资人沟通,外面没人知道发生了什么。直到 2023 年 9 月,亚当去了一趟纽约,当时股价 80 美元,他说「我要开始跟投资人聊聊了,市值已经涨到我们不能随便回购的位置」。那一周股价从 80 涨到 150,市值从 280 亿变成 550 亿。

他说坐在那些会议室里,很容易看出对面在想什么:有人在桌子底下给朋友发消息,赶紧买。

后来事情走到了另一个极端。股价从 9 美元涨到 750 美元,用了两年半,市值从 38 亿到 2500 亿。有人在最低点买了期权,现在大概住在大房子里。

他对公开市场投资人的评价是:和私募市场没什么本质区别,都跟着趋势走,而且往往比你想的要晚。最聪明的那批人抓得早,这就是为什么有好的 VC 和一般的 VC,有好的二级投资人和一般的二级投资人。

隐私新规落地之后,用户开始抱怨广告变差了

Apple 的 ATT、欧盟的监管,都直接压缩了 AppLovin 这类公司的数据空间。亚当的态度是欢迎规则清晰:规则写清楚了,技术就能应对。

他给了一条具体的因果链。五年前在 iOS 上你可以精确地给一个用户投广告,现在不允许了,你就只能把一群不那么相似的人打包投放,结果就是给他们看更差的广告。

执行之后发生了什么?大量用户投诉,说广告变得很垃圾,要求看更相关的内容。

亚当的逻辑是:消费者其实想要相关的广告,因为这帮他发现自己想要的东西。你在游戏里花 30 秒看一条广告换一条命,这 30 秒是有货币价值的。既然要付出这 30 秒,你是愿意看垃圾,还是愿意看一个跟你有关的东西?

他说这一轮隐私争议的噪音过去之后,剩下的是一段平静期:规则写好了,技术公司也适配了,而深度网络足够强,能处理这些限制。

买下游戏公司,买的是训练数据

AppLovin 曾经自己买过游戏工作室,后来全部卖掉了。

亚当说那本质上是一笔数据交易。他们做第一个深度学习模型时需要训练数据,而游戏工作室一般不愿意把数据分享给第三方公司。所以只能自己买工作室,把训练数据灌进第一个模型。

模型做出来,效果在市场里验证成功,公司开始快速增长。第三方看到效果,主动找上门来合作。于是游戏业务就卖掉了。

Agent 会替你订补剂,但不会替你逛街

如果未来每个人都有一个 agent 替自己办事,购物入口从手机和电脑变成眼镜或者别的东西,广告会变成什么样?

亚当的答案分两半。一部分人会用 agent 来处理那些重复的、可优化的消费行为,比如每个月的补剂订阅,让 agent 自动比价、按时下单。这部分会真实发生。

但发现型消费不是这样。典型的消费者,不是那种天天泡在 Twitter 上追新技术的人。他打了个比方:

我们的受众是《纽约时报》的读者。今天依然有大量的人在天天用雅虎的产品。(亚当·福鲁吉)

普通消费者想买一个东西,是想逛、想比较、想走完下单流程、想盯着物流。如果事后有人告诉他,其实 agent 可以帮你省 20%,在一笔 50 美元的交易上,这句话没有意义。因为逛和买的过程中那一份多巴胺,正是他享受的东西。

他觉得科技圈的一个常见毛病是过度放大 Twitter 上的世界,忘了普通人不是那样生活的。

两个最聪明的巨头在同一个赛道,它怎么赢的

Meta 和 Alphabet 有全世界最好的工程师,广告收入占它们营收的大头,这件事他们做了十年二十年。一个几百人的公司凭什么在这种赛道上活下来还做大?

亚当的答案分两层。第一层是心态:

我们从来都不觉得自己赢了。每天早上醒来,我们默认自己马上要被人干掉,所以最好拼命干活。(亚当·福鲁吉)

第二层是结构:公司足够精简,里面的人都是这件事上的专家,只盯着一件事,就是把游戏里的注意力转化成交易行为。他的判断是,只要能极度专注、保持精简,就能比巨头跑得快。

一位主持人换了个更硬的角度问:这门生意的钱会从哪里漏出去,或者反过来说,利润率还有多少扩张空间?当年亚马逊的长期逻辑就是,那些看起来在漏钱的业务,最后都长成了新业务。

亚当的回答很直接:我们的 EBITDA 利润率是 84%,全市场第一,我不太确定还能从哪里漏。

他解释了这套模式的运转方式。广告主进来,带着一个交易模型,比如卖口红。平台给他的是套利:他从这里买到一个消费者,这个消费者当场转化,广告主立刻就收回了获客成本。20 美元的口红,他付给平台的钱低于 20 美元减去销货成本,他是赚的,于是他加预算。整个过程按效果付费,可以无限放大。

至于「漏」的部分,他说他们不在完整链条上:平台不是广告主本身,但要让广告主能见到消费者。因为运营极度精简,极度依赖算法和自动化,中间没有太多环节可以漏钱。

然后是那个绕不开的质疑:85% 的 EBITDA 利润率意味着「赚太多了」,理论上应该有竞争者愿意用 60% 甚至 50% 的利润率把这部分利润抢走。

但它没有发生。亚当的解释是,这类技术非常复杂,如果你能持续创新、并且拥有别人拿不到的数据,优势就会累积起来。他顺手举了个看起来不相关的例子:按这个逻辑,Anthropic 不应该在大模型领域一路领先。但一个模型一旦到了某个规模、被一大群人用上,它本身就变成了一道别人很难跨过去的护城河。

帕洛阿尔托、北京和新加坡

AppLovin 的工程团队分布在帕洛阿尔托、北京和新加坡。主持人问中国团队带来的优势是什么。

亚当的评价是:中国人非常谦逊、非常勤奋、非常聪明。不管是在中国、美国还是世界上哪个地方,能和这样的人一起工作,你就是和最聪明的一群人在一起。

他说自己创业时定下的目标之一,就是跟优秀的人一起共事,然后把事情搞明白。他描述自己在会议里的状态:

我坐在那个房间里,知道我大概是最笨的那个人,这件事让我很兴奋。(亚当·福鲁吉)

可以带走的几条

  • 看一家暴跌的公司,先问它的收入是不是由可以量化的算法驱动。如果是,股价和业绩的背离可能是机会,但前提是你能判断技术有没有真的换代。AppLovin 的反转点在 2023 年 4 月的模型切换,不在任何一个季度的财报里。
  • 回购是管理层最诚实的信号之一。一家公司在低谷期注销掉 20% 到 25% 的流通股,这个动作比任何业绩指引都更有信息量。
  • 「手机在偷听」这条传言,真正的机制是可追踪行为加关系数据,不是麦克风。搞清楚差别,比转发恐慌有用。
  • 做产品或做增长的人,可以从搜索和发现这个切分里拿到东西:承接已经存在的需求,和创造一个原本不存在的需求,经济增量完全不在一个量级。
  • 讨论 agent 的时候,别拿推特用户的行为去推断普通消费者。能被 agent 优化的,是重复、标准、可比较的消费;不能被优化的,是过程本身就是回报的那部分消费。
  • 小公司对抗巨头的可用策略只有三条:选一个足够窄的口子、保持精简、跑得比对方快。亚当的原话是,每天都假设自己马上要被人干掉。
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(00:00:00) Adam is probably the best founder no one's ever heard of. There's an ad platform hiding inside 100,000 mobile games and is quietly outperforming Facebook ads for e-commerce brands. Of all those 1,000 plus IPOs, the number one most valuable is Apple 11. Apple 11 CEO, Adam Perugui. The founder mentality has got to be Chase winning. They're going to print something like $6 billion in cash this year. In a world where things don't make sense, people think you're cheating. Instead of realizing you built one of the cooler technologies the world's ever seen. Please welcome Adam Perugui. Welcome Adam. Hey man. (00:00:45) Hey man. How you doing bro? Good to see you. Likewise. Adam, thanks for being here. We thought it'd be really great to chat because a lot of people don't talk as much about, you're not in the headlines all the time with your business. You're operating your business almost like absent media. You don't do a lot of press. You don't get out there a lot talking about the company. But it's such an incredible business. Can you just tell the audience kind of what Apple 11 is? And maybe also frame up the market a little bit for us? Yeah, totally. I think the fact that we were able to build a very big company without having VC funding at the early stage created this world where we just had to build quietly. And then obviously the goofy name didn't help us all that much as well. But what we are ultimately is an advertising company that's helping mobile game developers monetize that space. (00:01:32) Now what people don't realize is just how big the mobile gaming universe has become. You've got over a billion people a day playing mobile casual games. These are all adults, heads of households. And the scale of the opportunity is just humongous. We disclosed last January, so nearly two years ago, that on our own platform there was $11 billion a year of ad spend. Since then we've grown 60% year over year roughly. And so if you gross that up to a nice round number today, you get $20 billion. Now we're not the only player in this marketplace. This is a market that's monetized by a lot of other ad companies as well. So then you'd probably more than double that again and round it off and say there's probably about $50 billion of advertising being spent every single year in this mobile gaming ecosystem. (00:02:18) It was not very long ago that social was a $50 billion opportunity. Space is growing really quickly. A lot of audience. These people watch ads. A lot of times they watch the ads to get rewards. And so that dynamic creates this possibility to create intent. For most of the company's life, we've been creating that intent to drive a user to take one game's experience and go to the next game's experience. And what's really gotten investors excited about our company and just us excited about the opportunity that we have in front of us is that deep learning models have gotten so powerful now that you could take that same space and try to take that adult and give them a shopper behavior experience. And that allows us to tap into much larger economies, make more of an economic impact in the world. (00:03:04) And that's why our team's just really, really pumped up on what we're doing. The first wave of internet advertising was in many ways the spark for a lot of critical technologies that then sort of diffused out into the world. So like if you think what Google was able to do with AdWords, AdSense, Applied Semantics, all of that whole range of technology. Is that true in this generation of internet advertising? Are there technologies and things that are being birthed here that are consequential and foundational now to the rest of the internet? Yeah, I mean, advertising is like ML 1.0, but really was the first implementation of all these technologies that now are driving AI today. And the economic value of a large language model and what it's doing in our society today is (00:03:50) much greater than advertising. But advertising is a very profitable implementation of a deep learning model. Now, recommendation systems are structured differently than large language models, but in a lot of ways they follow the same trajectory. So a lot of the research that's being done in the space in the large language model space can port to recommendation systems. And vice versa, a lot of the researchers in the large language model space might have started early in their careers looking at advertising systems. So these two spaces are really related. The nice thing about our business and any advertising business is that when you build a model, you're predicting a future outcome, an advertisement, or if you're building a social network, an engagement post or a sequence of them. But you can translate the value of that prediction immediately. Is it true that there's just a broad-based behavior around humans' reaction to ads in 2026 (00:04:41) versus 2006? Has there been an evolutionary arc that's very predictive? Yeah, it's interesting. I started my career in 2005. So I saw the ads back then. Complete garbage. It was all spam. And the technologies just weren't powerful enough. And your old company, Facebook, did a really good job of realizing if you can take all the data we have in front of us and pair it with good technology, the ads can become really relevant. And if you talk to most people who shop today, most of their shopping recommendations are coming from Instagram. The ads have become very much like content. And in our domain as well, people love the ads that we show. And you would think people wouldn't like them, but we see tons of engagement on little mini games that are appearing in other games. And people are playing these previews because the technologies have gotten so good at recommending (00:05:28) something relevant to someone. There's been a lot of hand-wringing about the impact AI will have on the ad networks, specifically Google's interface. And OpenAI has an ad product now. I'm sure you've been monitoring it and trying to learn from it. What is advertising going to look like when people are doing five or six queries with a chat bot? Because it's pretty obvious 95% of the world are not going to pay $20 a month for this technology. They're going to expect it to be free. free. Chat GPT has already said they're going to make it free. Tell us what they're doing in advertising. And is it going to be less effective each time? But in aggregate, people are going to use it more? Or is it going to just be even better than Google Search's franchise? Yeah. I mean, there's two sides of advertising. (00:06:15) One part of it is bottom-of-funnel advertising, where a consumer sort of knows what they want to buy, but they're doing research to go complete the transaction. And that's Google's search business. If I wanted to buy a pair of dress shoes, go to Google historically, do some research, and they direct me to where I need to go based on the ads. And today, you can go to a large language model and close the loop on that same thing. So that ads model is almost going to exclusively compete with the Google Search business. What we operate in is a world where we're showing a user an ad, and we don't know what their intent is. So we're trying to create something that didn't exist before. Show them a recommendation and get them to go, wow, that looks really cool. Let me go transact on that and do it really quickly. That's what drives Facebook's ad business, too. And so the reason that's interesting to me is that the transaction via search or LLM was (00:07:05) going to happen anyways. If the LLM didn't exist and Google Ads had never come to existence, but Google Search existed, that transaction, the closed loop, would have happened. So there's not actually a whole lot of economic expansion that happens from that. But when you show a consumer an ad for something that they had no idea existed, they didn't know they needed to buy. Discovery, basically. Totally. Complete discovery. And this is what makes Meta so amazing in their ad business and what we aspire to do. You create that discovery moment. Not only is it a really fun moment for the consumer, because then they're excited about what they bought. They wait for the package. They're excited to open it up. But you create economic expansion. Talk about the arms race that develops over time, where some people say, you know, I mentioned something with my friends at lunch, and all of a sudden they show up and there are these (00:07:53) ads on Meta or wherever. Is that just us overreacting? Or is that actually happening? And is there a push, not to be more, not intrusive, but you know, like the tendency to want to sell more. That's creepy. Yeah. It feels creepy when it does happen. Or just to push the boundaries, Adam. Like what is actually happening when people say, I say something at lunch and all of a sudden an ad for that same thing appears? I mean, I think you've done other actions that are trackable, like do a search, browse a website, do a product search, and you don't realize it. And then you say something related to, and you start seeing ads that are relevant. So it's not like the mic is on or there's an app that has actually taken snippets. Well, wait, there's a theory though, that if we were all at lunch, especially with these apps, you know our geolocation, you've kind of put us into a group. (00:08:40) So we might be talking about this new car we're all interested in or watch. And then Freberg, when he's leaving, searches for the watch to bookmark it after the conversation. But you're tracking all of our locations. And then you say, okay, let's give all four of them the ads for the watch. And you're mix and matching based on... Is that what's happening? That's what I'm told is happening. I don't think advertising companies can track locations. So we don't track location at all. It's a really heavy concept to track people's precise location to then render an ad. And then to imagine the amount of data that's transferring of your mic on to then parse the mic on content to try to translate to an ad. Not realistic. But what about us being friends and being connected together, like groups? So we wouldn't have that data. But if you're on a social network, of course, your relationships together might drive an (00:09:28) ad experience. If Chamath searches for something, then you might see something relevant to it. There's nothing wrong with that. I mean, the one thing that people lose, there's a creepy factor that scares people somewhat. But all of the data collected at this point, given the scale of advertising across all these companies, is pretty much controlled in a lot of ways. What people then forget is the economic value that's created from these ads becoming that relevant. That ad that you saw, you recognize that ad. 20 years ago, you would not have recognized the ad. And there's a big part of GDP that's now coming from this digital ad economy. The better these technologies get, faster GDP growth. Adam, let's just go back to the, because what I find so fascinating about the business is the way you've operated it. You're based in LA. (00:10:13) Is that right? I'm based in LA. A company started in Silicon Valley. We're in Palo Alto. Palo Alto. But you're here. And then you have a lot of developers in China. Is that right? We have, our engineering offices are in Palo Alto, Beijing and Singapore. And then the company didn't raise a lot of venture money. You take the company public, 2021, it went public, like 20 billion market cap out the gate. Yeah, we were COVID IPO. We went out in April 2021. It was about $28 billion. $28 billion. And then in 2023, what did the market cap collapse to? Well, this is the funny thing about the public market. So we went out in 2021, $600 million of EBITDA, $28 billion market cap. We got as high as $40 billion. And then in 22, the stock went down literally every day. We got to about a $3.8 billion market cap. (00:11:02) And that year, we did a billion dollars in EBITDA. That's incredible. So hold on. So let's just go through this. So the market's in disbelief for some reason about the business. And what do you do? Yeah, what you learn pretty quickly, and I'm a finance background, so I had good education on this, is that your price in the markets is determined by the quality of your investors. And we had private market investors, both private equity and ex-co-founders and other team members that were going to sell when we went in public. And because there were so many companies going public during COVID, by the time we went out, blue chip investors weren't doing the research to figure out what is this goofy named company. So we ended up with no demand and a lot of supply. And that construct created this world where we just tanked. And multiple went from fairly high, I mean, I wouldn't really value companies on 50 times EBITDA, (00:11:53) but to something that was absurdly low, sub four times. So being that finance-minded person, you have to remember, with that kind of a bashing, you do have an opportunity on the other side of it. And I turned internal to the team and said, I'm not going to talk to investors at all anymore. They're not buying our stock. It's a waste of time. But guess what? We generated a ton of cash. Let's start buying our own stock. Let's become our best investor. So we kicked off a super aggressive buyback program. And since then, I think we bought roughly $6 billion of the company's stock, retired 20% to 25% of the shares outstanding. At peak, that $6 billion was worth over $50 billion. And so you can take that moment, which does feel super depressing, (00:12:39) and turn it into a huge offer. How did you manage the- Sorry, did you feel that way from the whole time? Or was there this period of depression where you're like, oh my gosh, what are we going to do? Yeah, that's what I was going to ask. How do you manage the internal culture when the stock is off 92%? It's tough. I mean, I'll tell you, I would get phone calls from family members, friends, are you suicidal? And I'm like, look, we got stock at a penny. The stock's still like $10. It's still up a lot. But it's very tough then because you realize as a CEO, your team is getting those same phone calls from their family members. And they don't have the gravitas that you do, nor the ownership. So we built it by just saying, look, it's an us against the world mentality. Everyone's turned against us. We're going to buy back shares. And we implemented a performance stock plan, which typically goes to CEOs. (00:13:27) But we did it across key people in the company and said, you know, we understand it's tough right now. We understand you thought you had a house and now you don't. But if you dig in and we recover, you're going to make a ton on the upside. And then what happened? Investors started showing up and saying, hey, we're paying attention again. It was interesting because for us, what happened was we went from ML 1.0, like we talked about a couple minutes ago, to ML 2.0. We went from a regression model to a deep learning model. And the outcome was we're driven by our advertising algorithm. The better it works, the better advertiser return is on our platform. And everything is performance-based. So we're selling revenue to advertisers, the more they scale. And so the company just started growing really quickly. Now, we turned into 23 and launched that model in April. (00:14:14) We still weren't talking to investors. So people hadn't found out. And then it was somewhere around, I think, September of 23 that I went to New York and I said, the stock's now like 80 bucks. And we'd recovered quite a bit because the performance was good. But I said, I'm going to start talking to investors because market cap's getting high enough. And we can't really buy back all that aggressively anymore. And in that week, the stock went from 80 to 150. And I think it was like 28 billion to 55 billion. From you being in New York. From me just going out and saying, hey, our company still exists. We survived this disaster. Ebitda grew. Yeah, and then people like, I'd sit in the meetings and do, like, it's pretty easy to read the other side of the room if you do that kind of thing, sell your company. I'd sit in the meetings and I'm like, these people are literally calling their friends in the room going, bye, bye, bye, bye, bye. (00:14:59) And I was like, ah, this is pretty good. And then what's the opposite side of that? Once they're long, are they now asking you, okay, Adam, how do we expand? How do we grow faster? Why just games? Why not e-commerce? Why not this? Why not that? Absolutely. Damned if you do, damned if you don't. So, unfortunately, not a lot of people are contrarian. So, you can go to the extreme down and then on the other side of it, you can go extreme up too. We ended up going from $9 to $750 a share in a matter of two and a half years. And so, like, it was like a $3.8 billion market cap. Some people bought some options back then. They were probably living in some massive homes. And we got to $250 billion market cap. So, extreme on both ends. We've now settled into a place where we have a lot of excitement about our growth opportunities. But I've found public market investors are not all that different than private market investors. (00:15:47) They follow trends, but a lot of times later than you'd want. The most sophisticated hit those trends early. And that's why you have really good VCs and you have average VCs. You have really good public market investors. You have average public market investors. Maybe you could talk a little bit about privacy. Apple, the EU, really, or look at companies like yours. And this is a little too aggressive in terms of the data you're collecting. Some video game developers don't like having data collected on their users. And they've tightened the screws a bit. Zuckerberg had to deal with it specifically. So, what's the headwind on this business? And how do you manage privacy when Apple really is trying to, let's call it what it is, they're trying to neuter your business? Well, look, in any of these spaces, you want the regulations to be clear. (00:16:34) So, once they're clear, technology can deal with them. And so, if you could precisely target a user five years ago on iOS and today, someone says, I don't want you to precisely target me, you group them in a bunch. And you serve them a worse advertisement. Now, the funny outcome of that is we'll get a lot of complaints after that change that Apple made from users that say, serve me more relevant ads. You're showing me a bunch of spam. So, there is this notion that you need privacy regulation so that technology companies can do exactly what's expected of them. On the other side, consumers do want relevant ads. It helps them discover products. If you're sitting there in a game and you're watching an ad for 30 seconds to get a free life, you're getting something that has monetary value. Now, if you're doing that, do you want to sit and watch garbage for 30 seconds? (00:17:20) Or do you want to watch something relevant? And so, what's happened since a lot of the privacy noise is a lot of calm. The rules were written. Technology companies have adopted. And deep learning networks are really powerful. They can deal with it. What happens with this? The consumer. I just want to do one quick follow-up. Yeah. With this amazingly profitable business, I think you dabbled in buying some of the games. And we have Bending Spoons coming on today to talk about their aggressive acquisition of not bad businesses, but let's call them slower growth businesses that maybe venture isn't interested in. Is that going to be a sustainable plan for you to become a game studio? And does that put you in conflict with the partners? Yeah. We sold all those games. We bought them originally as a data play. When we built our first deep learning model, we needed to have data to train it. (00:18:09) And game studios don't tend to want to share data to third-party companies. So we bought our own studios. We seeded the training data in our first model. We built a model that was really successful in market. We started growing really quickly. Once we started doing that, third parties were coming in. And that was that. You divested the game. And we divested that. What's the world of advertising look like where there's agents everywhere? Agents are servicing you. Maybe the human interface to compute changes. So it's not necessarily a computer that you're typing on or a phone that you're browsing. Maybe it's the Meta glasses or some other device. What role does the ad play? And what happens in this agentic commerce that so many other people are trying to now push into existence? Yeah, I mean, I think the reality is part of the world will start using things like agents to optimize certain shopper behavior that's consistent. (00:19:01) For instance, I might put my supplement subscription into an agent and have it optimized every single month and deliver on time. But these discovery platforms aren't that. And the typical shopper is not the person who's deep into agents and sitting on Twitter and adopting the latest technology. I sort of say, like, our audience is the New York Times audience. There's still a ton of people using Yahoo properties every single day. The typical shopper wants to find a product and wants to actually go through that shopper behavior. They want to window shop. They want to go through the transaction experience. They want to compare, probably. Totally. They want to track it. And if you told them after the fact, hey, an agent could have done this for you and saved you 20%, I don't think that matters on a $50 transaction. Because a dopamine hit from going through it is what they enjoy. (00:19:47) So I think there is this part of the world that is technologically advanced that's going to adopt these technologies. I just don't think – I think we really over-index on the Twitter-verse and forget that the average shopper is not that. Adam, let me just try and understand how you won. Because two of the smartest companies in the world with the best engineers, Meta, Alphabet, Google, make most of their revenue from advertising. They've built their own models. They've been doing it now for one to two decades. How did a small company compete in this particular domain and win? And what's the operating model that you think gives you an advantage to continue winning? Yeah, I mean, here's something that helped us get to this point. We never think we won. (00:20:34) We think every day we wake up and we're probably going to get screwed right now and we better work hard. And so you've got a company that's lean with a lot of subject matter experts who are really, really focused on this thing, this mobile gaming experience and translate it into transactional behavior on the other side. And so I think there's this ability to take on giants if you're very focused, you remain lean, and you can just move faster than them. What's the leakage in the business then? So meaning when you look at a P&L, you know, we did this, I did this thing with Amazon a decade ago where it's like you look at all of these places in which they were leaking and our big insight is, wow, they just absorb these things and they'll become the new businesses. And that was our long thesis for Amazon. Yeah. (00:21:19) So what's that version for you? Like there must be, is it payment infrastructure? Is it other kinds of things? Jason asked you about apps, but I guess you've divested that. So where's the leakage? Or said differently, where's the opportunity for margin expansion so that people underwrite this thing? Well, our EBITDA margins, I think, are number one in the market. It's 84%. So I don't know how much leakage we have. Yeah, given the metric. But the way to think about it is, Advertiser comes into our platform and they have a transactional model. Let's say they're selling lipstick. We give them an arbitrage. They buy the, they from us are buying the consumer. That consumer transacts. And they cover the cost of the consumer immediately. So the consumer buys the lipstick for 20 bucks. They pay us less than the 20 bucks minus cost of goods sold. They're happy. They scale up. And that performance model is very scalable. (00:22:05) Now, our leakage is we're not the full chain. We're not the advertiser in the equation. But we want to power the advertisers to meet the consumer. And we've run extremely lean and been so algorithmically focused and automation focused that we haven't had a lot of points of leakage. The other side then is when you have 85% EBITDA margins, people say, wow, they could be over earning. Right. That's the classic phrase. And then you have competition that says, I can compete Adam's margins away. I'm willing to do this at 60% or 50%. But sort of maybe as a corollary to David's question, that hasn't really happened. And it's been incredibly sustained. Yeah. And why do you think that is? Because these technologies are really complex. And if you can innovate and you have differentiated data, you can build an advantage. I mean, by that token, Anthropic shouldn't be running away with the large language model space. (00:22:52) But the power of a model that then reaches a point of scale and gets adopted by a large scale community becomes something that is a moat that is hard for other people to overcome. And talk to us about the team in China and how big of an edge these folks are. I mean, Chinese people are very humble. They're very, very hardworking. They're very sharp. And if you can work with them, whether out of China or United States or any other part of the world, you're working with some of the brightest minds in the world. And so when I started the business, one of my goals at this company was just work with great people and figure things out. And so when I sit in a room with some of the people on my team, I know I'm probably the dumbest person in that room. And that gets me excited to show. Got it. (00:23:38) It gets me to show up for the pod every week. How do you feel when you hear that? Works for me. All right. Let's give it up for Adam. Yeah. Adam, thanks, bro. That was great. Thanks, man. Thanks, man. It was great seeing you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

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